Jak (vy)povídá komunita ve Faulknerově "Růže pro Emily": studie narativní techniky by Krtička, Filip
- 1 - 
UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE – FILOZOFICKÁ FAKULTA 
 








Telling Community in William Faulkner´s “A Rose for Emily”: A Case Study in 
Narrative Technique 
 













Vedoucí diplomové práce (supervisor): 
PhDr. Hana Ulmanová, PhD, M.A. 
 
Praha, srpen 2013  
Zpracoval (author): 
Filip Krtička 





- 2 - 
Prohlašuji, že jsem diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně, že jsem řádně 
citoval všechny použité prameny a literaturu a že práce nebyla využita v rámci 
jiného vysokoškolského studia či k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.  
V Praze dne 19. 8. 2013                                                                                
- 3 - 
I want to thank my supervisor, Hana Ulmanová, for her keen eye thanks to which 
my thesis is stylistically better than it would have been without her contribution. 
Of course, any deficiencies are my responsibility. I also want to thank Professor 
John Matthews for his support in my research from the beginning two years ago. 
Part of his support was a provision of some critical material relevant for my 
research; I am very grateful for his kindness. Both of them deserve my thanks for 
their helpfulness and patience. 
 
- 4 - 
Souhlasím se zapůjčením diplomové práce ke studijním účelům.  
I have no objections to the MA thesis being borrowed and used for study purposes. 
 
- 5 - 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction                                                                                       7 
1.1 The Aim of the Present Thesis                                                           7 
1.2 Person in Narrative                                                                             9 
1.2.1 The Person(ality) of the Narrator                                                        9 
1.2.2 First Person vs. Third Person Narrative                                            12 
1.3 Unnatural Narratology                                                                      19 
1.4 The Structure and Evolution of the Present Thesis                          20 
2. Saying “We” in Narrative                                                               23 
2.1 We Narration: The Poetics of Collective Narrative                         23 
2.1.1 What Is Collective Narrative?: I and We in Collective 
Narrative                                                                                                     25 
2.1.2 We Is More than I: “We” Narration and the  
(Re)presentation of Collectives                                                                  30 
2.1.3 Collective Narrative and (Un)reliability: We Narration  
Between First Person and Third Person Narratives                                   34 
3. Telling Community in William Faulkner’s “A Rose for  
Emily”                                                                                                 43 
3.1 The Narrator and the Critics                                                             45 
3.2 “We believed …”: The Collective Narrator of “A Rose  
for Emily”                                                                                               51 
3.3 Telling Community in “A Rose for Emily”                                     55 
3.4 Exclusion and Absence                                                                     65 
3.5 The Invisible Watch Ticking                                                            72 
4. (Re)collecting Identity in “A Rose for Emily”                                80    
4.1 Collective Memory                                                                           80 
4.2 Memory in and of a Group: The Two Versions of  
Collective Memory and “A Rose for Emily”                                         88 
4.3 “a slender figure in white in the background”: The  
Ideological Construction of Gender, Sex and Race in “A  
Rose for Emily”                                                                                      93 
- 6 - 
4.4 Narration and Commemoration in “A Rose for Emily”                 102 
4.4.1 (Re)collecting Identity                                                                    102 
4.4.2 Identity Form(ul)ation: Disrupted Boundaries and  
Erected Symbols                                                                                       110 
4.4.3 Emily and the Narrator: Totem and Taboo                                     115 
5. Conclusion                                                                                     126 
Bibliography                                                                                      131 
Abstrakt                                                                                             139 




- 7 - 
The land is full of melancholy spinsters like me, lost to history, blue as 
roaches in our ancestral homes, keeping a high shine on the copperware 
and laying in jam. Wooed when we were little by our masterful fathers, 
we are bitter vestals, spoiled for life. The childhood rape: someone 
should study the kernel of truth in this fancy.1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The Aim of the Present Thesis 
Though spoken by the main protagonist and narrator of J. M. Coetzee’s In the 
Heart of the Country, Magda, one might very well imagine these words spoken by 
Emily Grierson, the eponymous character of William Faulkner’s best-known short 
story “A Rose for Emily”; that is, if she were allowed to present her “point of 
view.” The possibility is more than accidental. Magda lives on a farm only with 
her father in the middle of a veldt and, while Emily lives in Jefferson, the tableau 
mentioned by the narrator suggests that she lives quite isolated in the house only 
with her father, with limited social contact: “We had long thought of them as a 
tableau, Miss Emily a slender figure in white in the background, her father a 
spraddled silhouette in the foreground, his back to her and clutching a horsewhip, 
the two of them framed by the back-flung front door.”2  
This passage points to another similarity between the two characters: they 
both live in intensely patriarchal societies. As Dominic Head observes about 
Coetzee’s second novel, “the speaker, Magda, emerges as the symbolic daughter 
of colonialism” and he notes that “the personification of the law as male, and as a 
parasite devouring Magda’s body, emphasizes the partly colonized position of the 
white woman in colonial structures, obliged to support a model of power to which 
her own identity is subordinated.”3 Both of the heroines revolt against these social 
structures similarly: both women commit murder and both have relationships with 
men who are deemed inferior to them by the values of the societies they belong to.  
Though the two narratives diverge in many respects suggesting different 
aims of the two authors, it is important that Faulkner decided, for various reasons, 
                                                 
1 J. M. Coetzee, In the Heart of the Country (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982) 3. 
2 William Faulkner, “A Rose for Emily,” Collected Stories (New York: Vintage, 1977) 123. All 
quotations are from this edition; citations are hereafter quoted parenthetically within the text. 
3 Dominic Head, The Cambridge Introduction to J. M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 42-44. 
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to deny Miss Grierson her “voice”. The choice is even more important as the 
original text of the short story, before it was first published in April 1930, 
included “a rather elaborate scene between Emily and her servant that explicitly 
calls attention to the upstairs room and the shock the townspeople will experience 
when they discover what is in it.”4  As James Ferguson points out, “such a scene 
would have virtually destroyed the story because of its explicitness and its 
egregious violation of point of view.”5 The distillation of the final text points to a 
vital element of the story, the narrator. 
There is a tension set up in the first sentence of this narrative: Faulkner’s 
famous short story begins “[w]hen Miss Emily Grierson died.” 6  Miss Emily 
Grierson, the “main character” of the short story dies in the first sentence of her 
story. The tension starts even before that, in the title: “A Rose for Emily” – Emily 
is the focus, the locus of attention. Whereas the recipient in the transaction of 
“giving” a rose is explicitly stated, the giver is only implied: a rose for Emily 
by … I want to shift attention to this “faded” presence, the narrator of the story. 
My main focus in the short story where Emily stands in the center of general 
attention channeled at her by the narrative agency will, therefore, be not the one 
who is gazed upon, but the gazer: I want to shift from the participation in the gaze 
to the scrutiny of that gaze.  
I found my scrutiny upon an axiom, sadly an axiom not executed in critical 
literature very often, stated by Uri Margolin: “What the NA [narrative agent] says 
about the sujet de l’énoncé may not be accepted […] but he himself, as sujet de 
l’énonciation, can always be validly characterized on the basis of this act, 
especially as regards his ‘understanding of human nature’.”7 In other words, that 
the resultant portrait of Miss Emily is a cross between Faulkner’s Elly and Charles 
Dickens’s Miss Havisham, does not necessarily say anything about her, but it 
definitely says something about the narrator.8 
                                                 
4 James Ferguson, Faulkner’s Short Fiction (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991) 
34. 
5 Ferguson 34. 
6 Faulkner 119. 
7 Uri Margolin, “The Doer and the Deed: Action as a Basis for Characterization in Narrative,” 
Poetics Today 1986: 223. 
8 Among the many critics dealing with the short story, it is only Menakhem Perry who works with 
the abovementioned axiom; though only tentatively and not as an absolute of characterization 
statements: “[…] an additional focus of interest for the story [is] what Emily is for her fellow 
townspeople. There is, then, the possibility that their reactions are subjective, and that rather than 
revealing what Emily is truly like, these reactions will expose what Emily is for them, thus 
characterizing them rather than her.” Menakhem Perry, “Literary Dynamics: How the Order of the 
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I approach the narrator armed with the category of “we-narrative” as it has 
been developed over the last three decades by several narratologists; most 
importantly by Uri Margolin and Brian Richardson. The collective nature of the 
narrator of “A Rose for Emily” is its most patent feature. Yet, it hasn’t been 
treated as it deserves so far. One of the most striking things about the bulk of 
criticism dealing with Faulkner’s best-known short story that has accrued over the 
years is how easily the critics overlook or dismiss this important feature. This MA 
thesis is an answer to Brian Richardson’s intended incentive to provide the 
theoretical formulation of “we-narratives” with concrete analyses of individual 
texts. It is also an attempt to “rectify” the perception of William Faulkner’s “A 
Rose for Emily,” which owns its renown largely to its “shocking” or “spectacular” 
matter.  
This often (over)stressed aspect of the short story has, for a long time, 
preempted any critical insight into the complicated structure of the text. Given the 
focus on the theme of community and the nature of the text – that is, its use of we-
narrative, its preoccupation with the past, and the socio-historical context of the 
U.S. South – I utilize the interdisciplinary concept of “collective memory” to 
analyze and provide a new view of the short story. Since I subtitled my thesis “A 
Case Study in Narrative Technique” and the narrative technique under 
consideration is “we-narrative”, a form of narrative distinguished partly on the 
basis of the concept of person as a grammatical category, I start with a brief 
treatment of the (grammatical) category of person in narrative.  
1.2 Person in Narrative 
1.2.1 The Person(ality) of the Narrator 
The category of person in narrative concerns “[t]he set of relations between the 
narrator (and narratee) and the story narrated.”9 In his study, The Rhetoric of 
Fiction, Wayne C. Booth remarks that “[p]erhaps the most overworked distinction 
is that of person. To say that a story is told in the first or the third person will tell 
us nothing of importance unless we become more precise and describe how the 
                                                                                                                                     
Text Creates its Meanings [With an Analysis of Faulkner’s ‘A Rose for Emily’],” Poetics Today 
Autumn 1979: 314. 
9 Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991) 70. 
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particular qualities of the narrators relate to specific effects.”10 I absolutely agree 
with Booth that the classical distinction between first and third person tells 
nothing of importance on its own. However, I disagree with what Booth says next: 
“It is true that choice of the first person is sometimes unduly limiting; if the ‘I’ has 
inadequate access to necessary information, the author may be led into 
improbabilities.”11 It is a general problem of the grammatical category of person 
that it coalesces in the perception of narrative with the notional concept of person: 
that is, a speaking “I” is perceived as a voice belonging to a person in the sense of 
a human being. One may have noticed that I have used the pronoun “it” when 
referring to the narrator. This is a manifestation enough of my view of the narrator 
that concurs generally with Mieke Bal’s linguistic approach to the concept of 
narrator:  
When, in this chapter, I discuss the narrative agent, or narrator, I mean the 
linguistic subject, a function and not a person, which expresses itself in the 
language that constitutes the text. […] We also do not mean a story-teller, a 
visible, fictive “I” who interferes in his/her account as much as s/he likes, or 
even participates as a character in the action. Such a “visible” narrator is a 
specific version of the narrator, one of the several different possibilities of 
manifestation. In this chapter, we shall rigorously stick to the definition of 
“that agent which utters the linguistic signs which constitute the text.”12 
This approach seems to me the right one in general, as well as in the 
specific context of considering “A Rose for Emily,” as will become clear later. To 
put it in a nutshell (of a quip), the category of person is unduly “personified”. The 
anthropomorphic view of the narrator is a result of the mimetic codes that operate 
in the perception of narrative; and it’s a good thing that they do. They are, in 
general, vital for the understanding of the narrative (re)presentation. Nonetheless, 
one has to keep an open mind and realize that the category of person is a 
convention, and, as with all conventions, some texts rely on the violation of this 
convention. As Gérard Genette remarks à propos person,  
we know that the contemporary novel […] does not hesitate to establish 
between narrator and character(s) a variable or floating relationship, a 
                                                 
10 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1983) 150. 
11 Booth 150. 
12  Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, transl. Christine van 
Boheemen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 119-120. 
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pronominal vertigo in tune with a freer logic and a more complex 
conception of “personality.” The most advanced forms of this emancipation 
are perhaps not the most perceptible ones, because the classical attributes of 
“character” – proper name, physical and moral “nature” – have disappeared 
and along with them the signs that direct grammatical (pronominal) traffic. 
[…] The Borgesian fantastic, in this respect emblematic of a whole modern 
literature, does not accept person.13 
As Brian Richardson, who devotes a whole book to the narratives that 
transgress mimetic conventions, puts it, commenting on modern and 
contemporary fiction, “no more can one assume that a first person narrator would 
resemble a normal human being, with all its abilities and limitations (excepting, of 
course, a never-remarked-upon ability to produce a highly narratable story that 
reads just like a novel).”14 The assumption of “normal human being” who is the 
“speaker” of the I is based on the anthropomorphic conception of the category of 
person. In an article devoted to the analysis of the category of “voice” in narrative, 
Richard Aczel observes that   
[a]s an entity attributed to (silent) written texts, the concept of voice 
inevitably raises questions of ontology and metaphoricity which remain 
inseparable from its more technical delimitation as a textual function or 
effect. The question of “who speaks?” in narrative discourse invites the 
further question of whether texts can really be said to “speak” at all, and if 
so what are the theoretical motivations and implications of the metaphor of 
“speech” for “writing”?15 
The metaphorical understanding of text as speech is just one step away 
from seeing the textual I in terms of “a real human being”: in reality, it is only 
people who posses the faculty of speech. Aczel’s aim in his article is to posit 
“voice as a textual effect rather than an originary anima” in order to separate 
“between textual signs of stylistic agency and projected (metatextual) principles 
of narrative organization and unity.” 16   Aczel distinguishes between two 
applications of the term “voice” in narrative: 
                                                 
13 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1980) 246-247. 
14 Brian Richardson, Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction 
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006) 1. 
15 Richard Aczel, “Hearing Voices in Narrative Texts,” New Literary History Summer 1998: 467. 
16 Aczel 467. 
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In one crucial sense, of course, voice is always and only identifiable with the 
subject of enunciation, with the “hors texte” bracketed off by deconstruction. 
But this unitary, originary voice is not homologous with the configuration of 
idiomatic signals in the text which the reader reconstructs and attributes to 
textual speakers or speech-styles. Voice, in this latter sense, is of necessity a 
metaphorical term, and cannot be equated with the irretrievable originary 
voice of the producer (author) of a written text. Furthermore, this 
metaphorical sense of voice is the only meaningful sense of the term in 
(written) textual applications and any attempt to forge a synonymity 
between textual and spoken voice – that is, between vehicle and tenor, 
model and modeled – is by definition self-defeating.17 
 As the consideration of the category of voice, serving as a model for the 
consideration of the category of person(ality) of the narrator, has shown, the 
conception of the narrator (in the guise of an I) as a speaker, that is, of “a normal 
human being, with all its abilities and limitations” can be conceived of only 
metaphorically. Addressing this problem was necessary for the further discussion 
of the concept of person in narrative as well as a necessary provision for my later 
claim about the narrator in Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily”. In this section, the 
discussion was based on the category of “first person narrative,” because it is this 
category that raises the problem of the person(ality) of the narrator most 
conspicuously. In the next section, the discussion of person in narrative will be 
extended by addressing the distinction between the so-called “first person” and 
“third person” narratives.   
1.2.2 First Person vs. Third Person Narrative 
The traditional distinction between “first person” and “third person” narrative says 
nothing more than that “I am I” and that “they are they.” It is an absolute truth 
revealing nothing, because it is merely tautological. The distinction is founded on 
a double standard. The “first person narrative” is distinguished by the reference of 
the narrator to himself as “I”. The “third person narrative” is distinguished by the 
reference of the narrator to others as “he/she/it/they”. Applying different measures 
to the two types of narration means that they cannot even occupy the same 
category. Indeed, this statement of the problem amounts to the distinction Émile 
                                                 
17 Aczel 476. 
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Benveniste has made in his classic article “The Nature of Pronouns.” Stated 
succinctly, Benveniste claims that the category of “‘[p]erson’ belongs only to 
I/you and is lacking in he.”18 Benveniste bases his distinction on the reference of 
the pronouns. Regarding the first person, he observes that “the instances of the use 
of I do not constitute a class of reference since there is no ‘object’ definable as I to 
which these instances can refer in identical fashion. Each I has its own reference 
and corresponds each time to a unique being who is set up as such.”19  
Asking about the reference of I and you, Benveniste comes to the 
conclusion that these pronouns refer to individual instances of discourse: 
What then is the reality to which I or you refers? It is solely a “reality of 
discourse,” and this is a very strange thing. I cannot be defined except in 
terms of “locution,” not in terms of objects as a nominal sign is. I signifies 
“the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing 
I.” This instance is unique by definition and has validity only in its 
uniqueness. […] I can only be identified by the instance of discourse that 
contains it and by that alone. It has no value except in the instance in which 
it is produced. But in the same way it is also as an instance of form that I 
must be taken; the form of I has no linguistic existence except in the act of 
speaking in which it is uttered. There is thus a combined double instance in 
this process: the instance of I as referent and the instance of discourse 
containing I as the referee. The definition can now be stated precisely as: I is 
“the individual who utters the present instance of discourse containing the 
linguistic instance I.”20  
This passage points out two important things. Firstly, the first person 
pronoun potentially changes identity from one instance of occurrence to another. 
If the reference of personal pronouns is the instance of their discourse, then one 
cannot know, without contextual information, who is uttering I. Secondly, one 
must differentiate between the subject as the narrative agent and the subject as the 
experiencing agent (see below). Based on his previous observations, Benveniste 
maintains that the third person pronouns  
                                                 
18 Émile Benveniste, “The Nature of Pronouns,” Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary 
Elizabeth Meek (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1971) 217. 
19 Benveniste, “Pronouns” 218. 
20 Benveniste, “Pronouns” 218. 
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are utterances in discourse that escape the condition of person in spite of 
their individual nature; that is, they refer not to themselves but to an 
“objective” situation. This is the domain that we call the “third person.” 
The “third person” in fact represents the unmarked member of the 
correlation of person. […] Thus, in the formal class of pronouns, those said 
to be of the “third person” are, by their function and by their nature, 
completely different from I and you.21 
Benveniste observes that the reason for the difference of the third person 
pronoun from I and you is “a function of syntactic ‘representation’ which extends 
to terms taken from different ‘parts of speech’ and which answers to a need for 
economy by replacing one segment of the utterance, or even an entire utterance, 
with a more manageable substitute.” 22  In another article, concerned with the 
category of person in verbs, Benveniste goes so far as to call the third person 
“nonpersonal”: “It follows that, very generally, person is inherent only in the 
positions ‘I’ and ‘you.’ The third person, by virtue of its very structure, is the 
nonpersonal form of verbal inflection.”23 
 Merely the use of the pronouns of the first person and third person by a 
narrator cannot be a distinguishing factor, because their use is unavoidable. For 
Benveniste, personal pronouns – that is, I and you – are indexical, since “[t]he use 
thus has as a condition the situation of discourse and no other. […] a unique but 
mobile sign, I, which can be assumed by each speaker on the condition that he 
refers each time only to the instance of his own discourse.”24 Roman Jakobson, 
drawing also on Benveniste, calls these linguistic units, after Jespersen, “shifters” 
and notes that “the general meaning of a shifter cannot be defined without a 
reference to the message. […] the word I designating the utterer is existentially 
related to his utterance, and hence functions as an index.”25 Indexicals, shifters, 
also called deictics “share in common that they usually point at or demonstrate 
                                                 
21 Benveniste, “Pronouns” 221. 
22 Benvenist, “Pronouns” 221. 
23 Émile Benveniste, “Relationships of Person in the Verb,” Problems in General Linguistics, trans. 
Mary Elizabeth Meek (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1971) 199. 
24 Benveniste, “Pronouns” 220. 
25 Roman Jakobson, “Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb,” Selected Writings II: 
Word and Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) 131-132. 
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their object.”26 The use of the pronouns of the first person and of the third person 
is a necessary result of the deictic field which 
consists of the combined dimensions of space, time, person, perception, 
discourse, and perspective which jointly define the immediate setting in 
which utterances are produced. At the centre of this field is the indexical 
ground or origo relative to which relations of proximity, temporality, 
perceptual access, givenness in discourse, and prospection and retrospection 
are arrayed. This field is the elementary frame of reference, itself embedded 
in a broader setting by way of contextual or textual elements.27 
Thus, the narrator, placed at the origo of the deictic field has no other 
choice than to refer to itself as “I” and to others as “he,” “she” etc. Benveniste 
puts it succinctly when he observes that “in saying ‘I,’ I cannot not be speaking of 
myself.”28 This linguistic inevitability hasn’t been lost on (some) narratologists. In 
his seminal narratological study, Gérard Genette comments on the distinction 
between first person and third person narratives: “[…] these common locutions 
seem to me inadequate, in that they stress variation in the element of the narrative 
situation that is in fact invariant – to wit, the presence (explicit or implicit) of the 
‘person’ of the narrator. This presence is invariant because the narrator can be in 
his narrative (like every subject of an enunciating in his enunciated statement) 
only in the ‘first-person’.”29  
The problem of the first person and the third person narrators is in 
narratology connected to the larger question about the presence or absence of the 
narrator in narrative. In Anglo-American narrative theory, the presence of the 
narrator is determined by the distinction between “showing” and “telling”:  
Direct presentation presumes a kind of overhearing by the audience. 
Mediated narration, on the other hand, presumes a more or less express 
communication from narrator to audience. This is essentially Plato’s 
distinction between mimesis and diegesis, in modern terms between showing 
                                                 
26  William F. Hanks, “Deixis,” The Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, eds. David 
Herman, Manfred Jahn and Marie-Laure Ryan (London: Routledge, 2008) 99. 
27 Hanks 99. Benveniste himself treats the personal pronouns in terms of the deictic field while 
talking about what he calls “indicators”: “The essential thing, then, is the relation between the 
indicator (of person, time, place, object shown, etc.) and the present instance of discourse.” 
Benveniste, “Pronouns” 219. 
28 Benveniste, “Relationships” 197. 
29 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse 243-244. 
- 16 - 
and telling. Insofar as there is telling, there must be a teller, a narrating 
voice.30  
Though Seymour Chatman acknowledges that “[i]n the strict sense, of 
course, all statements are ‘mediated,’ since they are composed by someone,”31 this 
“someone” is for him not the narrator, but the author: “Every narrative, even one 
wholly ‘shown’ or unmediated, finally has an author, the one who devised it. But 
‘narrator’ should not be used in that sense.” 32  For Chatman, the distinction 
between showing and telling is a viable one. Not so much for Genette who 
correctly, at least in terms of narrative theory, leaves the author out of the picture 
and rightly collapses the opposition between the two terms: “‘Showing’ can be 
only a way of telling, and this way consists of both saying about it as much as one 
can, and saying this ‘much’ as little as possible.”33 
Mieke Bal, whose approach is linguistic, has put the case most extremely. 
According to her, every sentence of a narrative can be transcribed beginning with 
“I say:” or “I narrate:,” because for her “[a]s soon as there is language, there is a 
speaker who utters it; as soon as those linguistic utterances constitute a narrative 
text, there is a narrator, a narrating subject.”34 If the narrator is always present in 
the narrative, as common sense would suggest and as I agree there is, and one can 
logically transcribe all the sentences of narrative with the beginning “I say:,” then 
there is one fundamental consequence: “Insofar as the narrator can at any instant 
intervene as such in the narrative, every narrating is, by definition, to all intents 
and purposes presented in the first person.”35  
Indeed, this is not only a theoretical possibility: there are narratives that 
intentionally play on the opposition of first and third person narrative only to 
disrupt it. One example for all is Vladimir Nabokov’s Pnin in which the narrator 
                                                 
30 Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1980) 146. 
31 Chatman 33. 
32 Chatman 33. 
33 Genette, Narrative Discourse 166. 
34  Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, trans. Christine van 
Boheemen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 121-122. Gérard Genette puts the matter 
in similar terms: “[…] there is an enunciating instance – the narrating – with its narrator and its 
narratee, fictive or not, represented or not, silent or chatty, but always present in what is indeed for 
me, I fear, an act of communication. […] In the most unobtrusive narrative, someone is speaking 
to me, is telling me a story, is inviting me to listen to it as he tells it, and this ‘invitation’ – 
confiding or urging – constitutes an undeniable stance of narrating, and therefore a narrator.” 
Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990) 101. 
35 Genette, Narrative Discourse 244. 
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poses as a traditional “third person” narrator with the appendage of (seeming) 
“omniscience”, but is then revealed to be a “first person” narrator through self-
reference and at the end of the narrative even appears as a character to meet the 
hero of his story. If all it takes to destroy the boundary between the two “types” of 
narrative is one I, then the distinction really is untenable.36 
As Mieke Bal confirms, “[i]n principle, it does not make a difference to 
the status of the narration whether a narrator refers to itself or not. […] From a 
grammatical point of view, this is always a ‘first person.’ In fact, the term ‘third-
person narrator’ is absurd: a narrator is not a ‘he’ or ‘she.’”37 Nevertheless, Bal is 
quick to add, and rightly so, that “[o]f course, this does not imply that the 
distinction between ‘first-person’ and ‘third-person’ narratives is invalid.”38 What 
she has in mind is not the distinction rejected here, but the distinction made by 
Genette. Genette moves the categorization into “first” and “third” person 
narratives when he distinguishes them on the basis of the narrator’s participation 
in the narrated story:  
The novelist’s choice, unlike the narrator’s, is not between two grammatical 
forms, but between two narrative postures (whose grammatical forms are 
simply an automatic consequence): to have the story told by one of its 
“characters,” or to have it told by a narrator outside of the story. The 
presence of first-person verbs in a narrative text can therefore refer to two 
very different situations which grammar renders identical but which 
narrative analysis must distinguish: the narrator’s own designation of 
himself as such […] or else the identity of the person between the narrator 
and one of the characters in the story […] The term “first-person narrative” 
refers, quite obviously, only to the second of these situations, and this 
dissymmetry confirms its unfitness.39 
Since the terminology of “first person” and “third person” narrative is 
rendered unfit for Genette, he distinguishes between “two types of narrative: one 
with the narrator absent from the story he tells […] the other with the narrator 
present as a character in the story he tells […] I call the first type, for obvious 
reasons, heterodiegetic, and the second type, homodiegetic.”40 Richard Walsh has 
                                                 
36 Cf. Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited 97. 
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38 Bal 122. 
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gone so far as to claim, based on a criticism of Genette’s typology and the 
fictional pact established by the acceptance of the fictional narrator, that the 
narrator is either a character in the story or, in the case of Genette’s extradiegetic 
heterodiegetic narrator, the author himself/herself.41 Another criticism of Genette, 
provided by Aczel this time, shows the way to the analysis of narrators preferred 
here. Aczel, concerned with the critique of Genette’s use of the term (narrator’s) 
“voice,” insists on an analysis of narrators viewed “as an umbrella term for a 
cluster of possible functions, of which some are necessary (the selection, 
organization, and presentation of narrative elements) and others optional (such as 
self-personification as teller, comment, and direct reader/narratee address). One of 
the provinces of the study of voice is precisely the identification and 
differentiation of these varying functions.”42  
Of course, Genette is the last one to be satisfied with an analysis of a 
narrator that would stop at the statement of the narrator’s status as either 
homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. Nonetheless, Aczel proclaims that “[w]hatever 
one makes of such an argument, the overestimation of the first-person pronoun as 
the paradigmatic marker of narratorial presence is clearly unhelpful in the 
identification and characterization of narrative voice. […] ‘voice’ must, if it is to 
deserve the designation, signify a far more distinctive corpus of subjectivity 
effects.”43 Though Aczel does not agree with the hierarchy chosen by Chatman 
and opts for a proper analysis of the narrator’s “stylistic idiom,” Chatman concurs 
with Aczel in the view of the narrator: “The teller, the transmitting source, is best 
accounted for, I think, as a spectrum of possibilities, going from narrators who are 
least audible to those who are most so.”44 After all, Chatman voices a sentiment 
similar to Aczel’s criticism of the use of the term voice: “It is less important to 
categorize types of narrators than to identify the features that mark their degrees 
of audibility.”45 Chatman devotes one chapter in his book to provide his “overt” 
narrator with “a spectrum of features, ranging from least to most obtrusive 
                                                 
41 See Richard Walsh, “Who Is the Narrator?,” Poetics Today Winter 1997: 495-513. 
42 Aczel 492. 
43 Aczel 489-490. 
44 Chatman 146. One of the possibilities of the narrator is its use of self-reference: “[…] of course, 
the ‘I,’ the reporter, who must be the narrating subject of such sentences, may not refer to himself, 
so that the pronoun ‘I’ need not actually appear.” Chatman 201. Thus even Chatman suggests that 
the distinction of “first person” and “third person” narratives is misguided. 
45 Chatman 196. By audibility, Chatman means the overt traits of a narrator’s presence in the text: 
intrusive comments, self-reference, pronouncing judgments on characters etc. 
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markers: from set descriptions and reports of what characters did not say or think, 
to the various kinds of commentary – interpretation, judgment, generalization.”46  
Even according to Mieke Bal, for whom all narrators are I, one must 
inspect the narrative situations of these I’s to analyze the narrator properly, since, 
as she puts it, there are “all kinds of ‘I’s.”47 At the beginning of his study, Michał 
Glowiński bluntly states that the significance of personal pronouns in the novel “is 
undoubtedly a matter of enormous importance. The choice of a personal pronoun 
affects many subsequent choices.”48 As he observes, “[t]he semantic design of 
impersonal narration where the characters are called by the third-person pronoun 
‘he’ or its equivalents, such as proper names (Vautrin, Castorp, Schweik), is 
totally different from the semantic design in which the narrator speaks in the first 
person.”49 Statements like these can be accepted only once they are qualified by a 
close analysis of the narrator’s functions, of the narrator’s characteristics. This is 
what I intend to provide for the narrator of Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” with a 
close analysis of its features. 
1.3 Unnatural Narratology  
I assume an “unnatural” approach to the narrator in Faulkner’s “A Rose for 
Emily”. By this statement it might be said that I pledge allegiance to the recent 
development of “unnatural narratology.” Richardson remarks on the unnaturalness 
of modern narrators that “no more can one assume that a first person narrator 
would resemble a normal human being, with all its abilities and limitations 
(excepting, of course, a never-remarked-upon ability to produce a highly 
narratable story that reads just like a novel).”50 In a recent article by a group of 
unnatural narratologists (including Richardson), a straightforward definition of 
unnatural narratology is given: “The study of unnatural narrative is directed 
against what one might call ‘mimetic reductionism,’ that is, the argument that 
each and every aspect of narrative can be explained on the basis of our real-world 
knowledge and resulting cognitive parameters.”51 As one can see, this approach 
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does not preach a break with the reality we are embedded in; it merely points out 
the fact that fiction is a realm where this reality can be and often is transcended.  
As Richardson puts it, addressing Joseph Conrad’s The Nigger of the 
“Narcissus,” there are “still attempts to provide a mimetic framework that can 
explain these phenomena. But there is no need to insist on such a framework […] 
If Conrad’s depictions of his crew’s sensibilities are inherently unresolvable given 
the existing models based on realist conventions, then we should not limit 
ourselves to realist conventions when grounding our theories.”52 The narrative 
agency in Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” demands such a framework, though it 
might not be as unnatural as post-mortem narratives or as talking ice-creams in 
contemporary commercials. Of course, the appreciation and a suitable analysis of 
“A Rose for Emily” or the appreciation of the singularities and imaginative feats 
of literature in general do not require the acceptance of the framework of 
unnatural narratology. I mention and utilize this narratological development 
because the authors I draw on for the analysis of we-narrative belong to the 
leading scholars in this field and because providing a narratological analysis of 
Faulkner’s texts I saw it fit to support my argument by introducing this field of 
narrative theory. Of course, claims about the autonomy of literature and art have 
been made before. 
1.4 The Structure and Evolution of the Present Thesis 
The heavily narratological and linguistic introduction was necessary for the 
discussion of collective narrative in the next chapter that builds on the information 
given in this introduction. Chapter II starts with the general analysis of we-
narrative, an introduction to the poetics of saying “we” in narrative. In this section 
the observations on personal pronouns, the discussion of person in narrative and 
the distinction of “first person” and “third person” narrative becomes relevant 
since the dynamics of the employment of “first person plural narrative” are 
discussed. The third chapter is devoted solely to the analysis of “A Rose for 
                                                                                                                                     
(2006) 5-6. There has been a continuous growth in literature about unnatural narratives and/or 
unnatural narratology. For more see the collection of essays Jan Alber and Rüdiger Heinze, eds., 
Unnatural Narratives – Unnatural Narratology (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011). For a criticism of 
unnatural narratology see Monika Fludernik, “How Natural Is ‘Unnatural Narratology’; or, What 
is Unnatural about Unnatural Narratology?” Narrative Oct. 2012: 357-370. 
52  Brian Richardson, “Plural Focalization, Singular Voices: Wandering Perspectives in ‘We’-
Narration,” Point of View, Perspective, and Focalization: Modeling Mediation in Narrative, eds. 
Peter Hühn, Wolf Schmid and Jörg Schönert (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009) 153. 
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Emily” in terms of we-narrative. Here, the claim about unnaturalness in narrative 
will be recalled in support of my argument about the narrator of the short story. In 
the fourth chapter I introduce the interdisciplinary concept of collective memory. 
First, I introduce the concept and sketch out the theory. Secondly, I draw parallels 
between collective memory and we-narrative. Thirdly, I analyze “A Rose for 
Emily” in terms of collective memory with particular attention to ideology, 
community formation and maintenance, the (re)construction of the past and the 
theme of the individual vs. society. The concluding chapter provides a summary 
of my findings and hopefully provides some vistas for analyses of collectivity in 
Faulkner’s work.  
Before I proceed to other matters related to Emily, a few words about the 
distillation of the present text seem to be in order. This thesis is born out of an 
essay written for Prof. John T. Matthews’s seminar on Faulkner that he led as a 
Fulbright scholar at the Department of Anglophone Literatures and Cultures of the 
Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague. At the time of thinking about the 
essay I was to write, I was intrigued by Brian Richardson’s chapter on we-
narrative in his book Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and 
Contemporary Fiction and Uri Margolin’s article “Telling in the Plural: From 
Grammar to Ideology.” 53  These texts and Brian Richardson’s article “Plural 
Focalization, Singular Voices: Wandering Perspectives in ‘We’-Narration” were 
the only theoretical sources I drew on when writing the essay. When, at the end of 
that essay, I concluded that what one witnesses in “A Rose for Emily” is an 
instance of “collective memory,” I had no idea that such a concept even exists. It 
was only later, while I was reading more on we-narrative that I found out that 
such a concept has already been used in the humanities for several decades having 
its origin in Maurice Halbwachs’s 1925 Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire.  
When I delved into the available literature on collective memory, I found 
out that my “intuitive” use of the term resonated with the interdisciplinary concept 
which did not transform my use, or understanding, of the concept, but only 
extended it. The same applies for the sources I use that are explicitly concerned 
with the short story itself. At the time of writing the essay, I used only three 
                                                 
53  See Richardson, Unnatural and Uri Margolin, “Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to 
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different interpretations of “A Rose for Emily.”54 Since then I have read various 
interpretations of the story, though still a fraction of what has ever been written 
about the short story, and found out that some of them have made similar points as 
I am making in this thesis. Once again, these interpretations have enriched my 
reading without altering the basic interpretation I have provided for the story and 
are thus also treated extensively in the form of footnotes to provide views both 
similar to and differing from mine.  It is for this reason that in the chapter “Telling 
Community in William Faulkner’s ‘A Rose for Emily’” I present the modified 
text of my essay of the same title and treat the short story within the context of 
collective memory in the following chapter. Another reason is that I thus separate 
the narratological analysis of the text dealing largely with the identification of the 
narrator and its features from the social and historical dimension of the text 
provided by its consideration within the framework of collective memory. This 
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The rest of this is composite. It is what we (groundlings, dwellers in and 
backbone of a small town interchangeable with and duplicate of ten 
thousand little dead clottings of human life about the land) saw, refined 
and clarified by the expert, the man who had himself seen his own lonely 
and scudding shadow upon the face of the puny and remote earth.55 
2. Saying “We” in Narrative 
2.1 We Narration: The Poetics of Collective Narrative 
Western literature is centered on the individual, on “the stories of one individual 
in isolation or of a limited number of interacting individuals.”56 Thus, collective 
narratives in the form of “we” narration represent a minority, being still a marked 
type in relation to the traditional first and third person narratives. Therefore, as 
Richardson observes, collective narratives “foreground [their] difference from the 
autonomous individual consciousness associated with the rise of the novel in 
England.” 57  In the last two decades, scholars not only from the province of 
narratology or even of literary studies have provided new examples and analyses 
of collective narrative. 58  Richardson claims that “‘[w]e’ narration, a common 
strategy in contemporary fiction, also has a relatively long though little known 
history that extends for over a century”59 and traces the history of the first person 
plural narrative from Conrad to recent postcolonial and feminist literature.  
It might seem that by criticizing the category of grammatical person as a 
viable distinctive mark for a typology of narratives I handed the critic a stick to 
beat me with. However, as I hope to show, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere 
regarding collective narrative. Uri Margolin and Brian Richardson have shown 
that collective narrative is a narrative technique sui generis that deserves special 
attention and cannot be encompassed by the traditional characterization of first-
person narrative, or third-person narrative for that matter. In what follows I try to 
sketch out the “poetics” of the first-person plural narrative, based largely but not 
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exclusively on the works of the two aforementioned narratologists, and some of 
the interesting challenges it poses for the schematic division of narratives into 
first-person or third-person. 
Though what follows is presented as poetics of the narrative technique and 
the realm of poetics is the general and the universal, a note against generality has 
to be made at the outset. As I have already suggested, collective narrative is 
categorically different from first-person (and third-person) narrative. However, 
there are collective narratives where the distinction made on the basis of number 
fails and the treatment of we narration as properly collective is not at odds with 
seeing the narrative issuing from a single speaker (“we” is used conventionally to 
recount personal experience): “In certain non-Western cultures, by contrast, the 
idea of a separate consciousness is perceived as a fatal error. The error is not just 
conceptual, but what is more important, practical, since it threatens the solidarity 
and cohesiveness of the community.”60 What always has to be considered is the 
context (culture, gender, class etc) as well as the efforts of imaginative writers 
trying to challenge established norms. As Amit Marcus states, drawing on Susan 
Lanser’s observation of the culturally embedded views of consciousness, the 
problem of collective narrative “is thus political-ideological, rather than (merely) 
epistemological.”61  
For example, some of the feminist uses of “we” are not necessarily 
expressions of literal collectivity, but rather acknowledgments of the multiplicity 
of subjective consciousness. Morris Adalaide observes, commenting on the uses 
of pronouns employed in recent feminist fiction, that “we must acknowledge the 
multiple connections that make us all divided and contradictory beings.” 62 
Building on the notion of identity as essentially composite, these uses try to 
subvert the male notion of “the authoritarian ego” and show that the ego “we have 
taken to be monolithic is, in fact, multiple.”63 In effect, the collective pronouns as 
employed by feminist authors are “site[s] where disparate subjectivities collide, 
converge, and continue to coexist.”64 
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As Richardson’s quote on the opposition of collective narrative to the 
individual narrative associated with the rise of the novel in England suggests, the 
following characteristics of collective narrative are formulated largely, but not 
exclusively, within and in opposition to the Western, male dominated mode of 
narrative. My own effort in this thesis is to connect the employment of “we” 
narration as a form of collective narrative to the specific cultural context of the US 
South as presented in Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily.” After all, I agree with 
Adalaide in her assumption which sees contextual specificity as inherent to the 
use of “we” and pronouns in general:  
It is my assumption here that pronouns, like all narrative strategies, carry out 
the tasks Jane Tompkins has termed “cultural work.” The pronouns we 
select to stand in for us both respond to and shape our position in the social 
order: they react to specific historical pressures; they articulate problems and 
propose solutions; they summon others toward us or shove them away.65  
2.1.1 What Is Collective Narrative?: I and We in Collective Narrative 
First, I have to make a terminological clarification. The designation “‘we’ 
narration” used by Richardson might be misleading in suggesting that it concerns 
narratives where the first person plural pronoun, “we” occurs exclusively. The 
term “first person plural narrative” is more inclusive since it encompasses the 
various inflections of the pronoun “we”. The best term, as it properly designates 
the problem at hand and includes all the various possibilities of designations of 
the collective narrator is Margolin’s “collective narrative”. However, the terms 
“‘we’ narration” and “collective narrative” are largely overlapping and the reader 
is invited to think of the other as well when I use one of them.66  
Given what I have just observed, it is evident that the key difference which 
disables the category of first-person narrative to cover “we” narration is the 
category of number. “We” narrative is first person plural narrative. Uri Margolin 
defines “a collective narrative agent (CNA)” as “a group of two or more 
individuals represented as a singular higher order entity or agent, a collective 
individual so to speak, with global properties or actions.”67 One can immediately 
                                                 
65 Adalaide 11. 
66 This is mainly because when Margolin uses the term “collective narrative” he is speaking of 
“‘we’ narration” most of the time and so the two terms designate, at least for him, basically the 
same territory. 
67 Margolin 592. 
- 26 - 
see that what is distinctive about a CNA is not only quantity (“two or more”), but 
also quality (“higher order entity”): “‘Us’ or ‘we’ in this sense is different from I 
+ you + him/her.”68 However, the collective designation “we,” as well as other 
designations, can serve to mask an individual voice referring to it and others. In 
this case, to paraphrase Margolin, “us” or “we” is not different from, but 
designates, in various combinations, I + you + him/her. 
Margolin provides quite a rigid definition of “collective narrative (CN).”69 
Firstly, there must be “a collective narrative agent (CNA).” For Margolin, three 
conditions have to be conjointly satisfied for the occurrence of a collective 
narrative agent: 
A. The argument position in numerous narrative propositions evoking this 
domain, whether textually explicit or reader formulated, is occupied by an 
expression designating a collectivity, plurality, or group of some kind. […] 
B. The predicate position in narrative propositions fulfilling condition A is 
occupied by cumulative or by nondistributive predicates […] These 
predicates apply to a group as a whole, as one unit, but not to any of its 
members severally. […]  
C. The collectivity or group occupying the argument position is ascribed as a 
whole, as one unit, a range of thematic roles in the overall course of actions 
being narrated. A thematic role may be defined as a basic way in which 
individuals or groups participate in or are related to the events, activities, or 
states described: agent […] experiencer […] or patient […].70 
As Margolin concludes, commenting on these conditions, the “case will 
ultimately rest on the relative prominence in the given text of narrative 
propositions satisfying (A) to (C).”71  William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” 
satisfies all of Margolin’s conditions of a CNA. Firstly, the narrator uses 
exclusively collective designations to refer to itself: “our whole town” (119), 
“our” (passim) and most often “we” (passim). Even when the narrator wants to 
demarcate a smaller section of the totality that forms it, it uses collective 
designations like “people” or “they” (passim). Indeed, very few individuals stand 
out in the story and except for Miss Emily, Homer Barron and Tobe, their 
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presence in the text is only temporary. Secondly, there are many collective 
predicates employed to designate various actions. To give a few examples, “our 
whole town went to her funeral” (119), “We did not say […] We believed […] we 
saw […]” (125). Finally, suffice it to say for now that the collective narrator, apart 
from being a narrator, is ascribed all the thematic roles that Margolin lists: agent, 
experiencer and patient (for more, see chapter III).  
If a narrator classifies as a collective narrative agent, one more condition 
has to be fulfilled to classify a narrative as a collective narrative:  
A narrative is a full-fledged collective narrative (CN) if one or more 
collective narrative agents occur in it and if, in addition, the narrative as a 
whole is first and foremost the story of these CNAs. […] The difference 
between standard narrative and CNs resides therefore not in the very 
presence of a CNA but in the reversal of the usual proportion and 
central/peripheral relation between collective and individual agents.72 
One might challenge my classification of “A Rose for Emily” as a “collective 
narrative” on the basis that the main protagonist of the short story is clearly an 
individual, Emily Grierson. However, as I have already stated in the first chapter, 
the narrative of the short story is self-reflexive in the sense that through the story 
of Emily Grierson, the collective narrator reflects upon itself, that is, it produces a 
narrative that is first and foremost concerned with itself: with the “we,” the “our 
whole town,” the collective.  
“A Rose for Emily” satisfies all of Margolin’s conditions and thus it 
constitutes a collective narrative with a collective narrative agent. These are 
construed by the employment of “‘we’ narration.” Brian Richardson does not give 
an extensive definition of “we” narration. For him, any use of the pronoun “we” 
by the narrator qualifies as an instance of “we” narration. However, this does not 
mean that any use of “we” by the narrator is equal to all other existing uses. 
Richardson provides a typology of “we” narrations “differentiated according to 
the degree to which they diverge from the poetics of realism”73  yielding the 
following four categories of “we” narration:  
1) Conventional: the unproblematic case of a single narrator describing 
events experienced by him- or herself and others […] 2) Standard: largely 
realistic narration that nevertheless stretches verisimilitude at key points, 
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especially when the narrator discloses the inner thoughts or feelings of a 
group […] 3) Nonrealistic: in the texts by Conrad, Wright, Armah, and Mda 
we have flagrant violations of the parameters of realistic representation. […] 
4) Anti-mimetic: the texts of Sarraute and Adams eschew realism altogether, 
and function instead as experimental constructions of multiple discourses 
that can inhabit a “we.”74 
One can immediately see that Richardson’s approach provides a gradation 
that allows for a nuanced analysis of collective narratives. Of course, this 
typology is only one possible typology and the last instance in analyzing 
collective narratives is the individual text. In his article “Plural Focalization, 
Singular Voices: Wandering Perspectives in ‘We’-Narration” from 2009, 
Richardson provides only a three-level typology of “we” narration getting rid of 
the first category, the “conventional” type.75 This is because, as Richardson puts it 
in the article, he is concerned with narratives that “differ from natural narratives 
insofar as they produce a tension concerning the identity, speech situation, or 
knowledge claimed by the ‘we’ voice,” that is, with narratives that “are 
distinctively literary uses and are not normally found in natural narratives.”76  
Richardson thus draws a line of propriety dividing the first category from 
the other categories. He does so when he comments on the conventional type 
saying that “[t]echnically, this is not really a ‘we’ narration as I use the term 
above, but a first person singular narration that includes reference to others.”77 He 
underscores this statement by the reduction of his typology. Margolin also draws 
the line of propriety within his typology. Though providing different typologies, 
Margolin and Richardson both articulate one common, and a most important, 
feature. Both recognize that collective narrative or “we” narration can originate 
with an individual or with a collective. Thus they make a qualitative distinction 
within their multi-level classifications that allows one to split their typologies 
based on the distinctive feature of individiuality/collectivity.  
Both Richardson and Margolin qualify their terms with the adjective 
“proper” when the type of narrative originates in a collective voice or agent. 
Based on these articulations of propriety, I draw a line between a “we” narration 
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that (re)presents individual discourse, that is, narratives produced by an individual 
narrative agent referring to itself and others, and a “we” narration that (re)presents 
collective discourse, that is, narratives produced by a group, a collective. While 
Richardson formulates the distinction in terms of “mimesis,” Margolin formulates 
the distinction in relation to individual and holistic levels of group phenomena. He 
states the “propriety” of collectivity in collective narrative explicitly when he 
provides his typology of collective narrative agents.  
Margolin’s typology is based on “the nature and strength of the bond 
between members of a group” 78  yielding five types. The first type is “an 
instantiation class: the class of all individuals who possess a certain property or 
fulfill a certain condition.” 79  The second type is “a temporary, more or less 
random, assemblage or aggregate of unrelated individuals who share a brief 
space-time interval.”80 It is only the third type that is a proper collective narrative 
agent: “The CNA proper begins with the third variety, consisting of a collection of 
individuals acting as a plural subject or we-group […] defined with respect to its 
ability to perform collective actions […] Such a social action group also possesses 
supervenient action-related properties that cannot be distributed, that is, ascribed 
to its members severally.”81 The fourth type “is represented by a community: a 
group of people who each possess a shared, collectively negotiated sense of 
identity within a bounded whole.”82  The fifth and last type is “the collective 
structure as such, abstracted from any individuals who may embody it. […] An 
impression is created of an independent entity with a power, a will, and a logic of 
action all its own, one that goes on inexorably.”83  
Margolin sees as proper only those collective narrative agents that have 
holistic properties. While Richardson sees as proper “we” narrations that violate 
the rules of mimesis, it can be seen that both frameworks, holistic and mimetic, 
are symptoms of the same matter: ontology. Once defined at the holistic level, the 
collective narrative becomes enmeshed in a variety of problems. These problems 
result from the simultaneity of individual and holistic levels observed by Margolin: 
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he claims that “[t]here can obviously be no groups without individuals who 
embody them, but groups can and do have attributes that belong to the holistic 
level only. In other words, shifting from individual to group-level predicates 
involves a logical type shift.”84 These problems are, said together with Richardson, 
problems of “the poetics of realism” since they are problems of representation. 
The stress on the holistic level, on the collectivity that lies at the core of collective 
narratives is “tantamount to switching to a different ontological level, thereby 
creating the impression that we are dealing with an entirely different kind of entity, 
with a life, willpower, and power of action of its own.”85 Thus, Richardson’s 
proper types of “we” narration and Margolin’s proper collective narrative agents, 
that is, higher order entities can occur unproblematically only in fiction.86  
2.1.2 We Is More than I: “We” Narration and the (Re)presentation of 
Collectives 
It is a logical outcome of collective narrative that its plurality lays grounds for 
portraying groups and collectives. Put in different words, collective narrative has 
the potential to evoke the holistic level of phenomena. As Richardson asserts, “[i]t 
is certainly the case that it is an excellent vehicle for expressing a collective 
consciousness.”87 The holistic level evoked by collective narrative is the main 
reason why the classification of “we” narratives as “first person narratives,” 
practiced by the majority of scholars dealing with “A Rose for Emily” as well, 
comes short of properly grasping the essence and distinctiveness of this narrative 
technique. Margolin describes the problem precisely when he says that “[t]he 
views or goals of two or more individuals considered as a unit or plural subject 
thus do not break down into a set of personal goals and commitments. ‘Us’ or 
‘we’ in this sense is different from I + you + him/her.”88 
 Non-narratologists dealing with collective narratives also perceive the 
technique of “we” narration as predisposed to portray and thus form and sustain 
(or not) collectives. In her article focused “on the use of narrative voice as a way 
of articulating a fictional community,” Dawn Fulton stresses that the first person 
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86 I postpone further elucidation of this point for chapter IV dealing with collective memory, 
because the problem of ontology recurs with this concept as well and I correlate the two concepts 
(collective narrative and collective memory) there. 
87 Richardson, Unnatural Voices 56. 
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plural narrative voice is “a formal technique that seems exceptionally well suited 
to the investigation of questions of collective identity.”89 Indeed, as Richardson’s 
diachronic overview of “we” narration shows, there are no limits to the various 
groups that the narrative technique cannot evoke: in his account, Richardson lists, 
among others, “seamen whose lives may depend on each man performing his 
tasks […] isolated rural communities […] circle of revolutionaries […] segregated 
urban poor […] soldiers […] children’s sensibility […] crass cliques […] black 
Africans and members of the African diaspora.”90 
 Fulton, who deals with the evocation and questioning of the Martinican 
collective identity in the novels by Edouard Glissant and Patrick Chamoiseau, 
breaks down the effect by which the first person plural pronoun serves as “a 
discursive tool” of community formation: “By definition it [we] gathers 
subjectivities together and allows them to speak as one. Repeated use of the 
pronoun reinforces the idea of solidarity, as each verb, each sentence marked by 
the first person plural suggests common thought and common action.”91 As I have 
shown above, “proper” collective narratives, that is, those evincing holistic 
properties, indeed allow the “gathered subjectivities” to “speak as one.”  
 Although collective narrative has the potential, and it is its distinctive 
feature, to evoke (create, imagine) collectives or groups, it does so in no 
unambiguous terms. One has to remember what has been observed about personal 
pronouns in the first chapter of this thesis: being indexical, a personal pronoun 
“has no value except in the instance in which it is produced.”92 Referring solely to 
the particular instance of discourse they are used in, there are no other “such 
alienable terms as the personal pronouns.”93 Though plural, “we” carries along all 
the characteristics observed by Benveniste and others about singular personal 
pronouns. If anything, the plurality of “we” makes things even more complicated. 
The writers who have used the narrative technique of collective narrative and 
“we” narration do not make things easier either since, as Richardson observes, 
there is “a convention of ‘we’ narration: virtually no first person plural narrative 
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discloses its membership at the outset; there is always a bit of drama as the reader 
determines just who this ‘we’ is.”94 
 The first person plural personal pronoun is, on its own, distinguished by 
essentially unstable referentiality. As William Sanger Campbell puts it, “we” 
possesses an “elasticity of its potential referents.”95 Fulton connects this feature 
with the linguistic classification of the pronoun “we” into the “inclusive” type that 
includes the speaker and the addressee, and into the “exclusive” type that includes 
the speaker and a third party (i.e. third person), but excludes the addressee, when 
she observes that “the first person plural connotes a particularly fluid referential 
field because it refers implicitly to other pronouns as well. The interpretive 
instability of the pronoun can thus increase exponentially depending on how it is 
used.”96  This problem can be amended by some extra, contextual information 
identifying the “we,” but “[w]ithout specific reference to particular other persons, 
it is impossible to define the exact group signaled by the we.”97 Of course, some 
narratives, including “A Rose for Emily,” do not unveil the identity of the “we” at 
all, not only “at the outset,” as Richardson observes. 
 Since the reference of personal pronouns is always located exclusively in 
the particular position in the discourse in which they are employed, the groups 
evoked, referred to by “we” are potentially ever shifting with each use of the 
collective designation. Nevertheless, Fulton observes that “[t]he value of the we as 
a discursive strategy, particularly in the conceptualization of a homogeneous 
community, has thus been primarily its capacity to connote stability, timelessness, 
and permanence.”98 There is thus a double pull present in the use of the collective 
designations: the uniformity of the collective signifier, its sameness in form across 
various uses, impresses upon the perceiver the semblance of sameness while the 
signified potentially and, sometimes, actually changes and thus disrupts the 
surface identity of the form. In terms of evoking community, the “[c]ollective, 
plural terms designating groups may have variable extensions or reference classes 
on different textual occurrences, even though the same group is being designated 
by all of them.” 99  This means that the same designation of a group doesn’t 
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necessarily mean that it is comprised of the same members. Importantly, the 
surface, or formal identity of “we” is a vital aspect of collective references as it 
provides means to create, preserve and perpetuate a sense of collective identity 
across time since it “can thus extend backward and forward in time, restoring 
continuity, or, in a sense, providing the illusion that this continuity was never 
lost.”100  
Consider, for example, the notorious use of a collective reference at the beginning 
of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution: “We the People of the United States 
[…].”101  The designation is appealing in creating a sense of community. By 
imagining a single group behind the “we”, the preamble transforms the separate 
states into a single political entity: “The preamble was significantly revised by the 
committee of style during the final days of the convention. Instead of referring to 
the people of the states listed individually, the final wording imagined a single 
American people exercising their sovereign power […].” 102  Yet, one can 
legitimately ask who are “we”. As Rakove notes, “[t]he Constitution was a 
product of a particular historical moment,”103 but if it is to perform its proper 
function, the community invoked by the “we” has to apply to “the People of the 
United States” across time. Obviously the collective reference encompassed very 
different members in 1787 from those that are encompassed by it nowadays. 
 For such references to function across time, there has to be some 
invariable that persists: the group designated at the time of the creation of the 
Constitution and the group that is governed by it more than two hundred years 
later have to share some vital features. In other words, although the members are 
changed, the “essence” of the group they comprise stays the same. Though 
obscure and problematic, the referential instability has its positive aspect. 
However the pronoun is employed, “[i]t is the very ambiguity and fluctuations of 
the precise identity of the ‘we’,” Richardson notes, “that are among its most 
interesting, dramatic, and appealing features, and most apposite for an age that 
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eschews fixed essences.” 104  The referential instability of the collective 
designations has a serious consequence in an area that has been already much 
discussed regarding the first-person and third-person narratives: the question of 
(un)reliability. 
2.1.3 Collective Narrative and (Un)reliability: We Narration Between 
First-Person and Third-Person Narratives 
Brian Richardson expresses the distortive potential of a collective narrative most 
bluntly when he states that “the ‘we’ perspective affirms what it wishes to believe 
even when it knows it is mistaken.”105 The problem of (un)reliability in the first 
person plural narrative has actually two facets that are distinct to a certain extent, 
yet, connected to each other. The first one is related to the problem of the 
authority invested in the collective narrative “voice,” the narrative agent 
producing “we.” This is a problem arising from the plurality or singularity of the 
collective narrative, that is, it is a question whether the narrator is individual or 
collective. The second aspect is a theoretical, narratological problem and is related 
to epistemological issues associated with subjectivity and the position of “we” 
narration in relation to the first person and third person narratives.  
 It is interesting to note that even though Margolin and Richardson deal 
with collective narratives, both of them betray signs that they think about these 
plural narratives in terms of individual voice, or consciousness when it comes to 
the problem of (un)reliability.106 This is especially striking in Richardson’s case in 
view of his promotion of “unnatural narratology.” However, one has to wonder 
even in Margolin’s case when one reads the following passage from his study:  
When a narrator says “We did X,” on the other hand, it is clear he is 
referring to a (con)textually defined group of which he is a member, but it is 
not clear whether he himself participated in this action, since “We [as a 
group] did X” is compatible with “But I did not,” as we have seen earlier. 
Once more, when an individual speaker makes any “we” claims, he is 
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obviously speaking about a group of which he is a member but not 
necessarily for it or on its behalf. If he is empowered to speak on behalf of 
the reference class as a whole, his claims convey a joint communicative 
intent, the “we” designates both topic entity and originator of the discourse, 
and his utterance possesses the status of group or collective speech act. But 
if the speaker is not so empowered, the “we” tokens in his discourse 
designate topic entity only, and the authority, communicative intent, and 
illocutionary force of his “we” speech act rest with him individually.107  
The analysis is precise, if the plural pronoun “we” is used by an individual 
speaker who employs it also in reference to others. The problem is the 
presupposition that “[w]hen a narrator says ‘We did X’,” he is, as this passage 
suggests, inherently individual, a member of a group. This is somewhat striking, 
given that Margolin’s typology of possible collective narrative agents includes 
also “a collective structure as such, abstracted from any individuals who may 
embody it.” 108  In this case, the whole collective is so homogenous and so 
“collected” that its whole becomes an “individual”: it is impossible to speak of 
individual members.  
An interesting aspect noted by Margolin that comes into play and 
potentially problematizes the assessment of the (un)reliability of the collective 
narrative is the non-distributivity of collective propositions – the idea that “[t]he 
views or goals of two or more individuals considered as a unit or plural subject 
thus do not break down into a set of personal goals and commitments”109:  
Formally put, propositions including collective terms in their argument 
positions do not imply that every member, or any particular member of the 
group individually, is under the scope of any predication involving this 
group as a whole […] two or more people can, as a body, accept a given 
decision, view, or goal as their joint stance, without it being the personal 
view or goal of any of them individually (our view as a group vs. my 
personal view).110 
 Still relevant for the first facet of collective (un)reliability, Richardson 
addresses the referential instability as potentially laying basis for the interpretation 
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of the narrative/narrator as unreliable: “‘We’ may represent an intimate or a vast 
group, and its composition may – and usually does – change during the course of 
the fiction. […] important question is how homogeneous or disparate the ‘we’ 
cluster is, and how it becomes more or less inclusive as the text progresses.”111 
However, Richardson treats mainly the second facet of the (un)reliability of 
collective narrators as he remarks upon “the transgression that ‘we’-narration 
always threatens to enact: the collapsing of the boundary between the first and the 
third persons and thereby minimizing the foundational difference between the 
implicit fallibility of all first person narration and the inherent infallibility of third 
person fiction.”112  
Richardson thus posits the boundaries of “we” narration as the 
conventional epistemological limitations of first-person narrators and the 
conventional, and obscurant, omniscience of third-person narrators. 113  Indeed, 
Richardson positions “we” narration on the boundary between the two classical 
types of narrative: for him, “we” narratives “are thus simultaneously first and 
third person discourses, and transcend either subtly or flagrantly the foundational 
oppositions”114 associated with them. He continues to note that “‘we’ narration 
curiously occupies both [these poles] at once.”115  
 This placement allows Richardson to address the ability of narrators to 
report on other characters’ thoughts more sensitively than Margolin. When it 
comes to the collective narrator’s reports on mental states of other characters, 
Margolin states that “[a]n uneasy and unstable hybrid is created in ‘we’ narratives 
originating with a single speaker whenever they contain statements about inner 
action: mental states, events, or attitudes of any kind, from perceptual to 
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cognitive.” 116  When Margolin observes that “[t]he problem disappears in an 
impersonally narrated ‘they’ narrative, which, in analogy to third-person singular 
narratives, allows the narrating voice unrestricted mental access,”117 he reveals his 
reliance on the conventional division of first and third person narratives and the 
appendage that is associated with them.  
 Richardson also sees a problem in the collective narrator’s reports on other 
characters’ thoughts. Nonetheless, he acknowledges the collective dimension of 
this problem: “The ‘we’ form also raises interesting issues concerning reliability: 
insofar as it is a subjective form, it is enmeshed in issues of reliability and 
discordance, but these are issues that are potentially different from those in first 
person singular narratives since they may involve more accurate intersubjective 
beliefs as well as communal misprisions or even mass delusion.”118 Richardson is 
more context-sensitive than Margolin when it comes to general theoretical 
statements about collective narrative119: Richardson notes a possible gradation 
noting that “‘we’ narrators can attain a highly probable intersubjective sense of 
things or they can produce an unreliable narration that is bounded by the 
epistemological limitations of the group they belong to.”120  
Richardson’s sensitivity to variation and gradation seems to stem also from 
his positive, even celebratory approach to infractions of conventional forms:  
Rather than an inherently flawed technique, it seems to me to be instead an 
extremely flexible strategy that works precisely because of its variable 
referents. The drama created for the reader is thus to determine how literally 
and how figuratively to take each such expression of shared mental events. 
The “we” glides between the lone individual and the entire collective; 
between a strict and a more lax denotation; and between mental experiences 
that are entirely, partially, or minimally shared.121 
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 Though Richardson’s views of collective narrative are more context-
sensitive than Margolin’s, Richardson is not able to embrace the consequences of 
the collectivity of we narration: “[…] whenever a text uses a first person plural 
narrator to depict the thoughts of others, it necessarily straddles the line between 
first and third person fiction, as a homodiegetic character narrator discloses that 
which can only be known by an external heterodiegetic intelligence.” 122  The 
phrasing Richardson uses seems to go against the ideas of unnatural narratology 
he has promoted in recent years: why should it be a homodiegetic narrator who 
“usurps power” of the heterodiegetic narrator? If indeed the “we” narrative 
“occupies both positions at once,” as Richardson claims, it also occupies none of 
them inherently more than the other: we is a curious mix of the two techniques (or 
rather the conventions that go with the choice of the pronoun) and vary from text 
to text.  
Richardson defines “we” narrative as occupying “simultaneously first and 
third person discourses” as a follow-up of the above quoted passage. Thus, he 
defines it as occupying both of these discourses only when collective narrative 
features reports on thoughts of “other” characters. This is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, “we” narration can be said to straddle the line between first and 
third person narratives only if it’s one of the first two types Richardson provides 
in his typology: those “we” narrations where realistic poetics are adhered to and 
where there is only a singular speaker behind the collective voice. Secondly, and 
following from the first reservation, if “we” narrative is a proper one, that is, if it 
is produced by a collective entity, there can be no “others” of whose thoughts it 
can report. In such narratives the narrator, being essentially collective, occupies 
all the positions of the individuals that compose the collective and, thus, has 
access to the consciousness of all the individuals composing it.  
In such cases, the narrator can be said to straddle the line between first and 
third person narratives only in comparison to other texts. The narrator itself 
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cannot be designated as “a homodiegetic character narrator” disclosing what “can 
only be known by an external heterodiegetic intelligence” since this designation 
unnecessarily splits the collective narrative agent, a higher order entity, into lower 
order entities construed according to the poetics of realism. As Richardson says 
himself, if the text employs unnatural narrative techniques, the critic should 
employ unnatural frameworks. A collective narrator reporting on thoughts of 
characters of the story it narrates does not, at least not always, commit an 
“epistemic slippage,”123 as Richardson has called it.  
The whole narratological debate of (un)reliability has a most interesting 
complementation in William Sanger Campbell’s observations on “we” narrative 
passages in The Acts of the Apostles and in the ancient histories of Thucydides, 
Polybius and Flavius Josephus. Although Campbell uses narratological sources, 
though not specifically the framework of collective narrative, his observations 
regard rather rhetorical effects of “we” narrative passages in relation to 
(un)reliability. Campbell states that “[m]uch like the first person singular, first 
person plural creates a personal narrative tone that projects the involvement of the 
narrators in their stories and storytelling, that is, their closeness to and knowledge 
of events and, thus, their authority and competence to narrate the story.”124 This is 
interesting since in standard narratological parlance, first person narrator is 
considered to be inherently fallible and unreliable. As Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan 
summarizes it, “[t]he main sources of unreliability are the narrator’s limited 
knowledge, his personal involvement, and his problematic value-scheme.”125 All 
of these are problems in which first person narrators, being (considered) 
subjective individuals, are enmeshed. 
 Campbell observes a distinctive feature of first person plural narrators that 
first person singular narrators lack. Campbell states that  
[t]he effect of this use of first-person plural style is that it simultaneously 
accentuates the authority of the narrator (similar to first person singular) 
while at the same time tempering it by including his experience with that of 
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others through the use of the collective “we.” […] first person plural makes 
and at the same time moderates claims that may be open to challenge as 
exaggerated or excessive by others with different perspectives on or 
information about events.126  
This moderation can turn into its opposite and become an amplification since 
Campbell observes that “referring to the narrator as ‘we’ in those ancient texts 
projects a sense of corroboration concerning the narrative eyewitness’s version of 
the story: it is not just ‘my’ word, but ‘our’ word.”127  
 Campbell’s observations are valuable since they show the other side of the 
coin of first-person narrative epistemology: first-person narrators are not only 
limited and fallible, but also trustworthy and reliable: “If third person is the 
grammatical style of objectivity, first person singular is the style of personal 
integrity and trustworthiness.”128 This view of the “subjective” narrative technique 
stems from the corpus of texts under Campbell’s scrutiny: since he is concerned 
with historical texts, first-person narrative figures in his view mainly in its witness 
role. The first person narrator is invested with authority as the one who can say “I 
was there, I saw it.” Considering the witness role of the first person narrator, one 
can observe that it is not specific to historical narratives.  
It follows from the definition of first-person, or homodiegetic narrator as a 
“narrator present as a character in the story he tells”129 that the fictional use of the 
first person narrative also has a witness status. As the convention of third person 
narrative draws on the abstract notion of omniscience which sanctions its 
authority, the convention of first person narrative acquires authority as the 
autobiographical report of “one being present at the unfolding events.” This is, of 
course, not the only authority of the first person narrative: various types of sources 
(hearsay, written accounts, recordings etc.) may come into play. However, if 
sources are not specified, their lack is taken as an indication of the “personal” 
involvement of the first person narrative agent. 
 I conclude this passage with a discussion of the reader’s identification with 
the “we” of the narrative text since it relates to the problem of (un)reliability. 
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Campbell imputes to “we” narrative the feature of the readers’ identification with 
the first person plural narrator. Campbell claims that  
first person plural suggests familiarity and a shared purpose. Readers sense 
that they know or should recognize who ‘we’ are and, in addition, that at 
some level they are part of the collective voice. Even when the narrative 
context explicitly defines or limits referents, readers experience a connection 
to the ‘we,’ whether it be the narrator only, other characters or narrative 
participants, or other persons or groups with which the narrator might be 
associated. Even when the precise identity of ‘we’ is unclear, the sense of 
personal involvement with first-person referents that readers experience 
often engenders a more sympathetic disposition toward first-person plural 
referents, and that can lead to a more empathetic reading perspective.130  
While I concede that the subjective aspect of first person plural narrative 
may cue readers toward “a more sympathetic reading perspective,” the 
“connection” readers experience is highly variable because it is (con)text 
dependent. There is a variety of conditions at play, some of which are expressed 
by Margolin: “One decisive factor seems to be readers’ social self-categorizations 
as members of a given actual world group […] A second factor could be the 
match between the properties and destiny of the textually inscribed CNA and 
those occurring in readers’ social self-categorizations. […] Another factor may be 
the cultural status of the CN text.” 131  Indeed, I am going to show that in 
Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily,” the collective references work counter 
Campbell’s assertion and distance the reader from the text and the inscribed 
community rather than include the reader.  
A claim parallel to Campbell’s, this time not on the receptive level, but on 
the fictional level of we narrative, has been made by Richardson: “The vast 
majority of ‘we’ texts valorize collective identity in no uncertain terms; ‘we’ is 
almost always a favored term and a desirable subject position that is to be sought 
out and inhabited.”132 Again, the favorability of “we” differs from text to text. It 
might apply in pragmatic terms once the “we” group occupies the sought for 
social status, wealth etc., but even this is variable. Amit Marcus, providing an 
analysis of collective narrative in Israeli fiction, points out that Richardson’s 
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claim is a result of the texts he analyzes. Marcus contends that “[p]erhaps this 
generalization is accurate when applied to the postcolonial ‘we’ fiction analyzed 
by Richardson. Yet it is inaccurate as regards Israeli ‘we’ fiction, which has 
actualized the subversive potential of this grammatical form to critically examine 
collective norms, as well as the authority and knowledge of a collective source of 
narration.”133 In my analysis, Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” provides a “we” 
narration that is not straightforward as it subverts itself.   
The problems and intricacies of collective narrative and we narration are 
not, of course, exhausted by this chapter. Some of the themes in this section of my 
thesis might seem to be left off at places where one would like to go further. I will 
treat other general and theoretical aspects of the narrative technique at relevant 
places; when the analysis of Faulkner’s work calls for it. Some of the threads 
beginning in this section lead into areas that I reserve for a discussion of later, 
albeit related matters.  
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We tell you, tapping on our brows,  
   The story as it should be,—  
As if the story of a house  
   Were told, or ever could be;  
We’ll have no kindly veil between  
Her visions and those we have seen,—  
As if we guessed what hers have been  
   Or what they are, or would be.134  
3. Telling Community in William Faulkner’s “A Rose for 
Emily” 
I have three main aims in this chapter. Firstly, based on my approach, I want to 
“identify,” that is, characterize the narrator of the short story. Since I maintain that 
the narrator is essentially collective, my main effort is to delimit the membership 
in the community it constitutes: I want to posit the boundaries of the community 
based on its epistemological limits. This goes hand in hand with my second aim to 
inspect the theme of community in the short story represented not only by the 
narrator, but also by other groups and collectives. The two most remarkable 
features of the short story are the aforementioned narrator and the “temporal” 
ordering of the narrative – all the critics dealing with “A Rose for Emily” remark 
on these two aspects of the short story. My third aim is to show how these two 
features dovetail with each other as a successful presentation of collective 
memory at work. 
My approach to “A Rose for Emily” has an important implication for the 
perception of the short story. Without dismissing the “spectacular” (gothic) 
quality of the short story (Emily as a locus of attention), since it is an integral part 
of it, I claim that the function of “Miss Emily Grierson” is, at least, twofold. 
Emily’s story is not only a spectacular show for the town of Jefferson and the 
reader, but, as a representative of the concept of Southern Lady, Emily provides a 
particularly meaningful standard by which the community of Jefferson, itself a 
representative of the South, can be measured, or defined through the formulation 
of its relation to Emily.  
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Just how central and venerated the “Southern Lady” was can be seen in the 
following poetic, yet precise description by W. J. Cash in his classic study of the 
Southern society, The Mind of the South:   
The upshot, in this land of spreading notions of chivalry, was downright 
gyneolatry. She was the South’s Palladium, this Southern woman – the 
shield-bearing Athena gleaming whitely in the clouds, the standard for its 
rallying, the mystic symbol of its nationality in face of the foe. She was the 
lily-pure maid of Astolat and the hunting goddess of the Boeotian hill. And 
– she was the pitiful Mother of God. Merely to mention her was to send 
strong men into tears – or shouts. There was hardly a sermon that did not 
begin and end with tributes in her honour, hardly a brave speech that did not 
open and close with the clashing of shields and the flourishing of swords for 
her glory.135 
Cash’s rendering of the Southern woman’s symbolic significance conveys 
the elevated position she held in the officially proffered ideology of the society. 
By employing the mythical imagery in describing the woman’s view, Cash also 
successfully conveys the extent to which this view of the woman was a fiction.136 
The short story’s words “looking or not looking at us” (128) are particularly apt as 
a description of the dynamics of gaze and the narrative at large in the short story 
told by a narrator “under the guise” of various collective references: looking at 
Emily, one sees through her the community which is the mediating agent of her 
image. 
The employment of collective narrative with its inherent evocation of 
community has an important stylistic feature as a consequence. This is, as 
Margolin notes, “the adoption of a collective perspective with respect to 
individual group members’ properties, actions, and interactions.” 137  This 
collective perspective has a vital, albeit logical consequence for the presentation 
of a narrative, specifically the characters: “The individuals in question are thus 
presented as being essentially members or constituents of a group or collectivity, 
as social selves rather than private ones. Their actions are regarded not as those of 
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autonomous, unique individuals but as those of members of a group […] who bear 
certain defined roles in it.”138  
This is precisely what one witnesses in Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily.” 
The focus on the strangeness of Emily’s behavior and the “shock” experienced by 
both the community of Jefferson and (supposedly) the readers at the end of the 
story seems to stress Emily’s “individuality”: Emily’s actions alienate her from 
the rest and put her in the spotlight. The reactions of the narrator and the members 
of the community of Jefferson that are presented in the narrative appear precisely 
because Emily is treated as a member of a specific community by which her 
actions and behavior are judged: Emily is individuated and differentiated on the 
background of the homogeneous collective. 
This confirms my view of the narrative as a self-reflexive formulation of 
community identity through Emily who represents and at the same time violates 
the social role of the Southern belle: a symptomatic role positioned at the centre of 
the social matrix of the community, one that allows a meaningful signpost of 
identity for(mul)ation. Thus, the short story presents a typical case of the 
“collective perspective” since in it “[i]ndividual actions are considered primarily 
for the impact they have on the individual’s relative position and role in the group 
[…] on the nature, internal structure, and cohesion of the group as a whole, and on 
its standing vis-à-vis an outside individual or group.”139 
3.1 The Narrator and the Critics 
It would be negligent to pass over the criticsʼ views of the narrator expressed 
partly in their pronominal references to it without comment in an interpretation of 
“A Rose for Emily” that is based on a careful reading of pronominal usage. In this 
part, I focus on the narrator and the critics. Charting the critical literature about 
the short story will help to bring my own interpretation and approach into focus. 
Moreover, some overview is appropriate since Faulkner’s most anthologized short 
story has attracted a variety of critics and generated a vast body of critical 
literature since its publication in 1930. In his 1985 article, John L. Skinner 
estimated “some hundred articles devoted to it.”140  
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Commenting on the criticism preceding him, Skinner says that “the 
characters may be made to represent past versus present, North versus South, old 
versus new or almost any other conflict.”141 He instructs that “there may even be 
good reason for not interpreting the story any more – at least in traditional terms 
of character and theme – and for turning instead to more formal 
considerations.”142 However, the text’s resistance to a single interpretation that 
Skinner registers is not limited to the theme and characters, but extends to the 
“formal considerations” he proposes to inspect. It seems that one cannot uniquely 
identify not only the theme of the short story, but also the “identity” of the 
narrator.  
Most critics agree that the narrator is essentially individual, in fact, an 
individual in Jefferson: “[t]he story is told by one of the townspeople,”143 “[t]he 
story seems to be told by a participant in at least some of the events described,”144 
“[t]he story is told by an anonymous, first-person narrator in the plural (ʻweʼ) who 
seems also to be a marginal character in the story”145; the narrator is “some 
unidentified neighbor of the protagonist,”146 “a resident of the town who is no 
intimate of Miss Emily.”147 If the critics consider the collectivity of the narrator, 
they concede a collective “point of view”: the narrator is seen as a “spokesperson 
for a group,”148 “an anonymous citizen who presents the collective views of the 
town,”149 while “the events are being described by a resident of Jefferson – a 
representative of the community’s collective understanding of Emily’s life.”150  
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Once one moves beyond the “person” of the narrator to its “personality,” 
one finds that the identity of the narrator proves to be a most divisive issue. On 
the one hand, the narrator is seen as sympathetic to the object of his narration: for 
Heller, the narrator is distinguished by a “consistent narrative sympathy for 
Emily.”151 On the other hand, he is seen as Emily’s victimizer: Judith Fetterley 
sees the narrator as “the last of the patriarchs who take upon themselves the 
burden of defining Emily’s life, and his violence toward her is the most subtle of 
all.”152 While for Fetterley the narrator is a father-figure, Ruth Sullivan maintains 
that the narrator is psychically a child, that “his psychic development is 
infantile.”153  Lawrence Rodgers claims that “the unnamed narrator that pieces 
together the fragmented decline of the Grierson lineage […] provides a kind of 
detective.”154  
While many critics see the narrator as a man, this view is based rather on 
extra-textual evidence. Firstly, it is a convention to assume that an unidentified 
narrator is male: a narrator is usually considered to be male until proven 
otherwise. 155  After all, it is standard to refer to the narrative function called 
“narrator” as he. Secondly, given the cultural context, the narrator is presumed to 
be male on the basis of the Southern society’s structure the short story depicts. 
Thirdly, critics assume that the narrator is male based on the beliefs and opinions 
it betrays in its narration: for Skinner, “behind the patronizing comment on male 
respect and female curiosity must lurk a male narrator.”156 On the other hand, one 
can also see the narrator as a woman: Jennings Mace observes that “the story has 
all the trappings of a tale told by a gossiping woman (A stereotype, yes, and one 
that probably wouldn’t have bothered Faulkner at all.) to a visiting cousin, 
complete with fractured chronology, dead ends, and a genuine snapper of an 
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ending.”157 Yet, as Norman N. Holland observes, “one cannot tell whether the 
narrator of the story is male or female, old or young.”158  
I have come across several critics who treat the narrator in collective terms, 
though they have not embraced the collective nature of the narrator fully. I will 
discuss them now briefly in order to show how my analysis differs from their 
views. For Nikolaus Happel, the narrator “doesn’t emerge as an ʻI’ in the 
foreground, but he places himself as the ʻwe’ within the circle of the townspeople, 
and becomes a participatory witness and observer. […] His being is a part of the 
viable whole of the town; he participates in the events of this community and pulls 
the reader into this participation.”159 Happel doesn’t say that the narrator is an 
individual who is part of a group, like other critics, but his discussion of the 
collectivity of the narrator is too vague to specify if he has really taken the step to 
claim a collective narrator.  
A recent perception of the collective narrator comes from Alice Robertson 
who sees the narrative as expressing “the communal point of view represented by 
the composite narrative voice.”160 Robertson also states that “the collective ʻwe’ 
narrative voice, a segment of the townspeople, never narrows into a single 
ʻspokesman for the community’.” 161  However, her analysis contains several 
observations that contradict this statement of the narrator’s collectivity. For 
Robertson, the we narration represents a “limited character stance [which] cannot 
logically provide interior privilege into the protagonist’s consciousness.” 162 
Though the narrator, indeed, cannot provide “interior privilege” into Emily’s 
consciousness, this is not an inherent trait of the technique, but is a motivated 
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feature of the narrative. Besides other misreadings, the most important one is 
Robertson’s claim that the narrator “can’t be ʻthe citizens of Jefferson’.”163 
Though concerned more with the detective story structure in “A Rose for 
Emily,” Lawrence Rodgers observes that “the narrator himself is speaking as a 
representative voice of Jefferson (or, in using the ʻwe’ pronoun throughout, 
perhaps even as the collective voice of the town).”164  Rodgers speaks of the 
narrator as of “this vox populi” 165  or “the collective sensibility the narrator 
represents”166; nonetheless, given his focus, he does not provide any insight into 
the collective nature of the narrator. Ruth Sullivan provides a rare example of a 
critic who takes the obvious textual evidence into consideration and derives from 
it the logical conclusion: “Who is the narrator? Not a single person because 
Faulkner uses a first-person plural point of view, ʻwe’; that ʻwe’ is townspeople 
[…].”167 
How is it then, that such an obvious interpretation has been missed by so 
many critics? I think there are two main reasons why the majority of the critics 
take the individuality of the narrator as apparent despite the narrator’s explicit and 
exclusive use of collective denominations, mainly we, in reference to itself. Firstly, 
those critics who see the narrator as “one of the townspeople,”168 subscribe to the 
traditional distinction of narrative into first- and third-person. For them, 
identifying the narrator is part of the “fundamental question involved in ʻwhere to 
standʼ,” which involves “the basic choice between first- and third-person 
narration.”169 Thus the critics are trapped; they are stuck with two possibilities 
neither of which is appropriate for “A Rose for Emily”.  
Secondly, stemming from the first reason, critics who have marked the 
narrator as an individual, misread passages of the narrative based on their view of 
the narrator and create unnecessary problems challenging their readings. Even 
though interpreting the narrator in individual terms, the critics cannot escape the 
collective nature of the narrator presented in the narrative and are lead to palpable 
contradictions in their arguments. An emblematic statement expressing the 
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paradox lying in the supposition of the narrator’s individuality is the following 
definition of the narrator by Joseph Reed: “The story is told by an unspecified 
first-person speaker, apparently an individual, but one who always speaks as 
we.”170 The paradox is obvious: how can it be “apparently an individual” if the 
narrator “always speaks as we”?  
Critics writing about “A Rose for Emily” do not take into account that the 
short story is an instance of we narration. They note it as a peculiar fact that the 
narrator is “our whole town” (119) or “we”; they sometimes stress the fact as 
important, but they do not really “grasp” it. What I mean by this is that though 
they point out that there is a “we” that narrates, they do not see a problem in 
treating it as if it were an “I” that narrates. Also, stemming probably from this 
assumption, they do not develop an appropriate framework or utilize the 
theoretical framework that exists for the treatment of collective narratives. But, we 
is more than I and it is so in “A Rose for Emily.” 
One might take Helen E. Nebeker’s interpretation of the short story as a 
case in point. Her analysis of “A Rose for Emily” is too heavily influenced by her 
stress on the teleological aspect of narrative and her (one can almost call it) 
obsession with the spectacular aspect of the short story.171 Nebeker is a victim of 
her own analysis. Classifying the narrator as individual, she is faced with 
insurmountable problems in identifying it: “What observer witnessed that scene? 
Who remembered and repeated the exact words? Who could possibly report that 
when Miss Emily opened the box of poison at home she found written on it the 
notation, ‘For rats’?” 172  There isn’t an individual who would satisfy all the 
requirements Nebeker has produced in the vicious circle of her own analysis. 
By positing an individual as the narrator of the story, Nebeker has raised a 
wall in front of her that she now needs to scale in order to bring her analysis to a 
successful conclusion. She has entangled herself, of course, in the first-person 
narrative convention of subjective knowledge, of limited epistemology. To quote 
Ferguson,  
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the use of the first person poses greater problems than do the other narrative 
modes. […] Perhaps the most basic problem with which writers must 
contend when employing this point of view is the extremely complex 
question of credibility. They must attempt, at least if they are using the 
conventions of realism, to justify the view point character’s knowledge of 
the events he or she is narrating.173 
 Firstly, as the quoted passage shows, this convention suggests that “the 
other narrative mode,” that is, the third-person narrative with its appendage of 
“omniscience” is somehow more realistic; that an all-knowing disembodied voice 
of a narrator is more realistic than a first-person thematized narrator who merely 
does not specify where it came to its information. Secondly, Ferguson continues 
the above observation by stating that “Faulkner sometimes got into trouble in his 
handling of this problem.”174 In case of “A Rose for Emily,” this unnecessarily 
presumes Faulkner’s intention and aspiration to achieve realism at the level 
demanded by the convention of the first-person narrative. In my opinion, the 
narrative agent in the short story cannot be reduced to a single spokesperson and 
is essentially collective. Faulkner’s technique matches perfectly the “realism” of a 
collective narrator and the instance of we narration that his short story presents. 
3.2 “We believed …”: The Collective Narrator of “A Rose for 
Emily” 
William Faulkner uses the pronoun “we” as a reference to the subject of the 
narrative agent in several of his short stories, to a larger or lesser extent. None of 
these uses however reaches the “logical type shift” that Margolin observes as 
inherent in the properly collective use of collective narrative. The consistent albeit 
ambiguous use of the pronoun and the consequent creation of the voice of the 
community are specific for “A Rose for Emily.” The other uses are natural, or 
mimetic, that is, the “we” is reducible to I + you + him/her.  
Thus, for example, in “That Will Be Fine” the initial “we” refers to the boy 
Georgie who is the protagonist of the story and to the servant Rosie who is present 
with him in the opening scene: “We could hear the water running into the tub. We 
looked at the presents scattered over the bed where mamma had wrapped them in 
the colored paper, with our names on them so Grandpa could tell who they 
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belonged to easy when he would take them off the tree.”175 The “we” does not 
occur anymore in the short story: from then on, the protagonist uses the 
conventional “I” of the singular “first-person” narrative, as he acts for the rest of 
the story on his own, largely in defiance to the rest of the family and without their 
knowledge. The I of the narrator suits his character much better: “[…] in spite of 
his ignorance of sex, the little boy is, in other respects, utterly corrupt, one of the 
most loathsome children in all of fiction. A monster of greed, he is obsessively 
concerned with the acquisition of money and hence totally selfish, involuted, 
solipsistic.”176 
Richardson expressly classifies these uses of “we” narration as his first 
type, “conventional,” noting that the most common use to which Faulkner puts we 
to “is the case of a first person narrator recounting the experience of a small group 
or members of a family.”177  “A Rose for Emily” represents for Richardson a 
“more capacious” 178  we narration and he traces the shifts in the collective 
narrative throughout the story. Though his observations on the short story are 
perceptive, he maintains that we narration is switched for a “third person 
narration”: “The story begins with a relatively unobtrusive collective pronoun […] 
which quickly dissolves into third person narration but then resumes with a 
number of interesting ʻwe’ statements.”179  This, of course, is effected by the 
deictic field in which one can refer to another only in third person. According to 
Richardson’s typology, the narrative of “A Rose for Emily” can be classified 
either as his second type, “standard” we narration that “stretches verisimilitude at 
key points” if one posits an individual behind the collective we; or as his third 
type, “nonrealistic” we narration with “flagrant violations of the parameters of 
realistic representation,”180 if one sees the narrative as truly collective.  
The view that the narrator in “A Rose for Emily” is a collective in the 
strict sense and the appropriate theoretical framework allows for correction of the 
misapprehensions of the critics about the narrator. The main problem, inextricably 
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connected with the view that the “corporate narrator is clearly an individual,”181 is 
the limitations of the first-person point of view. This brings us back to the flagrant 
inconsistency in the critics’ accounts of the short story: their unproblematic use of 
first-person singular attributes for a first-person plural narrator. Thus, Hans Skei is 
able to say, in one breath, that “he [Faulkner] also lets him [the narrator] have 
access to information which does not come from having watched, eavesdropped 
and listened to secrets and which simply do not fit in with the implied restrictions 
of the first-person perspective” and yet claim that “‘A Rose for Emily’ is clearly 
told from a community point of view, so that the narrative voice in the story is the 
voice of ‘our town’ and ‘we’.”182 Similarly, Nebeker, who in search of the single 
speaker arrives at the complicity of several individuals, fails to infer the necessary 
conclusion of the communal narrative agent. Skei, like Nebeker, posits a “single 
mind behind the ‘we’.”183  
The most problematic part of the short story for the critics is the “scene” 
where Emily buys arsenic and the last sentence of part III: “Miss Emily just stared 
at him, her head tilted back in order to look him eye for eye, until he looked away 
and went and got the arsenic and wrapped it up. The Negro delivery boy brought 
her the package; the druggist didn’t come back. When she opened the package at 
home there was written on the box, under the skull and bones: ‘For rats’” (126). 
Commenting on this scene, Nebeker starts to give a series of conditions which the 
single speaker behind the “we” must fulfill to be able to obtain the various 
information in the story (including what happened at the druggist) that are not 
“common” knowledge. Strangely, Nebeker dismisses the possibility of the 
information circulating “as public rumour, common gossip” as a violation of 
Faulkner’s art and an “oversimplification” of the story.184  
It is actually Nebeker’s comment that violates the structure of the short 
story as the text makes it abundantly clear that the narrative features a gossiping 
community that “sat back to watch developments” (127): “When her father died, 
it got about that the house was all that was left to her; and in a way, people were 
glad” (123); “And as soon as the old people said, ʻPoor Emily,’ the whispering 
began” (125); “Then some of the ladies began to say that it was a disgrace to the 
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town and a bad example to the young people” (126). Skei, commenting on the last 
sentence of the section, proposes that “[t]his may of course only be dramatic 
presentation, but,” he continues in Nebeker’s way, “the question remains: how 
does the ‘we’ know this? The point of view is rather limited, and the narrator must 
have access to what appears to be relatively secret information.”185 The dramatic 
presentation seems to be the best solution if one sees the narrator as an individual. 
Since gossip is an important way of circulating information, the druggist 
may have just told somebody and the information got about the town. Secondly, 
he didn’t even have to have told anybody, as long as he is, and the knowledge of 
what happened in the drugstore confirms this, part of the “we,” of “our whole 
town”. In my view, the collectivity of the narrator has a necessary consequence: 
as “a singular higher order entity or agent” the collective “we,” composed from all 
the individuals who belong to it, occupies the position of all of them. That is, the 
communal “we” knows everything that every single individual of this “we” knows; 
and it can be supposed that the druggist would belong to this “we” (more on the 
characteristic of the narrative agent below). This epistemology corresponds 
precisely to the mixture of first-person and third-person fiction properties that 
Richardson writes about and can be best described by the oxymoronic tag “limited 
omniscience.”  
The “unnatural” collectivity of the narrative agency can be seen in the 
description of actions. As Margolin observes, writers are “obliged to decide […] 
how much to describe in group-as-a-whole terms, and how much in individuals-
as-members-of-a-group terms” which, as he continues, “is tantamount to 
switching to a different ontological level, thereby creating the impression that we 
are dealing with an entirely different kind of entity, with a life, willpower, and 
power of action of its own.”186 What an apt description of gossip, by the way, 
which, indeed, seems to have “a life, willpower, and power of action of its own.” 
In “A Rose for Emily” the collectivity focus is not limited to physical actions but 
extends to mental states represented as shared: “our whole town went to her 
funeral” (119), “the one we believed would marry her” (122), “We had long 
thought of them as a tableau” (123), “all the ladies prepared to call at the house” 
(124), “We did not say […] We believed […] We remembered […] we knew […] 
we saw […] we were glad” (125) etc., etc.  
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Furthermore, some of the actions represented as conducted by a 
community are hardly to be executed by a plurality of individuals. Consider how 
the narrator describes the demand made by the new generation upon Emily’s taxes: 
“When the next generation, with its more modern ideas, became mayors and 
aldermen, this arrangement created some little dissatisfaction. On the first of the 
year they mailed her a tax notice. February came, and there was no reply. They 
wrote her a formal letter, asking her to call at the sheriff’s office at her 
convenience” (120; italics mine). To write a letter and mail it as a group effort is 
not only a waste of energy and time, but it is also very impractical and one can 
only hardly imagine the described procedure literally. Even though this might just 
represent reference to governmental authority, it is still conceived in collective 
terms with the vague reference “they”.  
The actions are presented as a collective effort. That the narrator presents 
actions which are individual intentionally as communal is revealed when the 
scene where Emily is met by the tax delegation is described: “[…] the visitors 
stated their errand. She did not ask them to sit. She just stood in the door and 
listened quietly until the spokesman came to a stumbling halt” (121). Firstly, it is 
said that the delegation as a whole informs Emily; then, Emily’s actions 
simultaneous with the delegation’s act of “stating their errand” are reported. When 
the perspective returns back to the delegation, the act of “stating their errand” is 
explicitly described as proceeding from an individual, the spokesman. Thus, the 
narrator’s purposeful construction of communality is revealed. Not to mention 
that the presented collectivity of mental states creates an illusion of coordination 
while in real life “[a] group mental action can at most consist of the coaction of 
many: different individuals thinking, feeling, or perceiving the same thing at the 
same time, usually as a reaction to a common situation or event but without 
mutual coordination.”187  
3.3 Telling Community in “A Rose for Emily” 
I have already commented on the creation of communal narrative agency 
through the consistent use of “we” and other collective denominations in 
reference to the narrator and through the holistic representation of physical actions, 
perception and mental states (beliefs, emotions etc.) by using collective predicates. 
One of the stylistic features enhancing a collectivity focus is the introduction of 
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beings and objects in the plural, listing the individual entities composing these 
collectives only later so that they are “represented as mere constituents or 
subordinate parts of the respective collective entities.”188 The problem with “A 
Rose for Emily” is that it never specifies the collective “we” by listing its 
components. This “problem” only confirms my thesis: referring vaguely to the 
narrative agency on a purely holistic level as “we” or “our whole town,” the 
narrator presents the community as indivisible, as an organic whole.  
However, the narrator is not the only entity that is envisioned as a group or 
a collective in “A Rose for Emily”. The vague pronoun reference pervades the 
text and is not limited to the “we” that narrates: “When the town got free postal 
delivery, Miss Emily alone refused to let them fasten the metal numbers above her 
door and attach a mailbox to it. She would not listen to them” (128; italics mine). 
Who is “them”? Is it “the newer generation who became the backbone and the 
spirit of the town” (128) mentioned few lines before? Is it the workers who came 
to attach the mailbox? Is it the representatives of the post? The pronominal 
anaphora is not provided with an antecedent, a referent that would allow us to 
identify “them”. Using this kind of vague pronoun reference, the text creates 
several communities represented as supposedly familiar with no need of 
specifying the pronoun reference. As Karen van Hoek shows in her study, the 
exclusive use of “[p]ronouns signal[s] a subtle sense of closeness between the 
speaker and the person being referred to.”189  
The following passage, for example, introduces several groups before a 
collective agency “they” is referred to without specifying which of the groups is 
being meant:  
The day after his death all the ladies prepared to call at the house and offer 
condolence and aid, as is our custom. Miss Emily met them at the door, 
dressed as usual and with no trace of grief on her face. She told them that her 
father was not dead. She did that for three days, with the ministers calling on 
her, and the doctors, trying to persuade her to let them dispose of the body. 
Just as they were about to resort to law and force, she broke down, and they 
buried her father quickly. (123-124; emphasis mine) 
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Following the syntax and the pronoun references in the passage, it seems 
that “they” of the last sentence refers to “the ladies” of the first sentence as “the 
ministers” and “the doctors” are subordinated in the third sentence which makes 
them unlikely to serve as a reference for “they”. While “the ladies” can resort to 
law, though it would seem rather a male area (given the context of the short story), 
it is hard to imagine “the ladies” resort to force. Even though “they” in the last 
sentence might refer to “the ministers” and “the doctors” to whom does it refer to: 
to the first group, to the second, or both of them? And when “they buried her 
father quickly” is it meant physically digging the grave, is it a way of saying that 
“they” got the body to the ground where it belonged to, or does the burying refer 
to the performance of the necessary ceremonies? In each case, different groups 
could be imagined to perform these actions, respectively: grave-diggers; various 
groups involved in getting the body to the ground from getting it out of the house 
to putting it into the dug hole; all those who attended the funeral. A shift seems to 
occur to a group different from those specified in the text preceding the pronoun 
reference “they”, but this shift occurs without providing the referent for the 
pronominal anaphora. 
Thus, the (for the reader) vague pronoun reference strengthens the sense of 
community as it points to the inclusion of the narrative agent into the narrated 
world and to the exclusion of the reader from it. The use of pronouns creates a 
sense of alienation that goes against the critics’ claims of the readers’ 
identification with the “we”. It is not true, as Reed observes, that “[w]e join the 
narrator […] because of the automatic alliance of the first person (all those 
appealing wes).”190 The use of pronouns is not the only feature suggesting that the 
narratee191 as well as the real reader is not part of the collective. At several points 
in the narrative, the narrator provides information that serve as explications; 
innocuous details without which the story would not be comprehensible the way it 
is. Disregarding all the information familiarizing the reader with Miss Emily and 
the incidents of her life that are necessary for the existence of the narrative that 
can be interpreted as explications made to an outsider, there are more concrete 
passages. The narrator informs its audience that it was “Colonel Sartoris, the 
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mayor – he who fathered the edict that no Negro woman should appear on the 
streets without an apron – [who] remitted her taxes” (119-120). The specification 
of Sartoris’s character by reference to the edict elucidates the setting of the story: 
it speaks of the times more specifically than the only concrete date in the whole 
story that is given immediately before the quoted passage – the year 1894 (119). 
Though this inserted information may be seen only as a reminiscence of a 
great member of the community and his deeds, the following insertion 
unequivocally marks the audience as outside the community: “The day after his 
death all the ladies prepared to call at the house and offer condolence and aid, as 
is our custom” (123; italics mine). If one was familiar with the community, it 
would not need to specify its customs. That the insertion concerns custom is 
significant since custom “give[s] any desired change (or resistance to innovation) 
the sanction of precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in 
history.” 192  Thus custom remains the living part of community life, unlike 
traditions: “The object and characteristics of traditions, including invented ones, is 
invariance. The past, real or invented, to which they refer imposes fixed (normally 
formalized) practices, such as repetition.”193 Thus it makes sense that one has to 
be familiarized with the story of Miss Emily, “a tradition, a duty, and a care” (119) 
since traditions, being invariant and thus not adaptable like custom, can be 
obliterated by the change brought about by the passage of time. 
  Several critics observe shifts in the various uses of the “we” in the short 
story from section to section.194 For example, Alice Robertson claims that the 
narrator cannot be the group of the citizens of Jefferson “because ʻwe’ watch 
ʻthem’ (both groups are citizens) lime the house.”195 Whatever the shifts, these are 
changes in the, so to speak, experiencing “we”. The unnatural collectivity of the 
narrative agency which represents the community of Jefferson necessarily 
involves the history of the community: therefore the “we” of the older generation 
and the “we” of the rising generation are “natural” and are subsumed in the 
unnatural “we” that narrates and that represents the community across time.  
This representation across time is an act of imagination: not only in it 
being a work of art, but also in Benedict Anderson’s terms. Anderson observes 
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that nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”196 He continues: “[i]n 
fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and 
perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by 
their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.” 197 
Anderson’s famous definition is based on his view of “nation-ness, as well as 
nationalism, [as] cultural artefacts of a particular kind.” 198  His approach is a 
testimony to Richard Handler’s observation about a shift in the social sciences in 
recent times claiming that “cultures are not individuated entities existing as 
natural objects with neat temporal and spatial boundaries.”199 Rather, as Handler 
puts it, “cultures and social groups – taken at any level of analysis (local, regional, 
national, transnational) – are now conceptualized in terms of ongoing processes of 
ʻconstruction’ and ʻnegotiation.’”200 
The incipient use of the first person plural pronoun in the preamble to the 
U.S. Constitution – “We, the People of the United States […]” – invoked in the 
second chapter is just such an act of imagining a nation. In the end, these acts of 
imagination are performative in a kind of vicious circle: the “we” imagines a 
community and thus constitutes its textual form, its ideological, political and/or 
legal existence, while the individuals purportedly referred to accept (or not) the 
designation as referring to them and give it its “content”. From then on, the 
“form” and “content” of a community exist in a dynamic process of mutual 
(re)constitution. William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” is an example of a 
fictional representation of community formation and maintenance in the above 
(and below) terms. 
Thus, what I am mainly interested in is what Anthony P. Cohen calls “the 
symbolic construction of community”: “Community exists in the minds of its 
members, and should not be confused with geographic or sociographic assertions 
of ‘fact’. By extension, the distinctiveness of communities and, thus, the reality of 
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their boundaries, similarly lies in the mind, in the meanings which people attach 
to them, not in their structural forms.”201 Thus, “[a]s a symbol, it [community] is 
held in common by its members” who negotiate the community boundaries, that is, 
the identity of the community by means of symbols that “do not so much express 
meaning as give us the capacity to make meaning.”202 The main symbol by which 
the collective narrator of Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” expresses the 
community’s identity is Miss Emily and what she means to the narrator as a 
community. 
 One of the main things that creates the sense of the community is the 
shared interest in Miss Emily, the last Grierson who passes “from generation to 
generation – dear, inescapable, impervious, tranquil, and perverse” (128). Part of 
the (deceitful) structure of the narrative is the shifting of attention from the 
narrative agent to the character of Emily by the stress laid on the voyeuristic gaze 
and by the spectacular story that is in the focus of that gaze. I have already 
commented upon Emily’s significance for the characterization of the narrative 
agent: Emily provides a mirror that reflects on the community. The reader is 
informed that “[a]live, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort 
of hereditary obligation upon the town” (119). This information aligns the 
narrative stance to Emily with Colonel Sartoris who remitted her taxes and 
imposed this obligation upon the town of Jefferson.  
 But the imposition works two ways. The seemingly innocuous act of 
charity attests to what Scott Romine observes about communities in general: “[…] 
the first law of community, which I take to be this: insofar as it is cohesive, a 
community will tend to be coercive.”203 By remitting her taxes, Colonel Sartoris 
recognizes Emily as a Southern lady, a subject worthy of care and protection, of 
special treatment. In the social fabric of the South, he recognizes her as a specific 
subject of the society: “In Faulkner’s South, the term carries racial as well as class 
and gender connotations. A ‘lady’ was by definition white, and the protection of 
her honor by (white) gentlemen a trap for both races and sexes.”204  
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The coercive nature can be explicitly seen in the two impositions into 
Emily’s affair with Homer Barron: when “the ladies forced the Baptist minister 
[…] to call upon her” and when “the minister’s wife wrote to Miss Emily’s 
relations in Alabama” (126). Both these acts are coercive: they are interferences 
(unlike the ladies who involve the minister, the men “did not want to interfere” 
[126]), but they are also significantly cohesive as they try to lead a stray lamb 
back into its flock – the community tries to preserve its integrity: “[…] some of 
the ladies began to say that it [Emily’s affair with Homer] was a disgrace to the 
town and a bad example to the young people” (126). 
 Therefore, the information that “when the next generation, with its more 
modern ideas, became mayors and aldermen, this arrangement created some little 
dissatisfaction” (120) signals a fissure in the community. Emily as a hereditary 
obligation is disowned by the “next generation” signaling a change in manners: 
Emily stands for a transgenerational obligation, one of the pillars of any 
community: “Members of a community often possess a historical or 
transgenerational sense and feel an obligation to preserve and continue the 
heritage of previous generations, since they regard the past as a significant or even 
decisive part of what constitutes their own shared social identity.”205  
Importantly, it is modernity that is explicitly connected with the breaking 
of traditions, the breakup with the past: 
It was a big, squarish frame house that had once been white, decorated with 
cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies in the heavily lightsome style of 
the seventies, set on what had once been our most select street. But garages 
and cotton gins had encroached and obliterated even the august names of 
that neighborhood; only Miss Emily’s house was left, lifting its stubborn and 
coquettish decay above the cotton wagons and the gasoline pumps – an 
eyesore among eyesores (119; italics mine). 
 The new generation with its “modern” ideas falls in line with the garages, 
cotton wagons and gasoline pumps, all signs of the encroaching industrialism 
obliterating tradition and, in effect, Emily herself: “And now Miss Emily had 
gone to join the representatives of those august names where they lay in the cedar-
bemused cemetery among the ranked and anonymous graves of Union and 
Confederate soldiers who fell at the battle of Jefferson” (119). As Irving Howe 
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notes, in the 1920s, “[t]he traditional sense of Southern homogeneity was cracking. 
The agrarian economy was being pierced by salients of industrialism.”206 
  The seemingly innocuous act of demanding obedience to the law 
manifested by the tax delegation marks a profound change by the devaluation of 
Emily, the devaluation of the Southern lady as a value. Since values are only “post 
facto justifications of norms” by means of which communities cohere,207  the 
community that demands taxes from Emily has an entirely different conception of 
itself than the community for which Emily is “a tradition, a duty and a care.” 
While both communities might envision Miss Emily differently, their approaches 
to her are basically the same. As Heller observes “[t]he generations are similar in 
that they both choose to deal with an idea of Emily, rather than with Emily herself; 
they are different in that they have different ideas of her and, therefore, approach 
her and her taxes differently”: one generation approaches her as a “Lady 
Aristocrat,” the second as a “Faceless Citizen.”208 
 The “dehumanization,” as Heller calls it, of Emily into these categories is 
in keeping with the narrator’s dehumanization of Emily which again results into 
an idea of Emily. The description of Emily’s house in the above quoted passage 
shows that the house is described as Emily, while Emily is conversely described 
in terms of the house. She is also dehumanized in ultimate terms – as a corpse: 
“Her skeleton was small and spare; perhaps that was why what would have been 
merely plumpness in another was obesity in her. She looked bloated, like a body 
long submerged in motionless water, and of that pallid hue” (121).  
The most important dehumanization of Emily is the one that invests her 
with religious significance: “[…] a window that had been dark was lighted and 
Miss Emily sat in it, the light behind her, and her upright torso motionless as that 
of an idol” (123) – the words “torso” and “motionless” connect this description 
with the dehumanization of Emily as dead; “When we saw her again, her hair was 
cut short, making her look like a girl, with a vague resemblance to those angels in 
colored church windows – sort of tragic and serene” (124). As Perry observes, this 
construction of Emily’s picture is purposeful as “[t]he story opens by building up 
a portrait of an impressive woman. Even when, later on, material of a different 
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nature enters, the text keeps reinforcing the trend of this impression again and 
again” while “there is in ʻmonument’ something of the statue, rigid, static – 
isolated from the day to day ebb and flow of life, existing somehow ʻbeyond 
life.’”209 
 The necessity to coerce Emily to conform to the community points to her 
ambivalent status as both an insider and an outsider of the community. Emily does 
not become an outsider because she is “left” along with her house in “what had 
once been our most select street” (119), because she is left in the past. Emily 
becomes an outsider because of the tension between her and the community. As 
Romine observes, the community boundary “does not correspond precisely to a 
city limit: it resists mapping in a strict sense”210 since community is defined rather 
by the interaction of its constituent members: “[…] to be inside is not equivalent 
to being more intrinsically worthy of regard, but to be located within a network of 
social relationships and obligations that does not extend indefinitely.”211 Emily is 
outside because she resists conforming to the standards of the community. The 
story thus, behind the veil of the gothic tale, presents “[t]he classical conflict 
between an individual group member and the group’s collective stance.”212 As 
Emily brings her relationship with Homer “upon the sun of Sunday afternoon” 
(125), she not only flaunts her relationship with a Northerner and a man of a lower 
status, she primarily flaunts her individuality, her difference – the ultimate 
violation of community.  
 This brings us back to the limits of the narrator’s knowledge. Emily’s 
ambivalent stance in relation to the community is reflected in the fact that the 
narrator does not have knowledge of what Emily had been up to. Though Nebeker 
claims that the community tacitly connives with Emily’s murder of Homer, she is 
obviously reading too much into the narrator’s phrase “[a]lready we knew that 
there was one room in that region above the stairs which no one had seen in forty 
years, and which would have to be forced” (129): “The implications here are 
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overwhelming. We knew what was in that room; we had known it for forty 
years!”213 Nebeker obviously overlooks a statement given by the narrator on the 
previous page: “Now and then we would see her in one of the downstairs 
windows – she had evidently shut up the top floor of the house […]” (128). 
Nebeker infers so much because the text says “already we knew” – how can the 
narrator know?  
Now, the information that the door needed to be forced can come from 
several sources, most probably from Emily’s cousins who must have been in the 
house before the funeral and the visit of “our whole town” to prepare it. Or 
someone just tried the door. More pertinently to the present topic, the information 
imparted by the narrator attests to the working of communal epistemology. The 
following passage from the end of section II of the story shows the intricate 
working of epistemology, specifically, that if one believes something it becomes a 
fact: “We believed she had to do that. We remembered all the young men her 
father had driven away, and we knew that with nothing left, she would  have to 
cling to that which had robbed her, as people will” (124; italics mine). As the 
passage shows, belief changes into knowledge and, finally, into a general truth.  
This epistemological “evolution” points to a vital characteristic of a 
community membership: the individuals are “collected” by their adherence to an 
epistemological/ideological community, that is, they hold certain beliefs. More 
specifically, the community coheres by the shared belief in the too strong paternal 
role of Emily’s father as a psychological motivation for her denial of her father’s 
death: “We had long thought of them as a tableau […]” (123). Thus, also the 
“evident” supposition or belief that Emily closed the upper floor changes later into 
“knowledge.” As in any community, in this one, knowledge is authorized by 
reference to other members of the community. Thus the authority and the 
consequent ability to submit statements to truth conditions are dispersed without a 
single centre. To use Pierre Bourdieu’s words, the story features “a group whose 
members grant each other what each of them unknowingly takes for granted, the 
non-thetic theses which constitute the common vision of the world.”214  
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3.4 Exclusion and Absence 
The knowledge of the narrative agency is limited to information 
circulating freely among the people (gossip) and the knowledge of the constituent 
members of the community. How can one then decide who is and who is not a 
constituent member of the community and thus define the “we” of “A Rose for 
Emily”? Roger Scruton, commenting on the political formation of communities, 
observes that “[s]ince there is no ‘we’ without a ‘they,’ the possibility of enmity 
and fragmentation is contained in the very foundation of political existence.”215 
As Cohen maintains, the idea of community is unthinkable without its other: 
“‘Community’ thus seems to imply simultaneously both similarity and difference. 
The word thus expresses a relational idea: the opposition of one community to 
others or to other social entities.”216  In “A Rose for Emily” this “they,” the 
“other,” is not explicitly named, but it is marked out by epistemological allegiance, 
by positing “them” beyond the knowledge of the communal “we”.  
The exclusion of social others and their consequent absence in the 
representative voice of the “we” is constituted in several ways in “A Rose for 
Emily.” One type of community boundary is geographical: the communal narrator 
does not have access to foreigners’ knowledge. When Emily’s cousins are in 
Jefferson to settle the “problem” with Homer Barron, the “we” does not know 
what is going on and needs to learn this from other sources.217 The most obvious 
revelation of the geographical boundary of the community is Homer Barron. 
Homer not only is not from Jefferson, he is “a Yankee” (124). Obviously, had 
Homer belonged to the community, there would be no “revelation” at the end of 
the story and the community would not have lost track of him after he is last seen: 
“And, as we had expected all along, within three days Homer Barron was back in 
town. A neighbor saw the Negro man admit him at the kitchen door at dusk one 
evening” (127). As Romine notes, “[i]t has been said that in the South a man from 
the next county is a stranger, and one from the next state is a foreigner.”218  
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Part of the geographical exclusion is the narrator’s inability to penetrate 
Emily’s house and its secrets. The house, as the place of the “other” connected 
with the past, decay and ultimately death, precludes the penetrating vision of the 
community gaze. From the very beginning, the house is constructed as a mystery: 
“[…] the inside of her house, which no one save an old man-servant – a combined 
gardener and cook – had seen in at least ten years” (119). Romine observes that 
although the community boundary “often has a geographical analog, it does not 
correspond precisely to a city limit: it resists mapping in a strict sense.”219 Since 
community allegiance is the decisive source of knowledge, one can see the details 
of the interior of the house and of Emily’s face when the tax-delegation visits: the 
members of this delegation “are the city authorities” (121) and thus the members 
of the narrating “we”. The short story, by suggesting that a woman from the next 
house can be (or indeed is220) a murderess without anyone knowing it, shows a 
universal feature of communities: any community can unwittingly harbor an 
outsider, an “enemy within” (see below).  
The house whose inside no one “had seen in at least ten years” (119) as a 
place of the other resisting the community’s gaze has also another significance. It 
is a result of the gothic genre employed in the narrative “with the house serving as 
‘container’ or second skin […] the house becomes metonymic for the character's 
body” since in gothic narratives “the ‘house’ can signify another meaning of the 
word, ancestral lineage as well as a physical structure.” 221  This metonymical 
function is stressed by the fact that the house in “A Rose for Emily,” is 
personified “lifting its stubborn and coquettish decay” (119) and takes on Emily’s 
attributes. Thus the withholding of Emily’s “point of view,” not giving her voice 
is consistent with the house as a place outside of the narrator’s reach.  
It is interesting to note what the community’s entrance of the house for 
Emily’s funeral ultimately means in terms of the observed metonymy between 
Emily and her house. In this sense, the penetration of the house enacted by the 
community in order “to see the inside of her house” (119) signifies metonymically 
a penetration of Emily. Since Emily is dead, there is a hint of necrophilia at the 
very beginning of the story; a foreshadowing of the hint of necrophilia, “a long 
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strand of iron-gray hair” (130) at the end of the short story. On the story level (as 
opposed to discourse level), this act of penetration foreshadows a revelation that 
chronologically immediately follows the “penetration” of the house.222 
Another construction of the boundary leads along denominational lines: 
“The men did not want to interfere, but at last the ladies forced the Baptist 
minister – Miss Emily’s people were Episcopal – to call upon her. He would not 
divulge what happened during that interview, but he refused to go back again” 
(126). Obviously, the community’s denomination is not Episcopal223 as this is 
marked as foreign by the alienating designation “Miss Emily’s people.” Thus, the 
community cannot know what happened during that interview: the priest neither is 
a member of the community nor does he divulge what happened for gossip. 
Scruton, noting an interesting detail about religion as one of the conceptions of 
community membership, provides an explanation of such denominational divides 
as that found in the short story:  
Note that fine differences are always more important in determining 
membership than large differences, precisely because they permit 
comparisons. The man whose religion differs from mine by a tiny article, or 
a barely perceivable gesture, is not a believer in other gods, but a 
blasphemer against my gods. Unlike the man with other deities, he is 
automatically an object of hostility; he is the enemy within.224 
Indeed, Emily’s status as both an insider and an outsider can be formulated 
as “the enemy within”: Emily is the enemy of the community by violating its 
norms.225 Emily “permits comparison”: as I said, as a deviation from the image of 
a Southern lady, she is particularly useful as a measure of the community. Emily 
is marked out in several ways: geographically, by a different denomination and 
social status – though she is a “dilapidated” aristocrat, “a fallen monument” (119), 
the narrator consistently imagines her in terms of grandeur, she is one of “the 
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representatives of those august names” (119). It was already observed that one 
qualifies as a member of the community mainly by upholding its norms and 
beliefs. Thus while having all the preceding marks of the other, Emily stands 
outside of the communal “we” mainly for the reason that she resists the role of 
Southern lady: “But there were still others, older people, who said that even grief 
could not cause a real lady to forget noblesse oblige – without calling it noblesse 
oblige” (124-125).  
Another, equally useful cornerstone of the community to provide it with 
the possibility of self-reflection is “the Negro.” Interestingly, the only “Negro” of 
any importance in the story is associated with Emily: the importance is ascribed to 
him through the individuating act of giving him a name – Tobe. There are other 
African-Americans mentioned in the story: the “Negro delivery boy” (126) who 
works for the druggist and the “niggers” (124) who come with the construction 
company to pave the sidewalks. As Theresa Towner and James Carothers note, 
this “is the first time that the narrator has used the word ‘nigger’ to identify the 
black population in Jefferson; previously, the narrator has used ‘Negroes’ […] He 
thus makes a class distinction between town-dwelling blacks, including house 
servants, and the gang of black laborers.” 226  Therefore, the standards of the 
narrator cannot be reduced to those of Judge Stevens, and via him to the older 
generation, who calls Tobe “that nigger of hers [Emily’s]” (122). The narrative 
agency has developed a sense of class distinction of African-Americans which 
suggests less distance, or a less xenophobic reaction to “blacks.”  
Emily’s “combined gardener and cook” (119) is given a name; yet, except 
for Emily, no one uses it to refer to him, no one calls him Tobe.227 Tobe is the 
exemplary outsider of the community in “A Rose for Emily.” Firstly, he is a 
“Negro” – his skin color is different. Secondly, he is individuated by a name – 
apart from Emily who deserves even the full reference “Miss Emily Grierson” as 
the protagonist of the short story and Homer Barron, only distinguished members 
of the community deserve a name: “the mayor, Judge Stevens, eighty years old” 
(122) and “Colonel Sartoris, the mayor – he who fathered the edict that no Negro 
woman should appear on the streets without an apron” (119-120). Thirdly, as a 
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“Negro,” he does not uphold the norms and beliefs of the community, both 
because his social status does not allow him to and because, to a large extent, 
those norms and beliefs are aimed against him: consider Sartoris’s edict. Tobe is 
necessarily marked epistemologically as an outsider, and most patently so.  
For some time, Tobe is the only link between Emily and the rest of the 
world: he is “the only sign of life about the place going in and out with the market 
basket” (122) after her father’s death and he also “went in and out with the market 
basket, but the front door remained closed” (127) after Homer’s disappearance.228 
However, Tobe does not communicate any knowledge whatsoever that he might 
possess; neither does the communal narrative agency occupy his subject’s place. 
To use the words of Herman Melville’s seminal text about the relations between 
“blacks” and “whites” in America, “Benito Cereno,” one can say that in “A Rose 
for Emily” “the black met his voiceless end” 229 : not only Tobe, but all the 
African-Americans that are not given voice, that are excluded from “our whole 
town.” The following passage concerning Tobe reads like an elaboration upon the 
quoted sentence from Melville: 
We did not even know she was sick; we had long since given up trying to 
get any information from the Negro. He talked to no one, probably not even 
to her, for his voice had grown harsh and rusty, as if from disuse. […] The 
Negro met the first ladies at the front door and let them in, with their hushed, 
sibilant voices and their quick, curious glances, and then he disappeared. He 
walked right through the house and out the back and was not seen again. 
(128-129) 
Thus, the presence of Tobe in the text might recall the overwhelming silent 
presence of Atufal; though Tobe’s silence is made grotesque by the narrator’s 
theory about the harshness of Tobe’s voice. Tobe becomes as enigmatic, if not 
even more, as Miss Emily herself. The disinterestedness evinced towards him by 
the community and the use of we narration are as apt a presentation of the 
“unbridgeable social and hermeneutic divide”230 between “whites” and “blacks” 
in the U.S. South as one can get. To make this divide even more profound, one 
can recall the apocryphal scene from the original version of the story which shows 
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that Tobe knew about the secret of the bridal room.231 Tobe’s marginal presence 
in the short story is analogous to his position in the society: “Because deprivileged 
groups are required to participate consensually in the social order, they acquire a 
certain power to disrupt community, which can never overtly announce itself as a 
form of coercion.”232 
The disruptive potential of Tobe is shared by Emily: while his is tacitly 
ignored (with the exception of the mention of Sartoris’s edict that alludes to the 
oppression exerted towards “Negores”), hers is presented in full by the narrative 
of her violations of community norms. The pairing of Miss Emily and Tobe is 
significant and suggestive. The relation of the “we” to Tobe and to Miss Emily, 
the relation of the representative community of the South to African-American 
population and to women (Southern ladies), results into an interesting possibility. 
There is a possibility that what is actually going on behind the walls of the “big, 
squarish frame house that had once been white” (119; italics mine) is a 
relationship between Emily and Tobe. Going back to the metonymic relation of 
Emily and her house, it is, after all, Tobe, the “old man-servant – a combined 
gardener and cook” (119) of the short story’s first paragraph who is the only one 
who had seen “the inside of her house” (119; italics mine).  
The paradoxical and unimaginable “pairing” of Miss Emily and Tobe is 
the fact that her position of “high and mighty” is, to a large extent, based on the 
opposition to the inferior status of the “Negro” in the society. As Cash observes, 
in the South, there was “the influence of the presence of the Negro in increasing 
the value attaching to Southern woman. For, as a perpetuator of white superiority 
in legitimate line, and as a creature absolutely inaccessible to the males of the 
inferior group, she inevitably became the focal centre of the fundamental pattern 
of proto-Dorian pride.” 233  Since the relationship represents the society’s 
“combined passion, fear, and promise of racial conflict – the problem of 
miscegenation,”234 it is so unimaginable that it is excluded from the narrative to 
the extent that it occurs barely to anyone reading the short story.235 
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The community is delimited by epistemological allegiance, by 
geographical limits, denominational differences, different social status given by 
class and race. There is also a difference established along the gender line and it is 
not exclusive to Emily. Throughout the story, women act differently (at least, are 
presented to act differently) from men. For example, at the beginning, the women 
go to see Emily’s house “out of curiosity” whereas men go “through a sort of 
respectful affection for a fallen monument” (119).236 Perry observes that “[i]n the 
context of the initial paragraph an ironic view of the women is first activated: they 
do not react to what is really important. For the moment at least, the attitude of the 
men seems more appropriate than that of the women, whose only interest is to 
satisfy their curiosity.”237 There is also a difference between the “we” and women 
in general which is evident from the sneer that “only a woman could have 
believed” (120) Colonel Sartoris’s pretext for the remission of Emily’s taxes. The 
“we” of the short story thus represents “the paternalistic or hegemonic community 
[…] perhaps the dominant form of community in southern history and southern 
literature.”238 
Consequently, the initial, seemingly inclusive “our whole town” (119) 
turns to be rather exclusive as the community consists of a select group of 
individuals. The “our” in “our whole town” is literally possessive: it was our town 
that went to see Emily’s house, “we” own it. It is very unlikely that it would be 
the whole town, every last individual that went to Emily’s funeral; especially 
considering how many African-Americans inhabited the South and realizing that 
they would be excluded from such an event. Recalling Margolin’s observation 
about collective predicates, the exclusion of certain individuals is inherent in the 
very act of saying “we did X”. For example, there is a distortion present in every 
representation of speech of the community: “[…] the opinions and attitudes 
                                                                                                                                     
husband Albert and Tobe is her Highland lover Brown. See Dilworth 256-257. Nonetheless, the 
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voiced […] are best interpreted as typifications, schematization, or contraction of 
recognizable shared stances, perspectives, views, or common opinions held by 
numerous members of the group.”239  
Therefore assertions such as “[w]e did not say she was crazy then” (124), 
“[s]o the next day we all said, ‘She will kill herself’; and we said it would be the 
best thing. […] we had said, ‘She will marry him.’ Then we said, ‘She will 
persuade him yet’ […] Later we said, ‘Poor Emily’ (126) are summarizing 
distortions of the multiple discourse of the individual members of the community. 
Such summarizing distortions have the importance of community 
cohesion/coercion – they presents the community as homogenous, of one mind. 
This symbolic construction of unity “continuously transforms the reality of 
difference into the appearance of similarity with such efficacy that people can still 
invest the ‘community’ with ideological integrity. It unites them in their 
opposition, both to each other, and to those ‘outside’.”240 Only the dominant and 
the desirable escape the filter of the “we”. 
3.5 The Invisible Watch Ticking 
The collectivity of the narrator, its specifications and the procedures by which it 
operates have been already established. Turning to the “temporal” ordering of the 
narrative one can identify the precise nature of the narrative agency of the short 
story. Critics usually mark the temporal structure of the narrative as the most 
remarkable aspect of the short story and speak about a convoluted chronology. 
Apart from chronologies devised in various books and articles dealing with 
Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily,” several articles focusing specifically on the 
problem of chronology in the short story have been published. It is interesting as 
well as instructive to look at some of them as their brief discussion will help to 
stress my point. 
 The discourse, or suzhet (the order in which events are presented in the 
narrative) of the short story is mainly seen as obscuring the story, the fabula (the 
chronological order of events). More specifically, the discourse is seen as 
obscuring Emily’s crime that, had the story been told chronologically, would be 
clearly visible and there would be no surprise at the end of the story. As Clay 
Morton puts it, “[a]rranged in chronological sequence, virtually all of the details 
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that Faulkner chooses to include can be clearly seen as ʻclues’ to the horrible truth 
that the town ultimately uncovers.” 241  Some critics connect this deliberately 
“obscuring” structure, the deliberate withholding of information with the genre of 
the detective story. Bourdieu states that the story uses procedures similar to the 
detective novel,242 Morton notes that due to the relation between the fabula and 
the suzhet of the story, “we see a detective story worthy of Poe”243 and Rodgers 
analyzing the short story as a detective story claims that “[i]n light of all the praise 
given over to the originality, ambiguity, technical merit, and skillful manipulation 
of discontinuous, fragmentary narrative time in ʻA Rose for Emily,’ it is, within 
these considerations, an interestingly conventional detective tale.”244 
 Frank Kermode makes an explicit connection between discourse and 
secrets: according to him, discourse tends “toward secrecy, toward distortions 
which cover secrets […] [s]ecrets, in short, are at odds with sequence, which is 
considered as an aspect of propriety.”245 While all the claims about the detective 
structure of “A Rose for Emily” may attest to Kermode’s connection, their claim 
that withholding information classifies the story as detective is weak. 
“Withholding” of information is the basis of any narrative, a requisite for its 
functioning: without withheld information, there would be no narrative 
progression from the beginning to end motivated by imparting information.246 
Nevertheless, since it is true that “no small part of its [the story’s] appeal comes 
from the artful way in which Faulkner ʻleaksʼ the final appalling secret,”247 the 
discourse of “A Rose for Emily” might be said to be “motivated”: the structure is 
marked, it is remarkable. 
 And it has been remarked upon: as Paul A. Harris observes, “Faulkner’s 
maddeningly enigmatic cues and clues as to the actual dates of events in the story 
have given rise to a longstanding, almost humorous critical search for 
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chronological clarity.”248 Temporal specifications are given in the text in various 
ways: by absolute specifications – “dating from that day in 1894” (119); by 
relational/relative specifications – “[t]hat was two years after her father’s death 
and a short time after her sweetheart […] had deserted her” (121); and by 
“indicators of historical change”249 – “[w]hen the town got free postal delivers 
[…]” (128) or the incipit itself, “[w]hen Miss Emily Grierson died […]” (119). 
The problem of the short story is that it provides only one absolute time 
specification, the year 1894. Still, one would think that since everyone has to 
proceed from the same date in the calculation of chronology, there is no space for 
variation. 
 The opposite is true. To show the various chronologies devised for the 
short story, I have provided the following table. The chronologies and events have 












Nebeker (a)250 1863 (ca.) 1893 1894 1910 1937 (ca.) 
Nebeker (b)251 1854 (ca.) 1884 1894 1906 1928 (ca.) 
Moore252 1856 1888 1894 1910-1911* 1930 
Burg et al.253 1850 1879 1894 1901 1924 
Woodward254 1860* 1892 (ca.) 1894 1914 1934 (ca.) 
Going255 1850 1882 1894 1904 1924 
McGlynn256 1864 (ca.) 1894 1894 1916-1918 1938 (ca.) 
Morton257 1852 (ca.)* 1884 1894 1906-1907* 1926 (ca.) 
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As one can see, not only are the chronologies working from the same date 
diverse, they are not even consistent in the time lapses between the specific events. 
Thus, for example, while Nebeker (a) shows the lapse of 27 years between the 
death of Colonel Sartoris and Emily’s death, Nebeker (b) shows 22 years between 
the two events; while Moore has 6 years between Emily’s father’s death and the 
remission of taxes, Burg et al. have 15 years. Comparing several chronologies 
devised for the short story, Moore provides an interesting insight into the reasons 
for their variability: “In effect, the chronology to be established by tracing the 
course of Miss Emily’s life forward from the time of her father’s death fails to 
square with the chronology to be derived retrospectively from the time of her own 
death.”258 This, interestingly, adds another “unnatural” feature to the short story 
since one type of unnatural narratives, according to Richardson, is that which 
provides multiple possible chronologies.259 
 Before I go further, I want to comment on one feature of the chronologies. 
Two of the chronologies, Nebeker (a) and Woodward, set the death of Emily after 
the year 1930, the year of the publication of “A Rose for Emily.” One of the 
reasons that Nebeker devises a new chronology is to avoid “the only real 
discrepancy in the time sequence,” the fact “that the date of Emily’s death, 
approximately 1937, is some seven years after the date of the first publication of 
the story in 1930.”260 This is also a problem for Going who states that “[t]his date, 
unfortunately, would place Emily’s funeral, the opening and closing scene of the 
story, after the story’s date of publication.”261 In order to mend this “unfortunate” 
circumstance, Going abandons textual evidence and chooses the date of Emily’s 
death as 1924 stating that “[i]n place of exact internal evidence this date, with 
Faulkner’s benediction, may serve as a peg on which to swing the chronology of 
Emily’s life.”262 
 Both these “rectifications” of the chronology are based on the flawed 
assumption that either the real world includes Emily or the fictional world 
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includes Faulkner. Both Nebeker and Going conflate fiction and reality without as 
much as a wink of an eye. Of course, invoking the author’s license, there is no 
inherent problem in setting the end of the story in the year 1937 or 1934. Indeed, 
Woodward has no problem in “letting” Emily die in 1934 and Nebeker observes 
that her previous chronology (a) was based on granting Faulkner the author’s 
license. However, Nebeker turns from author’s license to a total collapse of fiction 
and reality when she includes the publication of “A Rose for Emily” in the 
chronology of the fabula of the short story: “1930 Story written and published in 
1930. Section I clearly indicates that Emily had died sometime previous to the 
time of narration.”263 By equating “the time of narration” with the publication date 
of the short story, Emily dies just in time for Faulkner to write her story in 
Nebeker’s view.  
Indeed, to use Harris’s words, the things some of the critics would do to 
accomodate the story to their needs are “almost humorous” or, maybe rather, 
almost sad. The critics try so hard to reconstruct the fabula because they see the 
untangling of the jumbled chronology as beneficial. Though I agree that for an 
understanding of Faulkner’s technique, for pedagogical reasons and for a 
contextual view of the short story,264 establishing the chronology may be useful, I 
see the appeal rather as “a kind of armchair detectiveʼs game.”265 While “the game 
is pleasant to play, and it is surely more stimulating than most armchair 
games,”266 to play this game is to miss the point of the short story (see below). In 
terms of interpreting the story, the chronology is unimportant. The various 
incompatible and inconsistent chronologies seem to underscore this since they 
show that the chronology cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed. 
 The critics speak of the “temporal” structure of the narrative in terms of 
chronology, though jumbled, but this is not a precise description. From the very 
beginning, what occurs is evidently an act of memory, of looking back; what else, 
when the main character of the short story is already dead. What is present in “A 
Rose for Emily” is a specific collective memory of the South. This memory is 
purposefully adjusted as the “we” of the narrative fashions itself, the community 
of Jefferson, in a certain light. The primacy effect, an effect of ordering 
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information in which “what comes first affects the nature of the whole,” 267 
executed, for example, in the series of attributes “dear, inescapable, impervious, 
tranquil, and perverse” (128) ascribed to Emily, represents the way in which the 
community readjusts the image of Emily and, thus of itself.  
The term “memory” equals here “rewriting of history.” This is a common 
way in which “the ‘we’ perspective affirms what it wishes to believe even when it 
knows it is mistaken.”268 Emily is the presence of the past not only and not so 
much because the narrator constantly represents her as dehumanized, 
depersonified and connected with death: Emily “looked bloated, like a body long 
submerged in motionless water, and of that pallid hue” (121) and “her upright 
torso motionless as that of an idol” (123). Emily is the symbol of the past, she is a 
ghostly presence also because she is dead and the story conjures up her ghost by 
the narrative act. Emily is also the presence of the past as she stands for a 
“culture” she inhabited not only in a certain moment but through the passage of 
time as the use of the past perfect tense in “[a]live, Miss Emily, had been a 
tradition, a duty, and a care” (119) suggests. That is why she is selected by the 
narrator as the pivotal point of the community’s reflection of itself, of the 
community’s looking back.  
 The conception of the narrative agency as an instance of collective 
memory is reflected in the use of we narration and in the “temporal” ordering of 
the text. The chronology is convoluted, but this is because parts of the text are 
organized achronically. Gérard Genette defines an “achronic structure,”269 as he 
calls it, as a structure in which the “succession [of events] has no connection to 
the temporal order of the events composing it,” it is a structure “in defiance of all 
chronology.” 270  The “historical” moments of the story are encountered in a 
synchronic mode of existence where they are activated largely by association. 
Thus the beginning of section II is an example of a thematic association and not a 
chronological order: “So she vanquished them, horse and foot, just as she had 
vanquished their fathers thirty years before about the smell” (121).271 In the words 
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of the short story, what the narrative presents in temporal terms is the past not as 
“a diminishing road but, instead, a huge meadow” (129). 
If the chronology is to be revived, one has to annotate an event by a time 
specification. The time references “are given off-hand, quite incidentally, at 
‘irrelevant’ places”272 and are not indexical: they do not allow fixing the narrative 
agency in time. In keeping with my view of the collective narrator as providing a 
reflection of itself through Emily, Perry sees the narrative discourse as a 
characterization rather than a temporally ordered story: “The general loose 
framework of the narrator's discourse consists in generalizations about the 
relationship between Emily and the town and their illustration by examples. The 
order of transmission is a plausible one for the discourse of someone seeking to 
characterize a person, rather than being the natural order of events in a human 
life.”273 The achronic structure dovetails with the technique of collective narrative 
(we narration) to convey the collective memory presented in the story. 
Emily has been seen as standing for the South, but as Perry puts it “it turns 
out that Emily is a highly suspect synecdoche for the ‘Southern past’,”274 mainly, 
because she resists the norms of “Southern past” that are imposed upon her. It 
should be rather the community, the narrative voice that stands for the South. As 
Emily clings to the dead bodies of her father and her lover, the narrator clings to 
the memory of the dead Emily and provides thus a parallel to her own clinging to 
the past. The story represents a community obsessed with its past, looking 
backward at its history and, thus, inward – at itself. Though the U.S. South 
consisted of various communities, the community in “A Rose for Emily” stands 
for the male middle and high class, and it is this one that gave the official account 
of the past. The achronic structure is the (re)writing of history which is the 
collective memory, the ghostly existence of the past in the present par excellence.  
By employing collective narrative representing physical actions and 
mental states almost exclusively on a holistic level with all its strategies and by 
the achronic order of events, the seemingly purely gothic and spectacular story 
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represents the mind of the South.275 Thus, the “we” in “[w]e had long thought of 
them as a tableau, Miss Emily a slender figure in white in the background, her 
father a spraddled silhouette in the foreground, his back to her and clutching a 
horsewhip, the two of them framed by the back-flung front door” (123) does not 
represent, as Nebeker would have it “a smaller group whose members have 
personally seen the tableau of daughter and father with upraised whip.”276 This 
emblematic image, standing for the paternal oppression Emily is subject to, attests 
to the conscious operation of the norms of the community, to the communally 
held belief and its intentional perpetuation: the image (and by extension the 
narrative) exists in the community’s mind, not as a perceptual phenomenon. 
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Memory believes before knowing remembers. Believes longer than 
recollects, longer than knowing even wonders.277 
4. (Re)collecting Identity in “A Rose for Emily” 
I have ended the analysis of “A Rose for Emily” in the last chapter by observing 
that we narration and the achronic (atemporal) organization of the narrative 
combine to produce collective memory. I now move to introduce the 
interdisciplinary concept of collective memory to supplement my “intuitive” use 
of the phrase. The division of the narratological analysis of “A Rose for Emily” 
from the consideration of the short story in terms of collective memory for 
analytical purposes leads necessarily to some repetitions in this chapter. Several 
passages and problems from the last chapter will be treated again, this time 
through the prism of collective memory and with the focus on its functioning and 
(re)presentation in the narrative.  
4.1 Collective Memory 
It is Maurice Halbwachs and his 1925 work Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire that 
is credited with the introduction of the concept of “collective memory.” 
Halbwachs transposes memory from the individual to the social sphere observing 
that “there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to 
the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and 
participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.”278 Since 
Halbwachs’s statement, the study of collective memory has burgeoned across 
interdisciplinary boundaries so much that “the study of collective memory has 
virtually erased interdisciplinary boundaries.” 279  The interdisciplinarity of the 
concept carries along one major problem. As James V. Wertsch and Henry L. 
Roediger III observe, “one of the reasons for the problems in defining collective 
memory is that it is not a topic that fits neatly within the confines of a single 
academic discipline” and, thus, “[p]erhaps the only generally agreed-upon feature 
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is that collective memory is a form of memory that transcends individuals and is 
shared by a group.”280 
 Therefore, the first conceptual opposition that has to be made is between 
individual and collective memory. The question of whether it is useful and even 
possible to conceive collective memory in terms of individual memory is still a 
debated topic.281 As early as in 1932, F. C. Bartlett has criticized the analogy 
made between individual and collective memory: “A more or less elaborate 
likeness has been drawn between the social group and the human individual, and 
on the basis of this, whatever is attributed to the latter has been ascribed to the 
former. This is certainly unsatisfactory. What is required is a direct study of social 
facts, and conclusions should be founded upon these facts alone.” 282  Most 
importantly, collective memory is implicated in more various practices of 
remembering than individual, personal memory: “Unlike personal memory, which 
refers to an individual’s ability to conserve information, the collective memory 
comprises recollections of the past that are determined and shaped by the group. 
By definition, collective memory thereby presumes activities of sharing, 
discussion, negotiation, and, often, contestation.”283  
Distortion is one aspect in which individual and collective memories differ. 
In his classical study, Bartlett emphatically asserts that “[t]he first notion to get rid 
of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative, or reproductive. In a 
world of constantly changing environment, literal recall is extraordinarily 
unimportant. […] remembering appears to be far more decisively an affair of 
construction rather than one of mere reproduction.” 284  There is, thus, one 
fundamental problem with discussions about memory distortion: “The notion that 
memory can be ʻdistorted’ assumes that there is a standard by which we can judge 
or measure what a veridical memory must be.”285 As Schudson continues,  
                                                 
280 James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger III, “Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations 
and Theoretical Approaches,” Memory Apr 2008: 318. 
281 See Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory Nov. 1999: 
336; James V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 35-38; and Wertsch and Roediger 321-322.  
282 F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972) 293. 
283 Zelizer 214.  
284 Bartlett 204-205.  
285 Michael Schudson, “Dynamics of Distoriton in Collective Memory,” Memory Distortion: How 
Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past, ed. Daniel L. Schacter (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997) 346. 
- 82 - 
[d]istortion is inevitable. Memory is distortion since memory is invariably 
and inevitably selective. A way of seeing is a way of not seeing, a way of 
remembering is a way of forgetting, too. If memory were only a kind of 
registration, a “true” memory might be possible. But memory is a process of 
encoding information, storing information, and strategically retrieving 
information, and there are social, psychological, and historical influences at 
each point.286  
Schudson also differentiates individual and collective memory according 
to the assumption of a standard of veridical memory observing that, if to set this 
standard “is difficult with individual memory, it is even more complex with 
collective memory, where the past event or experience remembered was truly a 
different event or experience for its different participants.” 287  Observing that 
“society can live only if there is a sufficient unity of outlooks among the 
individuals and groups comprising it” Halbwachs confirms that it is indeed the 
plurality of collective memory that distinguishes its distortion from that of 
individual memory: “This is why society tends to erase from its memory all that 
might separate individuals, or that might distance groups from each other. It is 
also why society, in each period, rearranges its recollections in such a way as to 
adjust them to the variable conditions of its equilibrium.”288 
Bartlett has famously called memory, as well as other cognitive reactions, 
“an effort after meaning”:  
Certain of the tendencies which the subject brings with him into the situation 
with which he is called upon to deal are utilized so as to make his reaction 
the “easiest”, or the least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed 
that is at the time possible. When we try to discover how this is done we find 
that always it is by an effort to connect what is given with something else. 
Thus, the immediately present “stands for” something not immediately 
present, and “meaning”, in a psychological sense, has its origin.289 
Put succinctly, “[m]emory work [is] the work of giving order and meaning 
to the past.”290 As Halbwachs puts it, “what happens is that we distort that past, 
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because we wish to introduce greater coherence.”291 The “motivated” structure of 
“A Rose for Emily” is motivated by giving palpable order to the past and so, not 
find in it, but produce in it meaning that will serve the present needs. The order 
imposed upon the past is the “achronic” structure of the discourse and the primacy 
effect operating primarily in the characterization of Emily. From evolutionary 
perspective, it is the very nature of memory to be adaptable to present needs and 
thus secure survival by utilizing past experience for solving present problems: 
“Memory, and all the life of images and words which goes with it, is one with the 
age-old acquisition of the distance senses, and with that development of 
constructive imagination and constructive thought wherein at length we find the 
most complete release from the narrowness of presented time and place.”292  
This adaptability of memory is also characteristic of collective memory. 
According to Halbwachs “the past does not recur as such […] the past is not 
preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present.”293 Thus, through the 
medium of memory, the past is subordinated to the present; or, more precisely, it 
is imaginatively reconstructed according to the present since “even at the moment 
of reproducing the past our imagination remains under the influence of the present 
social milieu.”294  In this imaginative reconstruction, memory uses the various 
sources that are available to it, “it does not preserve the past but reconstructs it 
with the aid of the material traces, rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that 
past, and with the aid  moreover of recent psychological and social data, that is to 
say, with the present.”295  
The adaptability of collective memory is specifically “usable”: “Memory 
in this sense extends the act of remembering for recall’s sake into a consideration 
of the use of memory to shape belonging, exclusivity, social order, and 
community.”296 James V. Wertsch points out that “[t]he most common reasons for 
developing a usable past have to do with individual or collective identity 
claims.”297 Barbie Zelizer expands on this notion to register the various uses the 
past is put to by collective memory: “Remembering becomes implicated in a 
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range of other activities having as much to do with identity formation, power and 
authority, cultural norms, and social interaction as with the simple act of recall. Its 
full understanding thus requires an appropriation of memory as social, cultural, 
and political action at its broadest level.”298 In service of these various practices, 
the groups performing the remembering “most frequently distort that past in the 
act of reconstructing it.”299 The distortion of the past motivated by present needs 
leads to another helpful conceptual opposition, that between collective memory 
and history. 
Like history, collective memory is a representation of the past. While 
history is judged on the basis of accuracy – we ask how truly historical accounts 
represent “what really happened” –, regarding memory (in general), there is a 
tension. As Wertsch observes, “[o]n the one hand, we judge memory by its 
accuracy, and we raise objections when inaccurate representations of the past are 
put forth as truthful. On the other hand, memory functions to provide a usable past 
for the creation of coherent individual and group identities.”300 Identity claims are 
one reason why the past is (re)constructed in the name of the present: collective 
memory “inevitably involves some identity project – remembering in the service 
of constructing what kind of people we are – and hence […] the past is tied 
interpretatively to the present, and if necessary part of an account of the past may 
be deleted or distorted in the service of present needs.”301 
 For clearness’ sake it is useful to give the characterizations of collective 
memory and history given by Wertsch and Roediger: 
Collective remembering: 
• involves an identity project (usually based on a narrative of heroism, 
a golden age, victimhood, etc.); 
• is impatient with ambiguity; 
• ignores counter-evidence in order to preserve established narratives; 
• relies on implicit theories, schemas, and scripts that simplify the past 
and ignore substantiated findings that do not fit the narrative; 
• is conservative and resistant to change. 
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In contrast, formal history: 
• aspires to arrive at an objective account of the past, regardless of 
consequences for identity; 
• recognises complexity and ambiguity; 
• may revise existing narratives in light of new evidence (from 
archives, etc.); 
• is constrained by archival materials; 
• can change in response to new information.302 
In his La mémoire collective, Halbwachs opposes collective memory and 
formal history in two aspects. Collective memory  
is a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, for 
it retains from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the 
consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive. By definition it does 
not exceed the boundaries of this group. When a given period ceases to 
interest the subsequent period, the same group has not forgotten a part of its 
past, because, in reality, there are two successive groups, one following the 
other. History divides the sequence of centuries into periods, just as the 
content of a tragedy is divided into several acts.303 
Halbwachs sees collective memory as more natural, innate to humans as 
well as to the passage of time. Stemming immediately from his first observation, 
Halbwachs formulates the second difference between history and memory: “In 
effect, there are several collective memories. This is the second characteristic 
distinguishing the collective memory from history. History is unitary, and it can 
be said that there is only one history.”304 One can relate Halbwachs’s observation 
on forgetting as the change of groups to the analysis of “A Rose for Emily” in 
chapter III.  
As I have observed, the group which demands taxes from Emily is a 
different group from the one that remits her taxes. The groups in question are 
generations. Critics observe that there are three generations in “A Rose for 
Emily.” Consider the following passage from Nebeker’s article: “Thus, in the first 
two sections, we have ambiguously but definably presented before us three 
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groups-the general townspeople of the inclusive our; the they of a contemporary 
society functioning when Miss Emily was in her late 50s or early 60s and to 
whom she refused to pay taxes; and the they of an earlier group.”305 On the last 
generation, Nebeker comments that it “would have been a chronologically 
overlapping group composed of Emily’s post-war contemporaries as well as the 
older pre-Civil War generation-men.”306 
This observation points to the fact, manifested in the short story, that 
generations are not defined by age, i.e. the distinction between generations is not 
based upon the span of time separating them. Nebeker’s last comment is an 
expression of Karl Mannheim’s observation of “the non-contemporaneity of the 
contemporaneous” which, in terms of generations, means that “[d]ifferent 
generations live at the same time. But since experienced time is the only real time, 
they must all in fact be living in qualitatively quite different eras.”307  In his 
treatise on generations, Mannheim has established that “each generation builds up 
an ʻentelechy’ of its own by which means alone it can really become a qualitative 
unity. […] the entelechy of a generation is the expression of the unity of its ʻinner 
aim’ – of its inborn way of experiencing life and the world.”308 
While not defined by age of the members of a generation, generations are 
defined in time, though in relative terms. What constitutes the entelechy of a 
generation is the “participation in the common destiny of this historical and social 
unit”: “We shall therefore speak of a generation as an actuality only where a 
concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed 
to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-
stabilization.”309 This cultural conditioning of generation formation is in keeping 
with my analysis of the ideological make-up of the different we-groups in “A 
Rose for Emily” representing different generations. Therefore, “the next 
generation, with its more modern ideas” (120) that disregards Emily’s status as 
Southern Lady does not represent necessarily a temporal shift, but it certainly 
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represents “the formation of a new generation style, or of a new generation 
entelechy.”310 
For Halbwachs, the social frameworks of memory do not condition only 
remembering, but forgetting as well since “forgetting, or the deformation of 
certain recollections, is also explained by the fact that these frameworks change 
from one period to another.”311 The first group forgets the status of a Southern 
lady and with it perishes Emily’s freedom from taxes. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka 
provides the pertinent observation that “most of the time, when we speak of 
forgetting, we are speaking of displacement (or replacement) of one version of the 
past by another.”312 
 It is Halbwachs’s follower, Pierre Nora who places history and memory in 
the starkest opposition: Nora claims that “[a]t the heart of history is a critical 
discourse that is antithetical to spontaneous memory. History is perpetually 
suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.”313 For 
Nora, the two representations of the past are antagonistic, unable to exist together, 
because they are characteristic of two incompatible developments of society: “The 
ʻacceleration of history,’ then, confronts us with the brutal realization of the 
difference between real memory – social and unviolated, exemplified in but also 
retained as the secret of so-called primitive or archaic societies – and history, 
which is how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, 
organize the past.”314 For Nora, memory is obliterated by history that supplants it 
at the moment when memory ceases to be the living part of a community. 
Commenting on the rise of memory studies in the years preceding the publication 
of his, by now, classical study, Nora observes that “[w]e speak so much of 
memory because there is so little of it left.”315 
One last clarification regarding collective memory is needed at this point. 
Collective memory is processual, “contemporary memory studies view memory as 
a process continually evolving across many points in time and space. 
Remembering is processual action by which people constantly transform the 
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recollections that they produce.”316 For Wertsch, there is “a strong emphasis on 
process, or action, and hence my preference for the term ʻremembering’ rather 
than ʻmemory.’ Instead of talking about memories that we ʻhave,’ the emphasis is 
on remembering as something we do.”317 In his view, the emphasis on process 
“contrasts collective memory as a static base of knowledge with collective 
remembering, which involves the repeated reconstruction of representations of the 
past, a process that is often quite contentious.”318 Though I use only the term 
“collective memory,” the processual nature of remembering is not lost on me. 
Indeed, the narrative of “A Rose for Emily” presents one reconstruction of the 
past as a process embedded in a specific time and place and, thus, potentially 
subject to a re-reconstruction.  
4.2 Memory in and of a Group: The Two Versions of Collective 
Memory and “A Rose for Emily” 
In chapter II, I have drawn a line between collective narratives produced by a 
single speaker and “proper” collective narratives produced by a group or a 
collective. The latter are distinguished as holistic presentations of a collective 
narrative agent and I have observed that such narratives occur unproblematically 
only in the domain of fiction. I will now correlate these two modes of collective 
narrative with two versions of collective memory. The problem of collective 
memory that is relevant for me in this section is the problem of the distribution of 
memory among the members of the group that does the remembering.  
There are two versions, as Wertsch puts it, or two “cultures,” as Jeffrey K. 
Olick puts it, of collective memory: Wertsch’s “strong version” and “distributed 
version” that correspond respectively to Olick’s “collective memory” and 
“collected memory.”319 The problem designated by these labels is the same as the 
problem of individual and holistic levels of collective or we narrative. Margolin 
has observed that the accentuation of the holistic level in collective narratives is 
“tantamount to switching to a different ontological level.”320  Olick states that 
collective memory subsumes phenomena of two types – those of “collected 
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memory” and those of “collective memory” – and observes that “[t]he problem is 
that these two sorts of phenomena to which the term collective memory can refer 
[…] seem to be of radically distinct ontological orders and to require different 
epistemological and methodological strategies.”321 
 Wertsch provides the following account of the two versions of collective 
memory: “The strong version of collective memory assumes that some sort of 
collective mind or consciousness exists above and beyond the minds of the 
individuals in a collective. […] The distributed version of collective memory 
assumes that a representation of the past is distributed among members of a 
collective, but not because of the existence of a collective mind in any strong 
sense.”322 There is no problem with the distributed version of collective memory. 
Though different accounts of it may vary as to “how” memory is distributed, this 
is the generally favored view of collective memory.  
The strong version is another story since “[s]trong versions of collective 
memory are typically based on assumptions about parallels between individual 
and collective processes. These usually rely on metaphorical extensions of 
assertions about individuals.”323  Wertsch comments on the strong version that 
“[i]n general, it has been difficult to defend this position.”324  He admits that 
“[s]uch parallels and metaphorical extensions are widely, and sometimes 
productively, employed when discussing how remembering occurs in groups. 
However, to the degree that they are taken to suggest that collectives have some 
kind of mind of their own, they can be highly problematic.”325 For Halbwachs, 
however, there is no problem involved: for him, “it is only natural that we 
consider the group in itself as having the capacity to remember, and that we can 
attribute memory to the family, for example, as much as to any other collective 
group.”326 
 Olick provides an account similar to Wertsch’s with an unequivocal 
dismissal of the strong version of collective memory. In a phrase reminiscent of 
Margolin’s observation on the holistic level of collective narrative, Olick asserts 
that “[i]t does not make sense from an individualist’s point of view to treat 
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commemorative objects, symbols, or structures as having a ‘life of their own’: 
only people have lives.”327 It becomes clear from Olick’s observations on his 
“collected memory” that the distributed version of collective memory is 
essentially individualistic: as he puts it, “the fundamental presumption here is that 
individuals are central: only individuals remember, though they may do so alone 
or together, and any publicly available commemorative symbols are interpretable 
only to the degree to which they elicit a reaction in some group of individuals.”328 
Olick strictly dismisses the strong version (his “collective memory”) as 
“metaphysics of group mind” since “ultimately it is only individuals who do the 
remembering.” 329  Thus, the distributed version of collective memory “locates 
shared memories in individual minds and sees collective outcomes as aggregated 
individual processes.”330 
 Both Wertsch and Olick331 share the notion of the metaphoric nature of the 
strong version of collective memory. Wertsch notes that “[t]he general point is 
whether it is legitimate to draw parallels between individual and collective 
memory, and if so, whether these parallels commit one to attributing questionable 
mental properties to groups per se.”332 Taking into account Richard Handler’s 
observation, the strong version of collective memory becomes theoretically more 
untenable, because it is not universal. Handler observes that “Western notions of 
collectivity are grounded in individualist metaphors. That is, collectivities in 
Western social theory are imagined as though they are human individuals writ 
large. The attributes of boundedness, continuity, uniqueness, and homogeneity 
that are ascribed to human persons are ascribed as well to social groups.”333 
One might conclude the debate by quoting Bartlett, one of those who 
actually stood at the beginning of that debate: “Whether the social group has a 
mental life over and above that of its individual members is a matter for 
speculation and belief. That the organized group functions in a unique and unitary 
manner in determining and directing the mental lives of its individual members is 
a matter of certainty and of fact.”334 My point is that the problem of positing a 
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collective consciousness, a group mind, above the individual group members 
disappears when this distinction is applied to fictional texts. When thus transposed, 
both versions of collective memory become equally valid since in literature, the 
domain of fiction, such an otherwise ontologically problematic concept becomes 
possible.  
If fiction can feature we narrations of Richardson’s “non-realistic” and 
“anti-mimetic” types and Margolin’s collective narrative agents presenting “the 
collective structure as such, abstracted from any individuals who may embody it,” 
then, fiction can also contain collective memory in the strong sense. Of course, 
each text has to be taken on its own terms: specifically, the make-up of the 
fictional world of the text plays a role in the interpretation. Textual as well as 
contextual features need to be considered. However, as follows from my argument 
below, even such mimetically based fictional worlds as the US South can be 
interpreted as presenting the “ontologically problematic” concept of the strong 
version of collective memory. After all, this concept is seen to be useful only 
metaphorically in sociology and it is literature where metaphors thrive.  
Turning to William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” as a case study for the 
two pairs of concepts, one can correlate them for the purposes of analysis. The 
strong and distributed versions of memory can be termed respectively as “memory 
of a group” and “memory in a group,” as Wertsch puts it commenting on 
Halbwachs’s work.335 Memory of a group (the “strong version”) is possible only 
when there is a proper group, or collective presented in the text: if the collective 
we cannot be broken down to the constituent members I + you + him/her. Thus 
Richardson’s “conventional” type of we narration and Margolin’s first two types 
of collective narrative agents are excluded from presenting “memory of a group.” 
Because these we’s can be broken down to the constituent members I + you + 
him/her – they are only aggregates of individuals without proper holistic attributes 
–, they can constitute only memory in a group (the “distributed version”) since 
this version of collective memory is seen precisely as “aggregated individual 
processes.”  
I argue that proper we narration, a proper collective narrative agent and the 
strong version of collective memory, all occur in William Faulkner’s short story 
“A Rose for Emily.” There are four points supporting my claim that I want to 
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mention. Firstly, it is Faulkner’s use of collective designations and pronouns 
analyzed in chapter III. As I have observed, these collective indexical 
designations are used consistently (and) with ambiguous reference.  Secondly, as I 
have observed in chapter III, positing a group mind (or collective consciousness) 
behind the we narration of the short story resolves all the epistemological 
infractions that critics have problems with. Positing such a group mind means that 
this mind has access to all the information possessed by every member of the 
community. This applies only to the “true” members of the community, to those 
who adhere to it epistemologically and ideologically. Thus, the identity of the 
collective narrator is established both by what it knows and what it doesn’t and 
can’t know. Of course, the gaps in the knowledge of the narrator allow for the 
story to exist: without the epistemological boundaries, there would be no mystery 
and the following revelation.  
 Thirdly, my argument has a contextual support in claims made about the 
specific “mind of the South.” In his classical study, The Mind of the South, W. J. 
Cash writes that “it is easy to trace throughout the region […] a fairly definite 
mental pattern, associated with a fairly definite social pattern – a complex of 
established relationships and habits of thought, sentiments, prejudices, standards 
and values, and associations of ideas.”336 In his critical study of William Faulkner, 
Irving Howe speaks of “regional consciousness” or “regional memory” as a 
distinctive feature of the South in opposition to the rest of the United States: 
Until very recently, regional consciousness has remained stronger in the 
South than in any other part of the United States. This “historical lag” is the 
source of whatever is most distinctive in Southern thought and feeling. […] 
the South, because it was a pariah region or because its recalcitrance in 
defeat forced the rest of the nation to treat it as such, felt its sectional 
identity most acutely during the very decades when the United States was 
becoming a self-conscious nation. While the other regions submitted to 
dissolution, the South struggled desperately to keep itself intact. Through an 
exercise of the will, it insisted that the regional memory be the main shaper 
of its life.337 
Though these passages might not posit a collective mind in the strong 
sense, they have the value of voicing the idea of the Southern distinctive mindset 
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that has been made many times. Of course, I cannot impute the intention of 
presenting a collective mind of the South in “A Rose for Emily” even to Faulkner. 
After all, my argument is an interpretive move. The possibility is there, 
nonetheless, and I find strong evidence in the text and its context. The 
observations about the mind of the South point to collective memory as a medium 
transmitting social beliefs, norms, values and judgments:  
Historians increasingly resist drawing general conclusions and lessons from 
the events of the past. But society, which pronounces judgments on people 
while they are alive and on the day of their death, as well as on their deeds 
when these are produced, actually encompasses in all of its important 
recollections not only a fragment of its experience, but also a kind of 
reflection of its thoughts. Since a past fact is instructive and a person who 
has disappeared is an encouragement or an advertisement, what we call the 
framework of memory is also a concatenation of ideas and judgments.338 
The passage quoted from Halbwachs points to the vital ideological 
function of collective memory: collective memory is an instrument of 
community’s cohesion/coercion. It has a pedagogical function in relation to the 
individuals of the group. In this sense, Cash describes the collective memory of 
the South positing a collective mind of the region. Thus, and this is the fourth 
point supporting my claim, the use of collective narrative and the consistent yet 
ambiguous collective denominations present in the narrative are an excellent 
(re)presentation of the dispersed ideological force at work in every community 
and in the short story. I devote the following section to the analysis of the 
ideology of the community. 
4.3 “a slender figure in white in the background”: The Ideological 
Construction of Gender, Sex and Race in “A Rose for Emily” 
Recognizing the ideological basis of the community at work and given that 
the access to Emily is only mediated and constructed, one can draw a parallel 
between this functioning of the narrative and what Judith Butler observes about 
the relation between sex and gender:  
If gender consists of the social meanings that sex assumes, then sex does not 
accrue social meanings as additive properties but, rather, is replaced by the 
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social meanings it takes on; sex is relinquished in the course of that 
assumption, and gender emerges, not as a term in a continued relationship of 
opposition to sex, but as the term which absorbs and displaces “sex,” the 
mark of its full substantiation into gender or what, from a materialist point 
of view, might constitute a full desubstantiation. 
When the sex/gender distinction is joined with a notion of radical lin-
guistic constructivism, the problem becomes even worse, for the “sex” 
which is referred to as prior to gender will itself be a postulation, a con-
struction, offered within language, as that which is prior to language, prior to 
construction. But this sex posited as prior to construction will, by virtue of 
being posited, become the effect of that very positing, the construction of 
construction. If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no 
access to this “sex” except by means of its construction, then it appears not 
only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that “sex” becomes something like a 
fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to 
which there is no direct access.339 
 The resemblances between the described social construction of gender and 
the relationship between “sex” and gender, and “A Rose for Emily” are several. 
Emily is merely a construct of the narrator who is the community. This is the 
result of the axiom of characterization descriptions that I have invoked in the first 
chapter. Moreover, whoever Emily is as a private person, she is “replaced by the 
social meanings,” that is, by the concept of Southern lady that exists in the social 
sphere the collective narrator ascribes to her (more below). Talking about a short 
story, the difference between Emily and her construction by the narrator is, indeed, 
“joined with a notion of radical linguistic constructivism.”  
As a text, “A Rose for Emily” is a discursive construct whose materiality, 
as an abstract entity that can be reiterated (cited), is language: the bodies in texts 
are literally constructed linguistically – they are characters consisting of words. 
The utility of Butler’s theoretical framework, however, exceeds the similarity of 
linguistic construction, since her concept of the discursive construction of bodies 
(gender, sex and race) provides an apt description of what is happening in the 
short story: “the regulatory norms of ‘sex’ [that] work […] in the service of the 
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consolidation of the heterosexual imperative” 340  are ostentatiously visible in 
Faulkner’s representation of the U.S. South.  
The narrator as a collective, by presenting a Southern community almost 
purely on a holistic level, presenting it as an organic whole, provides an apt 
correlate to Butler’s claim that “the ‘activity’ of this gendering cannot, strictly 
speaking, be a human act or expression, a willful appropriation” because 
“[s]ubjected to gender, but subjectivated by gender, the ‘I’ neither precedes nor 
follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix 
of gender relations themselves.”341 The view of the narrator as a single speaker 
thus comes short of embodying the repressive workings of a community ideology. 
The communal narrator, on the other hand, creates the cultural sphere and the 
social fabric in which this process occurs: as the community tries to preserve its 
integrity “in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative,” as 
Butler puts it, it becomes coercive, (re)pressing the subject into an imposed place 
within the social matrix. The collectivity of the narrator thus expresses Butler’s 
use of “Foucault’s conceptualization of power as myriad, multiple and 
dispersed.”342  
 Perry notes that “the relationship between Emily and the townspeople, and 
how they saw her, are in fact the ‘official’ subject matter of the story.”343 The 
construction of “gender” was not only an inherent part of the coercive Southern 
community dominated by white males, but the short story itself is seen as 
“centrally concerned with the origins, consequences, and dangers of gender 
construction and gendered readings.”344 Miss Emily is the prime “victim” of these 
“origins, consequences, and dangers.” From her birth, she is dominated by her 
father who is an example par excellence of the paternalistic authority of the 
community. His oppressive role can be best seen in the community’s 
conceptualization of the relationship between Emily and her father which provides 
the following symptomatic image: “We had long thought of them as a tableau, 
Miss Emily a slender figure in white in the background, her father a spraddled 
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silhouette in the foreground, his back to her and clutching a horsewhip, the two of 
them framed by the back-flung front door” (123).  
 Commenting on the tableau in his psychoanalytical reading of the short 
story, Norman N. Holland claims that “[w]ith such a father, there must be an 
oedipal component to the story.”345 Scherting sees Emily’s Oedipal complex as 
the motivation for Emily’s actions, for the murder of Homer Barron: “Emily 
Grierson was possessed by an unresolved Oedipal complex. Her libidinal desires 
for her father were transferred, after his death, to a male surrogate – Homer 
Barron.”346 Emily murders Homer and conceals his corpse in order to preserve 
him so that he would not be taken away from her like her father was: “She told 
them that her father was not dead. She did that for three days, with the ministers 
calling on her, and the doctors, trying to persuade her to let them dispose of the 
body. Just as they were about to resort to law and force, she broke down, and they 
buried her father quickly” (123-124).  
Emily’s unresolved oedipal complex as a motivation for her conduct is, 
however, only a particular realization of a larger force at work. The fixation on the 
father who “had prevented her from maturing sexually in the normal and natural 
way”347 is subsumed by the temporality of the “sex” construction: “Construction 
not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates 
through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the 
course of this reiteration.”348 The overemphasis on the norms that Emily is subject 
to creates in her case a destabilization of “sex.” 
 In the sphere of the larger society, of the town, Emily is most patently 
constructed as a subject by the remission of her taxes by Colonel Sartoris: “Alive, 
Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of hereditary obligation 
upon the town, dating from that day in 1894 when Colonel Sartoris, the mayor […] 
remitted her taxes, the dispensation dating from the death of her father on into 
perpetuity” (119-120). But the “obligation” does not concern only the town, it is 
double-edged. Sara Salih explains that Butler’s concept of interpellation which 
Butler uses “in a specifically theoretical sense to describe how subject positions 
are conferred and assumed through the action of ‘hailing’”349 is borrowed from 
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Louis Althusser. Althusser explains his idea of “interpellation” or “hailing” in the 
following way: 
I shall then suggest that ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it 
“recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 
“transforms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that 
very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and 
which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday 
police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!” Assuming that the theoretical 
scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will 
turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the 
hail was “really” addressed to him, and that “it was really him who was 
hailed” (and not someone else).350 
The seemingly innocuous act of charity makes Emily a subject. By 
remitting her taxes, Colonel Sartoris recognizes Emily as a Southern lady, a 
subject worthy of care and protection, of special treatment. Emily “turns around” 
to take up her subject position in the text with a delay. Sartoris’s generation does 
not demand Emily’s taxes, but when the tax delegation of the later generation 
comes to demand her taxes, Emily responds to the “hailing” of the Colonel: “See 
Colonel Sartoris. I have no taxes in Jefferson” (121). Thus, while Emily 
undermines the norms of the community and is, thus, an outsider, she can does so 
by utilizing the norms of the community, that is, from within: resting, partly, on 
the community’s norms makes her, partly, an insider of the community. 
 The repressive norms of the society do not manifest only in Emily’s 
oedipal fixation. The revelation of the bridal chamber at the end of the short story, 
suggesting that Emily had lain with Homer after his death, shows that another 
transgression against the heterosexual norms registered in the short story is 
necrophilia:  
The man himself lay in the bed. […] The body had apparently once lain in 
the attitude of an embrace, but now the long sleep that outlasts love, that 
conquers even the grimace of love, had cuckolded him. […] Then we 
noticed that in the second pillow was the indentation of a head. One of us 
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lifted something from it, and leaning forward, that faint and invisible dust 
dry and acrid in the nostrils, we saw a long strand of iron-gray hair. (130) 
The symbolic act of necrophilia perpetrated by the community upon Emily 
is correlative to Butler’s theory. Butler observes the blurring of the boundary of 
bodies: “[…] I could not fix bodies as simple objects of thought. Not only did 
bodies tend to indicate a world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond 
their own boundaries, a movement of boundary itself, appeared to be quite central 
to what bodies ‘are.’”351 The establishment of the boundary of Emily’s body as 
her house in the conventions of the gothic genre and due to the imagery in which 
Emily and her house become interchangeable (being described in terms of each 
other) is an exemplification of the difficulty with the boundary of bodies 
registered by Butler.  
 Another potential transgression against the heterosexual imperative enters 
the narrative with the arrival of Homer Barron into Jefferson. In the description of 
his character, the narrator remarks parenthetically that “he liked men, and it was 
known that he drank with the younger men in the Elk’s Club” (126) inserting this 
description in the information that “Homer himself had remarked […] that he was 
not a marrying man” (126). This sentence with its incidental characteristic has 
prompted the view that Homer is homosexual352 and that Emily kills him to keep 
him from leaving her. Hal Blythe and Charlie Sweet state that “the possibility of 
Homer’s being gay […] potentially adds another dimension to the story.”353 Their 
evidence, apart from the abovementioned sentence, is the connection between 
Homer’s name pointing to the Old Greek poet and “a supposed trait of gay men” 
since Classical times – pederasty – evidenced by the mention that “little boys 
would follow [Homer] in groups” (124).354  
Thomas Fick and Eva Gold provide a convincing argument to the contrary. 
For them, the sentence about Homer associating with men testifies to an assertion 
of manhood: “In fact, the passage that has been read as suggesting homosexuality 
points instead to a male culture intensely hostile to a woman’s world, a hostility 
that flourished in the lodge. It is homosocial but not homosexual.”355  Taking 
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context into consideration, Fick and Gold observe that in Homer’s time 
“masculinity was—and, we believe, largely still is—achieved through separation 
from women. Liking men, drinking with them at the Elks Lodge, and bragging 
about sexual conquests were signs of true manhood no less than giving lessons in 
painting china were, for Emily, the mark of true womanhood.”356  
Reading the expression “he liked men” as an expression of homosexuality 
is a misreading since “to read Homer as homosexual is to ignore that 
heterosexuality and homosexuality, like masculinity and femininity, are 
designated by shifting constellations of historically and culturally determined 
signs.”357 Put simply, the phrase “he liked men” has different meanings today and 
then. Going back to Butler, this only shows the linguistic construction of subjects 
evidenced even in the critical readings of “A Rose for Emily.” As Fick and Gold 
observe, to read Homer as homosexual, “is to become trapped by a version of the 
gender stereotyping that both precipitates Emily’s violence and then protects her 
from its consequences. This trap is set most conspicuously by language.”358  
This quote points out that there is danger not only in the various 
infractions of the heterosexual imperative, but also in its successful products. It is 
precisely the view of Emily as a woman, specifically as a Southern lady that 
blinds the narrator and the narrratee as well to the possibility of her crime: “The 
ending shocks us not simply by its hint of necrophilia; more shocking is the fact 
that it is a woman who provides the hint. […] Further, we do not expect to 
discover that a woman has murdered a man. […] To reverse this ʻnatural’ pattern 
inevitably produces the grotesque.” 359  Since Southern lady is also a class 
distinction, class, like gender, is complicit in preempting the suspicion of Emily’s 
crime and in laying ground for the final shock: “Society respects wealth because it 
respects persons who are rich, in terms of the moral qualities that it assumes in 
them.”360 Thus Bourdieu comments specifically on “A Rose for Emily”: 
The idea of nobility, a favourable prejudice which is socially instituted (and 
hence endowed with all the force of the social), functions as a principle of 
the construction of social reality, a principle tacitly accepted as much by the 
narrator and his characters as by the reader […] The meaning of the words 
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and actions is predetermined by the social image of the person who produces 
them and, in the case of a person ʻabove all suspicion’, the very idea of 
murder is excluded.361 
Going back to the question of Homer’s homosexuality, the pertinent and 
logical question raised by Jennings Mace undermines the idea of Homer being 
homosexual: “If he is indeed homosexual […] why has Homer returned to town at 
all? […] What about the heterosexual charade would cause him to return?”362 
Mace also remarks on the various possible meanings of Homer’s name (his 
comment being an exemplification of Skinner’s observation that the story can be 
made to represent almost anything): it can allude to Classical Greek society and 
thus to pederasty; it can refer to the blind poet “just as Homer is blind to the 
danger he is in by trifling with Emily Grierson”; or, in support of his 
homosexuality, “perhaps ʻHomer’ is really a shortened version of 
ʻHom(o)er(otic).’ The possibilities are wonderful.”363  Though I find a lack of 
evidence in the text for Homer’s homosexuality and I am convinced by Fick and 
Gold’s and Mace’s arguments, the possibility of Homer’s homosexuality exists 
and it adds another infraction of, another threat to the heterosexual imperative of 
the community’s ideology.  
 Butler remarks that  
it seems that the social regulation of race emerges not simply as another, 
fully separable, domain of power from sexual difference or sexuality, but 
that its “addition” subverts the monolithic workings of the heterosexual 
imperative as I have described it so far. The symbolic—that register of 
regulatory ideality—is also and always a racial industry, indeed, the 
reiterated practice of racializing interpellations.364  
One can recall the abovementioned definition of the Southern lady given by 
Towner and Carothers and Cash’s observation on the status of the Southern lady 
defined in opposition to the “Negro” to see that race and “sex” norms worked in 
connection in the South. In the short story, Emily’s servant Tobe is constantly 
referred to as a “Negro” by the narrator (eleven times altogether): he thus 
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represents literally the “reiterated practice of racializing interpellations,” 
reiteration of the discursive practices that label him into his assigned social role.  
The “Negro,” as a designation of the African-American population, is 
placed outside the community: Romine observes that in the South “the Negro was 
rhetorically integrated into the community even as the African American was 
physically and symbolically separated from it.”365 I have already remarked on the 
exclusion of the African-Americans from the community of Jefferson (see 
Chapter III). Importantly, the “sex” and race constructions are aligned in the short 
story by marking the authority of the construction, of the oppression as 
paternalistic: it is Emily’s father who drives all her suitors away and it is Colonel 
Sartoris, who “hails” Emily as a subject, who “fathered the edict that no Negro 
woman should appear on the streets without an apron” (120), an edict marking the 
Negro women symbolically as “outsiders” of the community. As Judith Fetterley 
aptly observes, “[t]he narrator is the last of the patriarch who take upon 
themselves the burden of defining Emily’s life, and his violence toward her is the 
most subtle of all. His tone of incantatory reminiscence and nostalgic veneration 
seems free of the taint of horsewhip and edict.”366 
I have already remarked on the possible relationship between Emily and 
Tobe and I have observed that one has to make a special effort to glean what is 
hidden in plain sight: the most abject of excluded transgressions of the white 
heterosexual imperative of the Southern community, miscegenation. Thus, the 
possible relationship of the Southern lady and her black servant further connects 
“sex” and race as discursively constructed ideological categories. The “Negro,” in 
all its forms, designated as an outsider of the community, as the “other,” presents 
the epitome of the sphere of abjection that is the result of the regulatory practices 
of the normative construction:  
The forming of a subject requires an identification with the normative 
phantasm of “sex,” and this identification takes place through a repudiation 
which produces a domain of abjection, a repudiation without which the 
subject cannot emerge. This is a repudiation which creates the valence of 
‘abjection’ and its status for the subject as a threatening spectre.367 
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The occurrences of so many sexual “deviations” within one short story 
represent the sphere of abjection that is the result of the identificatory practices of 
the “sex” construction. The “deviations” from the standard norm of “sex” point to 
the limit of the community’s cohesive/coercive nature in imposing “gender” and 
“sex” roles. These deviations are the irruption of the sphere of abjection into the 
sphere of the “normal” and they threaten to shake the establishment of the society. 
Thus, what is presented in the short story is what Romine calls “the reflexive 
moment”:  
[…] what this moment threatens to reveal is the arbitrary, symbolic nature of 
the tacit norms by which social roles are assigned and the objective world of 
the text is produced. […] In fact, the collective, concrete nature of these 
social positions or roles is precisely what is called into question at this 
moment, when hegemony fails, the familiar becomes strange, and cohesion 
begins to look suspiciously like the product of coercion.368  
4.4 Narration and Commemoration in “A Rose for Emily” 
4.4.1 (Re)collecting Identity 
Romine’s definition of the reflexive moment leads me to the ultimate question: 
What is the narrative motivation of “A Rose for Emily”? Why is the story told and 
why it is told the way it is? Given all the previous observations on the short story 
as presenting collective memory and as thematizing community, I argue that the 
narrative reflects a break-up of the community. At a moment when the community 
loses its cohesion and its traditional boundaries start to be blurred by the invasion 
of modernity, the community collectively remembers and produces a narrative 
which encodes its ideological make-up. In this way, the narrator-community tries 
to re-establish its identity which becomes undermined due to the changing times:  
The collective memory is a record of resemblances and, naturally, is 
convinced that the group remains the same because it focuses attention on 
the group, whereas what has changed are the group’s relations or contacts 
with other groups. […] The group is undoubtedly under the influence of an 
illusion when it believes the similarities more important than the differences, 
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but it cannot clearly account for the differences, because the images it has 
previously made of itself are only slowly transformed.369 
The narrative situation reflects a moment when the differences become too 
strong and when the relations with other groups can no longer be ignored. The 
narrative is not so straightforward: as the previous section shows, under the 
official account, there seep through the opposing forces of the maintained 
hegemonic position. The community of Jefferson produces a certain image of 
itself at a moment of crisis. The origins of the coercive norms are pushed aside by 
the narrative agency which channels the narrative information in a way that 
produces a spectacle out of the sphere of abjection: it shows the symptoms, not 
the disease. The regulatory, repressive norms are made entertainment as the gaze 
focused at Emily provides a gothic story of a mad woman in the attic, a murderess: 
the sphere of abjection is held at bay by yet another gendered construction. In the 
rest of the chapter, I show the functioning of the production of identity, the self-
fashioning of the community by narrating a story about Miss Emily Grierson and 
relate these matters to my analysis of the short story. 
I have already observed what the critics say regarding the structure of 
the short story in terms of fabula and suzhet. Their sentiment might be 
encompassed in Skei’s somewhat paradoxical observation that “[t]he ending is of 
the surprise type, yet it does not at all come as a surprise” since “[t]he text has 
prepared its reader for the discovery by numerous repetitive suggestions and hints 
and by creating a character and conditions for it to develop its worst sides.”370 The 
majority of critics see the structure in teleological terms: the whole raison d’être 
of the jumbled chronology is the ending. As to the question of whether the ending 
indeed surprises the reader or not, the critics are divided. The most reasonable 
position is the one Perry maintains: aware of the variety of readers, he notes that 
“there are some readers who link certain items and already guess in chapter IV of 
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ʻA Rose for Emily’ that Emily murdered Homer Barron and some readers who are 
surprised to find it out at the end of the story.”371  
For some, the structure is not only purposefully deceptive, but also takes 
on sinister tones. Nebeker sees the “chronology” of the story as a strategy of 
concealing the town’s complicity in Homer’s murder that she “uncovers”: 
“Through this structure and chronology with its merging and confusing of events 
and participants, Faulkner permits his first person narrator to mask not only his 
identity but also to conceal from us the knowledge he or rather they have 
concerning Emily’s horrible crime.” 372  Dilworth analyzes the sequencing of 
events in the same way, adding that the “final, shocking revelation, especially, 
distracts readers from accumulated evidence of the town’s prior knowledge of the 
killing.”373  
In my view, the discourse of the story is conditioned by the fact that it 
conveys an act of memory, specifically collective memory. One can utilize the 
distinction made by Jan Assmann between “communicative” and “cultural” 
memory. In his analysis, communicative memory “includes those varieties of 
collective memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications. These 
varieties […] constitute the field of oral history. Everyday communication is 
characterized by a high degree of non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, thematic 
instability, and disorganization.”374  Cultural memory is, unlike communicative 
memory, distanced from everyday life and “comprises that body of reusable texts, 
images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose ʻcultivation’ 
serves to stabilize and convey that society’s self-image. Upon such collective 
knowledge, for the most part (but not exclusively) of the past, each group bases its 
awareness of unity and particularity.”375  
“A Rose for Emily” is a mix of both. In terms of communicative 
memory, the structure of the short story results from orality. Several critics have 
related the discourse of the narrative to oral storytelling.376 Clay Morton opposes 
the oral structure or “oral plot” as he calls it, to fiction claiming that “[c]learly, the 
                                                 
371 Perry 61. 
372 Nebeker 8. 
373 Dilworth 252. 
374 Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” trans. John Czaplicka, New German 
Critique Spring-Summer 1995: 126. 
375 Assmann 132. 
376See Skinner 43 or Morton’s article. Reed observes that “[t]he use of gossip as the backbone of 
these stories is acknowledgement of Faulkner’s roots in the oral tradition.” Reed 26-27.  
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plot of ʻA Rose for Emily’ does not follow the kind of linear, chronological 
progression characteristic of fiction.” 377  Though this is clearly a false 
generalization – fiction is not characteristically linear –, the orality of the story is 
evident in the “achronic,” associative ordering of events in the short story.378  
Another factor designating the story as a communicative memory is its 
“time span.” Robertson notes that the narrator “spans three generations of 
Yoknapatawpha’s historical time”379 and this corresponds to Emily’s age of 74, 
roughly the time span of three generations. Assmann observes that the most 
important feature of communicative memory is “its limited temporal horizon. As 
all oral history studies suggest, this horizon does not extend more than eighty to 
(at the very most) one hundred years into the past, which equals three or four 
generations.”380 
Thus some of the features of the narrative form correspond to Assmann’s 
communicative memory. Turning to the narratives functions, one can relate them 
to the concept of cultural memory. Assmann posits cultural memory as distanced 
from the everyday and relating rather “fixed points [that] are fateful events of the 
past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, 
monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, 
observance).”381 The first characteristic of cultural memory that Assmann gives is 
“ʻThe concretion of identity’ or the relation to the group” by which “[c]ultural 
memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an 
awareness of its unity and peculiarity.” 382  This is also the function I have 
attributed to the narrative of “A Rose for Emily.”  
Another characteristic of cultural memory is “Obligation. The relation to 
a normative self-image of the group engenders a clear system of values and 
differentiations in importance which structure the cultural supply of knowledge 
and the symbols,”383 being the ideological component of collective memory that I 
have already analyzed. The last of Assmann’s characteristics I want to mention is 
                                                 
377 Morton 12. 
378 Cf. Morton 14. 
379 Robertson 158. Cf. Nebeker, “Emily’s Rose” 4. 
380 Assmann 127. 
381 Assmann 129. 
382  Assmann 130. As has been already observed and as Assmann puts it, “[t]he objective 
manifestations of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a 
positive (ʻWe are this’) or in a negative (ʻThat's our opposite’) sense.” Assmann 130.  
383 Assmann 131. 
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“Reflexivity.”384 Assmann observes that one of the ways in which cultural memory 
is reflexive is by reflecting “its own image insofar as it reflects the self-image of 
the group through a preoccupation with its own social system.”385 How is this 
social system portrayed in “A Rose for Emily”? 
The story does not feature any elaboration on the social system, that is, 
not overtly. As Cohen maintains, “the reality of community in the lives of its 
members […] is symbolic” while “[t]he symbols of community are mental 
constructs: they provide people with the means to make meaning.”386 The main 
symbol of the society in the short story is “Miss Emily Grierson”. This is given by 
the central status she, seen as a Southern lady, has in the social matrix of the 
community and the reflection of the larger social relations her symbolic position 
encapsulates:  
We strike back to the fact that this Southern woman’s place in the Southern 
mind proceeded primarily from the natural tendency of the great basic 
pattern of pride in superiority of race to centre upon her as the perpetuator of 
that superiority in legitimate line, and attached itself precisely, and before 
everything else, to her enormous remoteness from the males of the inferior 
group, to the absolute taboo on any sexual approach to her by the Negro.387 
Added to this Halbwachs observes the way in which social thought is 
embodied, materialized, that is, the way in which the abstract ideology of 
collective memory is made concrete:  
[…] the ideas of society are always embodied in persons or groups. Behind a 
title, a virtue, or a quality, society immediately perceives those who possess 
them. Those groups and persons exist in the passage of time and leave their 
traces in the memory of people. In this sense, there is no social idea that 
would not at the same time be a recollection of the society. But, on the other 
hand, society would labor in vain if it attempted to recapture in a purely 
concrete form a particular figure or event that has left a strong imprint in its 
memory. As soon as each person and each historical fact has permeated this 
                                                 
384 The other characteristics Assmann gives are the “capacity to reconstruct,” the “[f]ormation […] 
of communicated meaning” and “[o]rganization” of the commemorative practices. Assmann 130-
132. 
385 Assmann 132. 
386 Cohen 19. 
387 Cash 133. 
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memory, it is transposed into a teaching, a notion, or a symbol and takes on 
a meaning. It becomes an element of the society’s system of ideas.388 
In Emily’s character, a tension between the particular, the everyday life 
observed by the gossiping community and the general, her towering significance 
for the community’s self-reflection is encapsulated; a tension that can be 
conceived in terms of communicative (“the particular”) and cultural (“the general”) 
memory. This tension is related to the structure of the narrative and to the 
narrative organization of collective memory. The duality of “the particular” and 
“the general” inherent in Emily’s character corresponds to “two levels of these 
narrative tools […] instrumental in the very formation, or social construction of 
groups”389: specific narratives and schematic narrative templates.  
James V. Wertsch who introduces this distinction defines the two levels 
of narrative tools in the following way: “Specific narratives are organized around 
particular dates, settings, and actions, whereas schematic narrative templates are 
more generalized structures used to generate multiple specific narratives with the 
same basic plot.”390  In a Chomskyan manner, Wertsch posits a “deep” and a 
“surface” level of the narrative organization of collective memory in which one 
schematic narrative template (the deep level of collective memory) can realize 
several specific narratives (the surface level of collective memory)391: Wertsch 
notes that schematic narrative templates “are schematic in the sense that they exist 
at an abstract level and involve little in the way of concrete detail, and they are 
templates in the sense that their abstract form provides a pattern that is applied to 
multiple events, thereby creating several specific narratives.”392 
In “A Rose for Emily,” several schematic narrative templates combine, 
or are possible to infer from the specific narrative: “the young daughter rebels 
                                                 
388 Halbwachs, “Social Frameworks” 188. 
389 James V. Wertsch, “Collective Memory and Narrative Templates,” Social Research Spring 
2008: 139. 
390 Wertsch, “Collective Memory” 140. The concept of schematic narrative templates draws on 
Bartletts definition of schemata. For Bartlett, schema “refers to an active organization of past 
reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-
adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behaviour, a 
particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been 
serially organized, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, 
but as a unitary mass. […] All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build 
up an active, organized setting. […] They have to be regarded as constituents of living, momentary 
settings belonging to the organism, or to whatever parts of the organism are concerned in making a 
response of a given kind, and not as a number of individual events somehow strung together and 
stored within the organism.” Bartlett 201. 
391 Wertsch, “Collective Memory” 139. 
392 Wertsch, “Collective Memory” 141-142. 
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against her father,”393 “the enemy within subverts community,” “the individual 
asserts his uniqueness in opposition to the undifferentiated society,” “woman goes 
mad due to her loneliness” 394  or the Freudian interpretation of the Oedipus 
story.395 Indeed, the last one is suggested even by the narrator itself: reporting on 
Emily’s clinging to her father’s dead body, to her denial of her father’s death, the 
narrator states that “we knew that with nothing left, she would have to cling to 
that which had robbed her, as people will” (124).396 The abstract level is embodied 
in Emily’s view as the Lady Aristocrat, as a representative “of those august 
names” (119), as “a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of hereditary obligation 
upon the town” (119).  
In keeping with the circumscribed nature of collective memory by a 
specific group, schematic narrative templates “are provided by a sociocultural 
context.”397 Hence the gothic quality of the narrative that generates the specific 
narrative “organized around particular dates, settings, and actions” of an old 
spinster with a grotesque body, living in a decrepit, grotesque house “decorated 
with cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies in the heavily lightsome style of 
the seventies” (119) made even more grotesque by its “industrial” surroundings, 
who kills her lover and keeps his body in a death/bridal chamber to lay with his 
corpse in a bed: “A thin, acrid pall as of the tomb seemed to lie everywhere upon 
this room decked and furnished as for a bridal” (129). All the concrete details of 
the short story serve to flesh out the skeleton of the narrative, the schematic 
narrative template into a specific narrative. Since the narrative also fleshes out 
                                                 
393 See Perry 344. 
394 The implied obverse of this sexually biased template reads something like “a man would never 
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Emily’s madness two times: when it reports “[w]e did not say she was crazy then” (124) and when 
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house (or body).” Holland 8. In his psychoanalytical reading of the short story, this template 
acquires meanings of anal erotism and coprophilia. See Holland. 
396 For argument’s sake, I present the version of “what happened” suggested by the narrative and 
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would rather stress the relationship of Emily and the narrator. Thus, the following “summary” 
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watched for a long time by a narrator-group curious to know every detail of her appearance, 
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397 Wertsch, “Collective Memory” 139. 
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Emily, there is a parallel between the grotesqueness of Emily’s body and the 
grotesqueness of the (body of the) narrative. 
Thus, the community in “A Rose for Emily” (re)collecting its identity 
from a collectively remembered account of the past constitutes Wertsch’s “textual 
community.” Wertsch observes that “the simple existence of a text guarantees 
nothing about the existence of a textual community. Interpretive and social 
processes surrounding the text are also required. […] Thus a textual community is 
a collective whose thought and action are grounded in written texts.”398 Though in 
this conception what guarantees the perpetuation of the text is its fixed written 
existence, this is guaranteed in “A Rose for Emily” by the telling and possible 
repetition of the oral narrative. Moreover, the orality makes no difference because, 
as Wertsch continues to observe “[s]ome members of a textual community may 
not have even read the text, but by participating in the activities of a textual 
community, they can have the access to the textual material around which the 
group is organized.”399 
However, I argue that the community of “A Rose for Emily” is not 
generally textual, but specifically narrative. “Text” is too general a term 
encompassing various types of texts with various functions. Even though Wertsch 
focuses specifically on historical texts,400 even there is an important distinction to 
be made since narrative as opposed to other types of historical texts (annals, 
chronicles) brings with it an added value. As Hayden White observes “every 
historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralize the 
events of which it treats”401  and generalizes this observation: “Where, in any 
account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a 
moralizing impulse is present too.” 402  This is precisely what the “official” 
narrative of “A Rose for Emily” does in the name of its pedagogical function of 
instilling the community’s ideology in the story’s hearers/readers. The moral: any 
deviation (in both senses) from “our” standards is a perversion; if one is not like 
“us,” one “is, or is worth as much as a murderer”. 
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4.4.2 Identity Form(ul)ation: Disrupted Boundaries and Erected 
Symbols  
Romine’s reflexive moment is a sign of a crisis. It comes at a juncture when a 
community is threatened, besieged by enemies without and engulfed by enemies 
within: “The reflexive moment represents as well a formal crisis – that is to say, 
the relationship between narrative form and ideology is frequently made 
problematic at this crucial juncture.”403 In “A Rose for Emily,” the external threat 
is represented by modernity whose symptoms, in the form of “garages,” “cotton 
wagons” and “gasoline pumps,” obliterate and encroach Miss Emily, her house 
and “the august names of that neighborhood” (119). Cash observes that in the 
South the “identification of Yankee and modern ideology” lead to “the notion of 
the two as one and inseparable” which generated “the South’s fear and anger and 
pride to the repudiation of Yankee thought.”404 As a Yankee thought, modernity is 
coming from the outside of the community boundary. 
Modernity threatens also from within with “the next generation, with its 
more modern ideas” (120); the tone of this description being one of scorn. These 
ideas are the tax demand on Emily, postal service and paving the sidewalks. 
Another threat disrupting the community from within is the already registered 
violations of the heterosexual imperative. These disruptions come truly from 
within since they are embodied in the system, so to speak: they are the collateral 
damage produced by the perpetuation of the communal ideology. They represent 
the repressed, the sphere of abjection that returns with a revenge.  
The community battles these threats by strengthening its sense of 
identity and, thus, strengthening its cohesion through the narrative about Miss 
Emily Grierson. Narrative is especially convenient as a means of social cohesion: 
“The pleasure derived from such reminiscing has a great deal to do with our social 
nature; bonds between people, formed in shared experience, demand renewing 
through the telling.”405  Not only does the act of telling serve the purpose of 
bonding, but also the narrative itself is imbued with a story aiming at generating 
“the ‘we’ of affirmation”:  
No society can survive, I contend, or ought to survive, if it cannot generate 
the “we” of affirmation: the assertion of itself as entitled to its land and 
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institutions, inheriting them from its ancestors and passing them on. This 
affirmative “we” does not express a contract among living members, but 
precisely the refusal to be limited by contract. It involves an invocation of 
ancestors and progeny, as implicated in our present acts. It is the principal 
way in which the community represents (or “imagines”) itself as enduring 
through time: by deriving its rights and duties from circumstances that were 
never chosen, and from bonds that are irrevocable since absent generations, 
who cannot consent to their renegotiation, are nevertheless as much bound 
by them as we.406  
 As Cohen observes, “[c]hange in structural forms is matched by a 
symbolic recreation of the distinctive community through myth, ritual and a 
‘constructed’ tradition.”407 The community under “attack” of modernity turns to 
an establishment of its boundaries by narrative means, by constructing a myth in 
which its norms, beliefs and actions can be valued in opposition to the “other.” As 
Cohen further elucidates, “the greater the pressure on communities to modify their 
structural forms to comply more with those elsewhere, the more are they inclined 
to reassert their boundaries symbolically […] In other words, as the structural 
bases of boundary become blurred, so the symbolic bases are strengthened 
through ‘flourishes and decorations’, ‘aesthetic frills’ and so forth.”408 This is why 
Emily, as a symbol, becomes the focus of the community, the focus of the 
narrative. 
Scott Romine, who sees community also as a symbolic construct,409 
maintains, expressing the oppositional nature of community identity, that 
“community is enabled by practices of avoidance, deferral, and evasion […] 
community relies not on what is there so much as what is, by tacit agreement, not 
there.”410  Romine then observes “three conditions or techniques of deferral – 
                                                 
406 Scruton 290-291. 
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drawing boundaries, imagining structures, and creating images.”411 The last one is 
the most pertinent one as it aptly formulates Emily’s status in the community: 
In many ways the least tangible element of community, an image permits a 
mimetic orientation in which the positive attributes of community 
(cohesiveness, order, stability, interdependence, and so on) are lent a kind of 
iconic integrity or, to put the matter another way, are displaced into things. 
The community’s icon permits a way of thinking about community that 
effaces its status as thinking, since the community appears in this 
configuration as an object there to be perceived rather than as the product of 
collective or quasi-collective projection.412 
The narrative does not evince an overt elaboration upon the social 
structure of the community, because it displaces this structure as implied into its 
constructed image, the icon of Emily. As Halbwachs puts it, “if a truth is to be 
settled in the memory of a group it needs to be presented in the concrete form of 
an event, of a personality, or of a locality.”413 But Emily is not a straightforward 
icon. She embodies a tension since she is invested with the positive attributes of 
the community by being portrayed as divine – as an idol she is the means by 
which the community coheres –, and, at the same time, she is invested with 
negative attributes by being portrayed as a murderess – she is the one violating the 
cohesion of the community (see below). Another important aspect is that the 
fashioning of the community as “an object there to be perceived” is a crafted 
illusion: the narrator displaces the community’s ideology into Emily and 
“pretends” to tell a simply story of horror. Thus the “collective projection” is 
offered under the guise of entertainment. 
Therefore, in terms of collective memory, Emily instantiates Pierre 
Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire, sites of memory. Having a myriad of forms – 
museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, monuments etc. – 
“[l]ieux de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, 
that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize 
celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no 
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longer occur naturally.” 414 In sites of memory, memory is being externalized, 
deposited materially outside the self so that it can be engaged at will without the 
“burden” of “carrying it around.”415 
Halbwachs observes that “[g]eneral history starts only when tradition 
ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up. So long as a remembrance 
continues to exist, it is useless to set it down in writing or otherwise fix it in 
memory.”416 Drawing on Halbwachs, Nora posits sites of memory at a juncture, at 
a moment when collective memory passes and changes into history: “The moment 
of lieux de mémoire occurs at the same time that an immense and intimate fund of 
memory disappears, surviving only as a reconstituted object beneath the gaze of 
critical history.”417 The very existence of the narrative of “A Rose for Emily” 
reflects this shift: the need to produce the narrative stems from the fading of the 
cultural conditions in which Emily’s status and the identity of the community 
have been taken for granted.  
The crisis, the invasion of modernity into the community changes these 
conditions and disables the natural, everyday remembering serving the 
(self)assertion of identity and, thus, necessitates the construction of a monument, a 
memorial to commemorate the past: the narrative of “A Rose for Emily” and 
Emily herself. Interestingly, Schudson observes the moralizing effect of 
memorialization in terms similar to White’s: “Turning something into a 
monument or memorial changes the past in that very process. Memorialization 
moralizes the past, creates out of a chronicle a tradition.”418 The transient moment 
of memory changing into history corresponds to a cultural shift and, thus, to the 
community gradually passing into modernity in the short story: Nora laments “the 
disappearance of peasant culture, that quintessential repository of collective 
memory whose recent vogue as an object of historical study coincided with the 
apogee of industrial growth.”419 Interestingly for my interpretation, Nora connects 
the transition from a mythical time of memory, from a rural community to the 
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progressive time of history, to the modern industrial society with the emergence 
of self-consciousness.420 
The sites of memory have a double existence, concrete and abstract: 
“Lieux de mémoire are simple and ambiguous, natural and artificial, at once 
immediately available in concrete sensual experience and susceptible to the most 
abstract elaboration. Indeed, they are lieux in three senses of the word: material, 
symbolic, and functional. […] the three aspects always coexist.”421 Emily as a 
human being is material. In fact, the materiality of her body is palpable to the 
point of grotesque: “[…] what would have been plumpness in another was obesity 
in her. She looked bloated, like a body long submerged in motionless water, and 
of that pallid hue. Her eyes, lost in the fatty ridges of her face, looked like two 
small pieces of coal pressed into a lump of dough […]” (121). 
Emily’s symbolic dimension is her status as a Southern lady. This status 
is expressed concretely in Emily’s position as “the high and mighty” Grierson 
above “the gross and teeming world” (122). Interestingly, this description comes 
before the scene where four men set out to sprinkle lime on Emily’s grounds in 
order to extinguish the smell her neighbors have complained about. Thus, the 
statement of Emily’s elevated position is subsequently translated into a concrete 
event and conveyed as a concrete, though symbolically charged image:  
Four men crossed Miss Emily’s lawn and slunk about the house like 
burglars, sniffing along the base of the brickwork and at the cellar openings 
[…] As they recrossed the lawn, a window that had been dark was lighted 
and Miss Emily sat in it, the light behind her, and her upright torso 
motionless as that of an idol. They crept quietly across the lawn and into the 
shadow of the locusts that lined the street. (122-123) 
Emily’s function is a signpost of community identity, a mirror in which the 
social structure reflects with its entire ideological appendage. The religious 
imagery by means of which Emily is described points to her function as a mirror 
to the community, a pillar in relation to which the community can formulate its 
identity: “Now and then we would see her in one of the downstairs windows […] 
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like the carven torso of an idol in a niche, looking or not looking at us, we could 
never tell which” (128).422  
4.4.3 Emily and the Narrator: Totem and Taboo 
Though I have observed that the discourse is a result of presenting an act of 
memory, I have not really accounted for the ending: why is the “shocking” 
revelation with “the extra turn of the screw of horror”423 preserved for the very 
end? One of the motivations is very prosaic. As Iwona Irwin-Zarecka observes, a 
“ʻgood story,’ in the parlance of television producers, has a much better chance of 
entering collective memory.”424 It seems to me that with its “flashback” structure 
and climactic ending, “A Rose for Emily” constitutes a very good story, even “in 
the parlance of television producers.” After all, narrativization of the past, of 
memory aims at producing “good stories”: “Narrativization is an effort not only to 
report the past but to make it interesting. Narratives simplify.” 425  The other 
motivation strikes at the very core of the short story and the theme of community 
and collective memory. 
In her function providing the community with a possibility for identity 
form(ul)ation, Emily functions, to an extent, as a totem. In his Totem and Taboo, 
Sigmund Freud gives the following definition of a totem:  
It is as a rule an animal (whether edible and harmless or dangerous and 
feared) and more rarely a plant or a natural phenomenon (such as rain or 
water), which stands in a peculiar relation to the whole clan. In the first 
place, the totem is the common ancestor of the clan; at the same time it is 
their guardian spirit and helper, which sends them oracles and, if dangerous 
to others, recognizes and spares its own children. Conversely, the clansmen 
are under a sacred obligation (subject to automatic sanctions) not to kill or 
destroy their totem and to avoid eating its flesh (or deriving benefit from it 
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in other ways). The totemic character is inherent, not in some individual 
animal or entity, but in all the individuals of a given class.426 
Disregarding that totems are “as a rule” animals, one can say that Emily is 
the common ancestor of the community, the “clan” in the sense that the narrator 
and thus the community define their identity based on their “originary” narrative. 
“A Rose for Emily” begins with death and thus constitutes an inversion of the 
“originary” narrative. Emily is also the common ancestor of the clan as she 
symbolizes the aristocratic past from which the community has sprung not being 
itself exclusively aristocratic anymore. That the totemic character is inherent in all 
the individuals “of a given class” is important: it puts, in different words, the 
dynamics of the community’s identity construction through Emily. 
The narrative is generated by the crisis of the community which narrates 
its inverted “originary” narrative featuring the death of a god, the last god of the 
old gods: Emily joins the august names on the graveyard. Heller, connecting the 
denial of sexuality and death, both embodied by Emily in her lack of suitors and 
her denial of her father’s death, with the idea of the essential difference inherent 
in the ideology of class distinctions, observes the “aristocratic fantasy, one that 
explains the aristocratic immunity from death: one does not feel sexual desire 
because one’s own origin is asexual, the miraculous birth of a god, which 
establishes one’s difference in kind from those who are biologically created and 
which allows the evasion of the end of biological organisms.”427 
 The sacred obligation against various interactions with the totem is 
reflected in Emily’s isolation in her house. Nobody comes near her since her 
father will not allow it: “We had long thought of them as a tableau, Miss Emily a 
slender figure in white in the background, her father a spraddled silhouette in the 
foreground, his back to her and clutching a horsewhip, the two of them framed by 
the back-flung front door” (123). After his death, contacts of the community with 
Emily are also restricted: the tax deputation visits her, but she “vanquished them, 
horse and foot, just as she had vanquished their fathers thirty years before about 
the smell” (121); interestingly, the “smell deputation” doesn’t even come into 
contact with Emily, the men just “slunk about the house like burglars” (122); only 
when her father dies, the community accesses the house, but only when Emily 
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“broke down” (124). For the rest of the narrative, until Emily dies, only Tobe 
connects Emily with the outside world. 
This isolation, especially in the form of Emily’s father, sheds an 
interesting light on her as a totem. Freud observes that totemism is related to 
“exogamy,” which is “a law against persons of the same totem having sexual 
relations with one another and consequently against their marrying.” 428 
Commenting on the tableau of Miss Emily and her father, Allen points out that the 
father’s inhibition works two ways and inverts the exogamy connected with 
totemism: “Mr. Grierson’s prohibition is a curious inversion of the law of the 
father; it forbids not incest but exogamy. Straddling the doorway, Emily’s father 
not only blocks access to her; he prevents her from leaving. Behind the closed 
doors of the house, Emily’s romantic involvements are limited to an incestuous 
fixation on her father.”429 Once again, Emily functions as an inverted totem.  
Emily serves as a totem also in another sense. Freud relates totemism to 
child neuroses; in his view, both share “complete identification with [the] totem 
animal and [an] ambivalent emotional attitude to it.”430 In her perceptive analysis 
of the short story, Ruth Sullivan analyzes the narrator as a child:  
As for what Miss Emily means to the narrator, why he should take her rather 
than someone else as his object of curiosity, that must be answered in two 
ways: on the manifest story level she is a high-born and eccentric citizen to 
curious neighbors. On this level the term “voyeur” to describe the narrator is 
inappropriate. On the latent level, she is a mother to a child. […] But I am 
not saying the narrator is her child, only that he is a child - and not 
chronologically but psychically: his psychic development is infantile. Nor 
am I saying that Miss Emily is anyone's mother. She is a mother figure. For 
reasons not given in the story the narrator makes Miss Emily assume this 
role.431 
Freud observes that in child neuroses, in case of males, the totem animal is 
substituted by the father.432 Though Emily is a woman and assumes the role of the 
mother in the narrator’s eyes, the focus on her, rather than on some man is given 
by her central position in the social matrix of the community. Freud himself 
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provides another reason for the focus on Emily: “Psycho-analysis has taught us 
that a boy’s earliest choice of objects for his love is incestuous and that those 
objects are forbidden ones—his mother and his sister.”433 The narrator might be 
seen as choosing Emily, in a sense, as an object of love. Firstly, I have observed 
that some critics see the narrator as Emily’s former suitor. Secondly, the forbidden 
relationship is symbolically consummated at the end of the narrative by the act of 
the community’s, that is, the narrator’s penetration of Emily’s house.  
Also, Emily’s aristocratic pedigree seen as god-like and the religious 
imagery play their role. Accordingly, Sullivan observes Emily’s godlike status for 
the narrator: 
He sees her as godlike, defying all merely human laws, institutions, and 
relationships, for she will not pay taxes or allow numbers and a mailbox to 
be affixed to her house, she resists allowing her father to be buried, she does 
not even marry as normal people do. And she commits murder almost under 
the eyes of a town that (we feel) should have known eventually why she 
bought that arsenic. She takes human life and no human law stops or 
punishes her for it. Godlike, she lives in a “timeless meadow” for she also 
defies superhuman forces of time and death. […] she never does become 
fully humanized and the town never loses its fear of her. She is always 
unapproachable. […] She is rather like a goddess in her temple, cool and 
unapproachable and vaguely frightening, and like so many terrible mythical 
goddesses, she chooses a man of lower station, has an affair with him, and 
then kills him to gratify her own needs. To see someone as godlike is to see 
that person the way a child sees a parent; in the case of Miss Emily, a 
particularly distant, unapproachable, and frightening parent.434 
 Seeing Emily as having some similar aspects to a totem might imply that I 
am designating the community of Jefferson as a totemic tribe. I am not; however, 
if I was, I would not lack support. Once again, Cash provides an interesting 
observation on the Southern society: 
The final great result of Reconstruction we have to consider in this chapter 
[…] is that it established what I have called the savage ideal […] Here, 
under pressure of what was felt to be a matter of life and death, was that old 
line between what was Southern and what was not, etched, as it were, in fire 
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and carried through every department of life. Here the ideas and loyalties of 
the apotheosized past fused into the tightest coherence and endowed with all 
the binding emotional and intellectual power of any tribal complex of the 
Belgian Congo.435 
The duality of Emily’s portrayal both as divine, the “high and mighty” 
Grierson and perverse is characteristic of the concept of taboo which remarkably 
fits Emily on several levels:  
The meaning of ‘taboo’, as we see it, diverges in two contrary directions. To 
us it means, on the one hand, ‘sacred’, ‘consecrated’, and on the other 
‘uncanny’, ‘dangerous’, ‘forbidden’, ‘unclean’. The converse of ‘taboo’ in 
Polynesian is ‘noa’, which means ‘common’ or ‘generally accessible’. Thus 
‘taboo’ has about it a sense of something unapproachable, and it is 
principally expressed in prohibitions and restrictions. Our collocation ‘holy 
dread’ would often coincide in meaning with ‘taboo’.436 
 Like totem, taboo is distinguished by isolation. Freud observes that behind 
the various taboo prohibitions in various societies, “there seems to be something 
in the nature of a theory that they are necessary because certain persons and things 
are charged with a dangerous power, which can be transferred through contact 
with them, almost like an infection.” 437  Importantly, the power of taboo is 
gradable, “[t]he quantity of this dangerous attribute also plays a part. Some people 
or things have more of it than others and the danger is actually proportional to the 
difference of potential of the charges.”438 Thus, while Emily is inaccessible to the 
members of the community, both in physical contact and in terms of the observed 
epistemological boundaries of the narrator, one person plays an intermediary, 
possessing more taboo than the others: “After her father’s death she went out very 
little; after her sweetheart went away, people hardly saw her at all. A few of the 
ladies had the temerity to call, but were not received, and the only sign of life 
about the place was the Negro man – a young man then – going in and out with a 
market basket” (122). 
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 Freud notes that “[t]he source of taboo is attributed to a peculiar magical 
power which is inherent in persons and spirits”439: the “magical power” in the 
short story is the social position in the community. Emily and Tobe are both 
taboos as they are at the polar opposites in terms of social hierarchy. Sharing a 
radical nature of their respective social statuses, both provide the community with 
means of drawing its boundaries – Emily by standing at the centre, Tobe by 
standing beyond the community and forming its “other.” Tobe thus provides the 
community with the possibility of identity form(ul)ation in negative terms, in 
Romine’s words “by what is not there”. Cash sees the defining role of the 
“Negro” as exclusive to the South and wonders “[w]as there ever another instance 
of a country in which the relation of master and man arose, negligible exceptions 
aside, only with reference to a special alien group.”440  
 Like totem, taboo is related by Freud to obsessional neurosis, and he notes 
that “[a]s in the case of taboo, the principal prohibition, the nucleus of the 
neurosis, is against touching.” 441  Freud registers “the subject’s ambivalent 
attitude” to the tabooed object:  
He is constantly wishing to perform this act (the touching) […] and detests it 
as well. The conflict between these two currents cannot be promptly settled 
because […] they are localized in the subject’s mind in such a manner that 
they cannot come up against each other. The prohibition is noisily conscious, 
while the persistent desire to touch is unconscious and the subject knows 
nothing of it.442  
This tension regarding the touching, in other words, coming into contact443 with 
Emily explains the narrator’s obsessive gaze registering Emily’s every movement 
during the majority of her life.  
 As Freud continues his analysis, the obsessional acts serve as a release of 
the tension between the prohibition and the urge to do what has been prohibited 
and notes the “law of neurotic illness that these obsessive acts fall more and more 
under the sway of the instinct and approach nearer and nearer to the activity which 
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was originally prohibited.” 444  By obsessively watching Emily, the narrator 
straddles the line: it does not touch her, but does the next best thing by which it 
expresses the desire to touch, to come into contact with. The short story shows the 
gradual approach nearer the prohibited activity: the touching in the form of a 
symbolic incestuous sexual violation of a corpse. The amount of perversion of this 
act is commensurable to the amount of repression preceding the act.  
Emily, constituting a taboo, violates herself several taboos. Firstly, she has 
an affair with “a foreman named Homer Barron, a Yankee” (124) which is 
obviously a problem to some: “But there were still others, older people, who said 
that even grief could not cause a real lady to forget noblesse oblige – without 
calling it noblesse oblige. They just said, ʻPoor Emily. Her kinsfolk should come 
to her’” (124-125). Explaining this passage, Towner and Carothers say that to the 
older people Emily is “apparently sexually involved with him [Homer]” and 
“stands in need of her kinfolks’ protection.”445 Emily consorts with the enemy.  
Her second violation of taboo, this time not only “moral,” but also legal, is 
the murder of Homer Barron:  
“Arsenic,” Miss Emily said. “Is that a good one?” […] “Why, of course,” 
the druggist said. “If that’s what you want. But the law requires you to tell 
what you are going to use it for.” 
Miss Emily just stared at him, her head tilted back in order to look him 
eye for eye, until he looked away and went and got the arsenic and wrapped 
it up. (125-126) 
 The last taboo (in terms of the discourse of the narrative, literally last) that 
Emily violates, at least it is suggested, is necrophilia: 
The man himself lay in the bed. […] The body had apparently once lain in 
the attitude of an embrace, but now the long sleep that outlasts love, that 
conquers even the grimace of love, had cuckolded him. […] Then we 
noticed that in the second pillow was the indentation of a head. One of us 
lifted something from it, and leaning forward, that faint and invisible dust 
dry and acrid in the nostrils, we saw a long strand of iron-gray hair. (130)446 
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Indeed, as I have observed, necrophilia, symbolically, is what the community 
achieves. The act of penetrating Emily’s house at her funeral constitutes 
metonymically penetration of Emily herself: at the end, the community, the 
“obsessional neurotic” commits what has been prohibited.  
The community’s intervention into Emily’s relationship with Homer can 
be also explained in these terms. As Freud observes, “[a]nyone who has violated a 
taboo becomes taboo himself because he possesses the dangerous quality of 
tempting others to follow his example: why should he be allowed to do what is 
forbidden to others? Thus he is truly contagious in that every example encourages 
imitation, and for that reason he himself must be shunned.”447 Using the Baptist 
minister and Emily’s blood-kin to dissuade her from her relationship with Homer 
are acts attempting to deny Emily her forbidden fruit as it constitutes a danger to 
the community – not only by disrupting the community by an assertion of 
individuality, but also by providing a temptation:  
If one person succeeds in gratifying the repressed desire, the same desire is 
bound to be kindled in all the other members of the community. In order to 
keep the temptation down, the envied transgressor must be deprived of the 
fruit of his enterprise; and the punishment will not infrequently give those 
who carry it out an opportunity of committing the same outrage under colour 
of an act of expiation.448 
The text presents the community’s interventions into Emily’s affairs 
overtly as trying to prevent her from what the community deems as threatening. 
Thus, the only motivation for the intervention is the protection of the communal 
integrity. This corresponds to Freud’s observation that “[t]he obsessional act is 
ostensibly a protection against the prohibited act; but actually, in our view, it is a 
repetition of it. The ‘ostensibly’ applies to the conscious part of the mind, and the 
‘actually’ to the unconscious part.”449 It is thus fitting that the “actual” motivation, 
the repetition of the transgression, is unvoiced and is only implied in the 
community’s final penetration of Emily’s house, it is left for interpretation. 
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The emotional ambivalence from which the obsessional acts constitute a 
release is reflected in the linguistic ambivalence attached to taboo: “‘Taboo’ is 
itself an ambivalent word; and one feels on looking back that the well-attested 
meaning of the word should alone have made it possible to infer—what has 
actually been arrived at as a result of extensive researches—that the prohibitions 
of taboo are to be understood as consequences of an emotional ambivalence.”450 
Emily’s ambivalence as a character corresponds to the ambivalence of taboo. 
Allen observes the profoundness of Emily’s ambivalence: “Both grotesquely fat 
and excessively thin, living and dead, female and male, Miss Emily is, finally, 
ʻundecidable,’ the copresence of opposites. Evading basic distinctions, she is that 
most gothic of figures: the compound being.”451 
As a compound being, Emily is exemplifies “the conception of man in 
Faulkner’s works [that] is marked by the figure of the oxymoron.”452 Indeed, the 
two views of Emily constructed in the story, corresponding to the meanings of 
taboo – Emily as “high and mighty” and as perverse – are part of Emily’s 
oxymoronic nature. Perry observes that 
“A Rose for Emily” is not a pure inverted story, of the type which starts by 
constructing a certain central frame only to substitute for it, in the light of 
new information, an inverse frame. Its sophisticated rhetoric is designed to 
prevent the inversion of the story from being complete. The ambivalent 
attitude towards Emily, which includes an image of her as an impressive 
person, is not simply cancelled at the end of the story, even when the murder 
is revealed.453  
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Thus, at the end of the story, “the murder will not be seen only as the 
insane act of a jilted woman, but also as the act of a woman of extraordinary 
mental strength who moulds her own life”454 and “[t]he primacy effect is therefore 
not completely obliterated.”455 Though the two opposing meanings of taboo are 
simultaneous, in the short story, the two constructs of Emily are submitted to the 
operation of primacy effect. This is, of course, due to the linear nature of narrative, 
of linguistic signs, because of which one view of Emily necessarily must come 
first. Interestingly, the two views of Emily correspond to the working of the 
narrative itself. Skinner, commenting on the structure of the narrative, aptly 
observes that  
in terms of suzhet, she may be represented as a grand old Southern lady; in 
the context of fabula she is little more than an unusual clinical case, a 
psychopath and necrophiliac who has committed a gruesome crime […] the 
ugly banality of Emily's existence is the fabula presented in all the allure of 
colorful suzhet.456  
The division of various views of Emily on the planes of suzhet and fabula 
is, in other words, what Perry has observed in his analysis of the primacy effect: 
“We are witness here to a technique recurring in the story: information that 
depreciates the value of Emily is introduced into a context that specifically 
subordinates it to her aristocratic pride.”457  The two views correspond to the 
linguistic ambivalence of taboo: the concept serves as an apt characterization of 
Emily’s function and significance in the short story. The reason why the shocking 
revelation is withheld to the very end is motivated not only by the intended impact 
of the narrative on the narratee, on the reader/listener of the story. The revelation 
of Homer’s murder is part of the construction of Emily as “perverse.” The 
narrative presentation of this framework submits to the primacy effect operating 
in “A Rose for Emily” and is thus presented as second(ary). Thus, “revealing” 
Emily’s crime at the very end is leading the primacy effect to its logical 
conclusion. The final scene is postponed, like the framework of Emily as perverse, 
both on the story (fabula) and the discourse (suzhet) levels of the narrative: it 
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comes chronologically after Emily’s death, as the last event of the fabula and it 
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It is a question of the form of attention we choose to bestow; of our 
willingness to see that in reading according to restricted codes we 
disregard as noise what, if read differently, patiently, would make 
another and rarer kind of sense. And the text, almost with “cynicism,” 
tells us what is there, confident that we shall ignore it.458 
5. Conclusion  
Skinner’s observation on the multiplicity of meanings the characters of “A Rose 
for Emily” lend themselves to suggests an important aspect of the short story. 
Despite almost eighty years of criticism, Faulkner’s most famous short story 
remains elusive. This elusiveness is inherent in the text: in its vague pronoun 
references, in the ambiguity of Emily’s character, in the various lacunae in the 
fabula resulting from the narrator’s limited knowledge, and, as a consequence of 
this limitation, from the suggestions and suppositions the narrator presents as facts. 
Regarding the information given about Emily and her supposed crime, Heller 
observes that “[t]hese apparently conflicting cues are arranged so that as our 
suspicion of the truth about Emily grows, one set confirms and the other allays 
those suspicions. […] Our suspended judgment is never allowed to settle 
itself.”459 
 I have already suggested that the lacunae in the “factual” basis of the 
narrative open possibilities of alternative versions of the story; such as the 
relationship between Emily and Tobe. Commenting on the ambiguity of the final 
scene, Heller provides one such alternative:  
The final scene stubbornly refuses to resolve the conflicting responses that 
have been cultivated in the reader throughout the story. […] In fact, the 
narrator teasingly encourages the reader to doubt the relation. The 
monogram on the silver is obscured. The body is not identified, nor is it in 
an attitude to indicate a violent death from arsenic. It is possible that Homer 
and Emily lived together in the house, secretly of course, for several years. 
Such a suggestion seems absurd, but the very fact that it can be defended 
illustrates how little we really learn in the climactic scene.460 
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 Emily lacks explanation.461 As a narrative and ideological construct of the 
narrator, Emily doesn’t need explanation, because she exists to serve a purpose: 
she is an important symbol serving the identity claims of the community and, thus, 
she is the pedagogical tool perpetuating the community’s ideology. The narrative 
of the past produced in the interest of the present and future registers a tension in 
which the “official” narrative recollecting identity by implying in Emily the 
values, norms and beliefs of the community is pervaded by irruptions of the 
“other,” of the sphere outside of the community boundary. The narrative is a 
direct product of the threat of impending modernity because it is a means of, an 
attempt at containing that threat. As Romine observes, “the communal boundary 
marks not merely an already ordered social space, but a space inside of which 
order can and must be actively maintained. The communal boundary, then, tends 
to define the limits of social responsibility and social agency.”462 
 The collective narrator imposes a meaning upon the past which it erects as 
a mirror to reflect its identity. It is the community that is the source of the 
narrative of “A Rose for Emily”. Firstly, the community is the source of the 
narrative in a broad sense by infusing the narrative with certain norms, beliefs, 
and values and, thus, specific actions that follow from the ideological basis of the 
community. Secondly, the community is the source of the narrative more 
specifically, as a communal narrator in the strong sense: a multiple, collective, 
non-distributive voice of “a different ontological order.” Drawing on Émile 
Durkheim, Romine provides a support for this claim observing that “[o]ne of 
several ironies of southern history is that something approaching mechanical 
solidarity, in which, as Durkheim says, ʻthe individual consciousness is almost 
indistinct from the collective consciousness … [and] the individual has no sphere 
of action that is peculiarly his own,’ could exist in such a stratified and deeply 
divided culture.”463 
The view of the short story as an act of collective remembering explains 
both the use of we narration and of the achronic ordering of the narrative. Though 
positing an “unnatural” collective narrator might seem going too far to somebody, 
to use Skinner’s words regarding “A Rose for Emily,” “[s]tranger things are said 
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of this story in utter seriousness.”464 One such “strange” thing is, for me, the 
designation and treatment of the narrator as an individual. I do not claim that my 
interpretation is somehow better than other interpretations. I merely think that my 
reading makes a better interpretation than others according to the chosen “form of 
attention”. Other interpretations are obviously better regarding matters I have 
disregarded or only touched upon: Emily’s psychology, her motivation, the idea 
of time, questions of gender and sexuality, or the final scene and the telltale 
hair.465 Thus, my interpretation is complementary to those others. 
It seems significant that both the quite different aspects of the short story, 
the gothic dimension and the thematization of community and its (re)constitution 
are achieved by the same means: the vague use of collective pronouns creating a 
sense of an unseen, shadowy and almost omnipresent social/narrative agency. 
This collective agency both creates an intense atmosphere of prying which 
supports the gothic aspect and it is an apt portrayal of the community and its 
ideological dimension. The designation of Emily and her house as the “other” 
results from both aspects of the short story: it has its communal significance as 
well as its gothic necessity.  
I hope I have also shown the profitability of using narratology in 
approaching “A Rose for Emily” since it provides the appropriate framework for 
analyzing the short story. The unusual narration and the unusual structure of the 
short story can be both accounted for by applying narratological categories. The 
critics who observe the plural pronoun in reference to the narrator and claim the 
narrator’s individuality identifying him as an inhabitant of Jefferson miss the 
point of the short story. Such statements amount to dismissing Faulkner’s 
ingenuity and the aesthetic effects of his narrative.  
Faulkner is seen mainly as a novelist; his short stories are of secondary 
interest as well as importance, usually as complementary material to his novels. 
Hans Skei maintains that “Faulkner never learnt to write the well-rounded, slick, 
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and perfect story with its almost mechanical progression through crises towards a 
point which was intended to come as a surprise and give a twist to the story 
told.”466 For Skei, many of Faulkner’s short stories are unwritten novels: they “are 
a novelist’s short stories in the sense that many of them may be regarded as 
condensed and concentrated material for novels.”467  
Secondary to his novels, Faulkner’s short stories are also seen as 
secondary to other writers’ short stories. Ferguson sees Faulkner’s importance in 
short fiction as lesser to his peers, for example, Hemingway. Nevertheless, 
Ferguson appreciates Faulkner’s achievement: “One of the most impressive things 
about Faulkner’s short fiction is its extraordinary range. […] we are struck by how 
much richer Faulkner’s achievement seems because of its diversity and variety, 
even though it is more uneven in quality.”468 
Probably every critic of Faulkner’s short fiction has his or her canon of 
Faulkner’s best short stories.  Howe seems to have set the number of these canons: 
according to him, Faulkner’s oeuvre “contains a half-dozen brilliant pieces of 
writing and another dozen reasonably good ones; but it does not persuade one that 
Faulkner, the story writer, is nearly as important or original as Faulkner, the 
novelist.”469 Since the various canons are more or less the same, Ferguson’s can 
provide an example: “His very best stories – ʻRed Leaves,’ ʻThat Evening Sun,’ 
ʻA Justice,’ ʻDry September,’ ʻMule in the Yard,’ ʻBarn Burning’ – are 
technically virtually flawless.”470  
Though “A Rose for Emily” is considered one of Faulkner’s better short 
stories – it occurs as either one of the “half-dozen brilliant” or one of the “dozen 
reasonably good ones” –, its reputation has so far depended largely on its gothic 
quality, on the failure or success to surprise: “Simply as a story, ʻA Rose for 
Emily’ may seem too dependent on its climax of shock, particularly in its hair-
raising final sentence.”471 Indeed, the horror of the short story has been evaluated 
as more than successful: “A little shocker, an exercise in Southern gothic which 
simultaneously defines the mode of Southern gothic, replaces its predecessors and 
                                                 
466 Skei, William Faulkner 15. Howe comments that Faulkner “shows his ability to handle a genre 
for which he is not naturally suited.” Howe 261. 
467 Skei, William Faulkner 25. 
468 Ferguson 84. 
469 Howe 262. 
470 Ferguson 147. 
471 Howe 265. 
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tops all subsequent attempts at its horror.”472  The short story has been variously 
interpreted in terms of gender, sex, history (reading the story as portraying the 
South and the hostility between South and North), psychoanalysis or the gothic 
genre, but one only has to consider the comments on the ending of the short story 
made by every critic to see that the “formal” aspects of the narrative are, to a large 
extent, valued in teleological terms.473  
By reading “A Rose for Emily” in different terms than other critics have 
done previously, I hope to have induced revaluation of the short story. Seeing “A 
Rose for Emily” as an instance of we narration with achronic structure, as an 
example of collective memory at work makes the story become rarer in terms not 
only of Faulkner’s oeuvre, but also in the context of its time. Ferguson, 
commenting on the achievement of Faulkner as a short story writer observes that 
“surely the most important single aspect of that achievement [is] his management 
of point of view.”474 In “A Rose for Emily,” Faulkner achieves a sustained use of 
a collective point of view of a collective narrator. Richardson traces the history of 
we narration to Conrad’s The Nigger of the Narcissus as “the first sustained 
example of ʻwe’ narration.”475  William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily,” as a 
successful fusion of collective narrative, the theme of community and presentation 
of collective memory, deserves a prominent status in this history as an early 
important contribution to the narrative technique and in Faulkner’s short fiction as 
a remarkable achievement. 
 
 
                                                 
472 Reed 18. Hagopian, Cunliffe and Dolch say that the ending of the story is shocking, though 
foreshadowed, and morbid “outdoing the likes of Poe and Jacobean dramatists.” Hagopian, 
Cunliffe and Dolch 80. Howe, for example, sees the shock as justified by the theme, he still sees 
the story as deficient. Howe 265. 
473 Indeed, Skei’s dismissal of Faulkner as a short story writer unable to write “the well-rounded, 
slick, and perfect story” is dependent on the teleological aspect of the genre: “One of the chief 
characteristics of the short story, whether told orally to an audience or written, seems thus to be its 
end-orientation. In a sense the structure of the short story implies that it will be completed at its 
conclusion; tensions are resolved, crises have passed and led to happiness or grief, characters have 
gone through decisive experiences and lost or won; and all this has been implied from the very 
beginning of the story […].” Skei 21. 
474 Ferguson 84. 
475 Richardson, Unnatural 41. 
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Abstrakt 
Tato diplomová práce poskytuje detailní analýzu nejslavnější povídky Williama 
Faulknera „Růže pro Emily.“ Zaměření práce je motivováno tím, co vidím jako 
ústřední téma povídky: komunita a její fungování. Tím, že posunuji důraz z hlavní 
postavy na vypravěče, chci „opravit“ způsob jakým je vnímána tato povídky, jejíž 
renomé je založeno především na „šokujícím“ či „gotickém“ aspektu.  
 Užitá metodologie je vybrána se zřetelem na navrhovanou interpretaci. 
K textu přistupuji skrze naratologii. K rozboru neobvyklého vypravěče „Růže pro 
Emily“ mi slouží naratologický koncept „kolektivního vyprávění.“ Dalším 
důležitým teoretickým rámcem použitým k interpretaci povídky je 
interdisciplinární koncept „kolektivní paměti“. Některé sociologické koncepty 
komunity jsou též rozebírány.  
 V úvodní kapitole se zabývám především konceptem „osoby“ ve 
vyprávění a argumentuji proti tradičnímu rozdělení na vyprávění v první a třetí 
osobě. V druhé kapitole poskytuji úvod do narativní techniky kolektivního 
vyprávění. Třetí kapitola je detailním čtením „Růže pro Emily“ v kontextu 
kolektivního vyprávění. Nejprve identifikuji vypravěče jako ve své podstatě 
kolektivního a vymezuji komunitu, ze které sestává tím, že se zabývám jeho 
epistemologickým ohraničením. Za druhé, strukturu vyprávění analyzuji jako 
„achronickou“ a spojuji ji s fungováním paměti. Za třetí, na základě předchozího 
docházím k závěru, že vyprávění „Růže pro Emily“ představuje akt kolektivního 
vzpomínání.   
 Ve čtvrté kapitole představuji koncept „kolektivní paměti“ a rozebírám 
„Růži pro Emily“ v jeho rámci. Tvrdím, že vyprávění představuje „silnou 
verzi“ kolektivní paměti. Také navrhuji motivaci pro vyprávění tohoto příběhu: 
komunita prochází krizí identity a vyprávění, které slouží ke zdůraznění jejích 
ideologických principů, funguje jako potvrzení hranic komunity a jejího obrazu o 
sobě. Závěrem se zabývám statusem Emily ve vztahu ke komunitě jako totemem a 
tabu.  
 
Klíčová slova: William Faulkner, „Růže pro Emily“, naratologie, kolektivní 
vyprávění, kolektivní paměť, komunita, Jih USA 
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Abstract 
This MA thesis provides a close analysis of William Faulkner’s most famous 
short story, “A Rose for Emily.” The focus the thesis is motivated by what I take 
to be the central theme of the short story: community and its functioning. Shifting 
the focus from the main character to the narrator, I want to “rectify” the 
perception of the short story which owns its renown largely to its “shocking” or 
“gothic” aspect.  
The utilized methodology is chosen with respect to the proposed 
interpretation. The prism through which the text is approached is narratology. To 
account for the peculiar narrator of “A Rose for Emily,” I use the narratological 
framework of “collective narrative” (“we narration”). Another important 
theoretical framework introduced in order to interpret the short story is the 
interdisciplinary concept of “collective memory.” Some sociological conceptions 
of community are discussed. 
In the introductory chapter, I mainly discuss the concept of person in 
narrative and argue against the traditional distinction between first and third 
person narratives. In the second chapter, I provide an introduction to the technique 
of collective narrative. The third chapter provides a close reading of “A Rose for 
Emily” in the context of collective narrative. Firstly, I identify the narrator as 
essentially collective and delimit the community from which it consists by 
considering its epistemological limits. Secondly, I analyze the structure of the 
narrative as “achronic” and relate it to the working of memory. Thirdly, based on 
the previous, I draw the conclusion that the narrative is a (re)presentation of an act 
of collective remembering.  
In the fourth chapter, I introduce the concept of “collective memory” and 
consider “A Rose for Emily” in its context. I argue that the narrative presents the 
“strong version” of collective memory. I also suggest the motivation for telling 
the story: the community undergoes an identity crisis and the narrative which 
serves to foreground its ideological basis serves as a confirmation of the 
community’s boundaries and its image of itself. Finally, I consider Emily’s status 
in relation to the community as a totem and as a taboo. 
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